should obtain such a title."* So, according to this, the pope can change the nature of things. Such is a specimen of true papal reasoning. Other specimens of similar character might be given. 9. It is here objected by the maintainers of the supremacy, "that divers councils asked the pope's consent for the ratification of their decrees." So the second general council, writing to Pope Damasus, say, "In which things, legally and canonically settled among us, we exhort your piety, to acquiesce with us, out of spiritual charity, and the fear of the Lord." So the Council of Chalcedon asked the confirmation of Pope Leo I.: "That you may know how that we have done nothing out of favour or spite, but as guided by the divine direction, we have made known to you the force of all that has been done, for your concurrence, and for the confirmation and approbation of the things done."+ Pope Leo II. says of the fifth general council, “That he agreed to what was determined in it, and confirms it with the authority of the blessed St. Peter."§ To the objection we reply, that it was the custom of all general councils, when they framed their decrees for the public good, to ask all Catholic bishops, who were absent, to give their attestation by subscription. So Constantine recommended the Nicene decrees to all bishops for their consent. So the Synod of Sardica, in their epistle to all bishops, say: "Brethren and fellow-ministers, use all diligence, as being present in spirit with our synod, to yield consent by your subscription, that concord may be preserved everywhere by all the fellowministers." So Pope Liberius requested the emperor Constantine, That the faith delivered at Nice might be confirmed by the subscription of all bishops." Athanasius "procured a synod at Alexandria, to confirm the decrees, at Sardica and in Palestine concerning him."** the Macedonian bishops are said to have authorized their agents to ratify the faith of consubstantiality.tt So Many such instances occur in history, from which it is manifest that the decrees of councils concerning matters of common interest were presented to all bishops, requesting, or even demanding as a matter of right their assent; because, as the Roman clergy declare, 66 a decree cannot be firm which has not the consent of many."‡‡ By asking the consent of absent bishops, they, in the absence of mails and the periodical press, promulgated their doings: they did it to maintain concord, to add authority to their decisions, to engage all bishops in observing their decisions, to have the testimony of all bishops to the truth, to edify the church, and secure good government. It is not therefore marvellous that councils should seek the approbation of so eminent a bishop as he of Rome was; that as every vote had force, his suffrage might aid in attesting the faith, and preserving discipline. The pope's confirmation of councils was, in effect, nothing more than a declaration of his approbation, adding another vote; as those who were present by their vote, and those who were absent by V, 9. + Theod., P. Leo II., ep. p. 306. Sard. Epist. apud Athan. in Apol ** Id., iv, 1. tt Socr., iv, 12. Baron. Ann. 553, sec. 224. ¶ Soz., iv, 11. Quoniam nec firmum decretum potest esse, quod non plurimorum videbitur habere consensum.-Cler. Rom. apud Cypr., ep. 31. their subscription, are said to confirm the decrees of councils, every such consent being supposed to increase the authority. Hence the number of bishops composing a council is sometimes reckoned according to the subscriptions of the absent bishops as well as the votes of those present. Thus the Council of Sardica is sometimes said to consist of three hundred bishops, although less than two hundred were present; the rest concurring by subscription to its definitions. The absent bishops, in yielding their consent, express it by, I confirm, I define, I decree. But the effectual and authoritative confirmation of general councils, which gave them the force of law, was in the hands of the emperors, and depended on their imperial sanction. So Justinian affirms in general terms: "All these things, at divers times successively, our forenamed predecessors, of pious memory, corroborated by their laws what each council had determined, and expelled those heretics who attempted to resist the definitions of the aforesaid four councils, and disturb the churches."t 10. It is objected, "That some councils have been rejected for want of the pope's confirmation." In support of this objection it is stated, that the decisions of the Council of Ariminum were null, because the bishop of Rome did not consent to them.‡ To the foregoing it may be answered: 1. That which is alleged against the Council of Ariminum, is not the want of the pope's consent after the session was over, but the want of his consent in the council. 2. The same objection every bishop might allege, as all had a common right and interest to be present, and vote in these assemblies. 3. The dissent of other bishops, particularly of eminent ones, is also alleged in exception; which would be needless, if the pope's dissent alone had been the principal thing. 4. The emperor, and many other bishops, knew of no peculiar necessity of his confirmation. 11. Again it may be objected, "Some popes have made void the decrees of general councils." Pope Leo I. endeavoured to invalidate the decrees of the Council of Chalcedon concerning the privileges of the Constantinopolitan see. The behaviour of Leo was, in this case, disorderly, factious, ar rogant, and schismatic, proceeding from ambition and jealousy. Such conduct, at length, overwhelmed the dignity and liberty of the Christian republic. Nevertheless, he did not ground his opposition to the decree of the council so much on his authority to annul its decisions, as upon the inviolable obligation of the Nicene canons, which he presumed no synod could abrogate or alter. Besides, his opposition was not regarded by the church. Furthermore, it is unreasonable, that the humour or opinion of one man, no wiser or better than others, and of the same office and order * Sententias fratrum omnes sequimur, omnes confirmamus, omnes observandas esse decernimus.-Conc. Rom., P. Hill., p. 579. + His itaque omnibus per diversa tempora subsecutis, prædicti recordationis nostri natres ea quæ in uno quoque concilio judicata sunt, legibus suis corrobo averunt, et confirmaverunt; et hæreticos qui definitionibus prædictorum S. quatuor conciliorum resistere, et ecclesias conturbare conati sunt, expulerunt.-Just. in Conc. v col. 1, p. Theodoret, ii, 22. 210. P. Leo I., ep. 55, ad Pulcher; Aug., ep. 61, ad Syn. Chalc., ep. 62, ad Max. Annoch. See Barrow on Supremacy, p. 312. with them, should be preferred to the common agreement of brethren It is absurd that he should have the power of overturning their decisions, as he possesses no right to do so, grounded on Scripture, ancient custom, or history. The Scripture says nothing of general councils. None were held for three hundred years after Christ; and in the early councils, no canon was made confirming the annulling power of the pope. In conformity to ancient custom, it is more reasonable that the pope should submit to the decision of his brethren, than that all his brethren should submit to him. And this was the judgment of the church, declared by its practice. V. The WILL of the pope, declared by way of precept or proclamation, concerning the SANCTION, ABROGATION, or DISPENSATION OF LAWS, is not of sovereign authority in the universal church. 1. This privilege, however, the pope challengeth to himself; asserting to his decrees and sentences the force and obligation of laws. And, indeed, the body of the canon law, whereby he governs the church, consists principally of papal edicts, or decretal epistles, imitating the rescripts of emperors, and claiming the same force. Take the following quotations from Benedict XIV., who was elected pope in the year 1740, and who is an oracle, even among popes. In his work on Synods he says, "Those constitutions are properly called canons which bind the whole church: such are those which emanate from the chief pontiff or a general council; because if the statute of a bishop be confirmed by the pope, and extended to the whole church, then it is properly called a canon, as it is now authorized by the pope." Again: "When, however, in this economy of the church, nothing occurs which takes its origin in natural or divine law, it hence follows that the pope, for any good and lawful cause, may dispense with constitutions of this kind." "The pope, uttering any thing contrary to any sanction of Trent, does not oppose the mind of that council, nor does he lose that supreme authority granted to him by Christ the Lord, of relaxing and changing, when necessary, any ecclesiastical law; but he rather uses that power on which the Council of Trent itself depends for the stability of its decisions." To the pope it belongs to declare, in what circumstances the divine precept ceases to oblige."§ To doubt concerning the power of the pope, after he hath dispensed, is sacrilegious. Because it would be the same as to disparage Christ, because he had not sufficiently provided for the church."|| 66 Ferraris, who is a faithful interpreter of Roman Catholic divinity, says, under the word Dispensatio, No. 20, " Nevertheless, the pope can interpret and declare the divine law, that it would not be obligatory in some cases under certain circumstances; viz., when, from the observance of the divine law, either something unjust would follow, or a greater good be prevented. Otherwise, when no recourse is had to God for interpretation, he would not be a good father of a family, (which must not be allowed on any account,) if he would leave his flock without a shepherd, who, in doubtful and important cases, would inter Canones, nomine solæ denotentur constitutiones, &c.-Bened. XIV. de Synod., lib. i, c. iii, sec. 3. + Cum tamen in hac, &c.-Id., lib. vi, c. viii, sec. 12. Id., lib. vii, c. vii, sec. 7. pret and declare the divine will, and thus consult for all citizens in necessary cases." We select the following declarations from Ferraris, on the word Papa, article ii, from the thirtieth to the thirty-second number: "The pope is of so great authority and power, that he can also modify, declare, or interpret the divine law." "The pope can sometimes counteract the divine law, by limiting, explaining," &c. "The pope can modify the divine law, since his power is not of man, but of God, and he supplies the place of God on earth, with ample power of binding and loosing; because God our Lord and Redeemer is said to do what his vicar does, provided he does nothing contrary to the faith." "The pope can interpret, and having cause, can limit the divine law, as all commonly teach." Let any one consult Gratian, and he will find a multitude of such declarations as those cited above, and of which we present specimens. "No person ought to have either the will or power to transgress the precepts of the apostolical see."t "We who, according to the plenitude of our power, have a right to dispense above law or right." Pope Agatho says, "Thus all the sanctions of the apostolical see are to be received, as confirmed by the voice of the divine Peter himself." Among the Maxims of Pope Gregory VII. we find the following: "The pope alone can make new laws.-No book is to be deemed canonical, but by his authority.-He is to be judged by no man." But this power is exercised by the pope by usurpation; as he has no ground for it in Scripture or by ancient practice. 2. Originally the church had no other sovereign except the one Lord. and one Lawgiver.|| 3. Anciently, besides the divine laws, before the first general councils, the church adopted certain customs for their government, which, in the time of this council, or A. D. 325, were called ancient customs. These customs were such as each church enacted in provincial synods; or which were received from one church to another by imitation and compliance. These customs in time became rules or laws; not of divine, but of human right. And hence, according to the usages of dif ferent churches, these customs varied; and hence a variety of usage in external order or discipline. The pope could not impose his customs or laws on any church; for such laws were not obligatory on any churches, except those who voluntarily adopted them. And those who did once adopt them, were at liberty to reject them when they saw fit. If the pope imposed his *Ferrar. in Dispensatio, No. 20. + Nulli fas est vel velle vel posse transgredi apostolicæ sedas præcepta.-P. Greg. IV., dist. xix, c. 5. Qui secundum plenitudinem potestatis, de jure possumus supra jus dispensare. P. Inn. III.; Decret. Greg., lib. iii, tit. 8, c. 4. Sic omnes apostolicae sedis sanctionis accipendæ sunt, tanquam ipsius divini Petri voce firmatæ sunt.-P. Agatho, dist. xix, c. 2. See Barrow, p. 314. Eph. iv, 5; James iv, 12. Apxaianon. Conc. Nic. i, can. 8; Conc. Const. i, can. 2. laws, he was liable to a repulse; as is manifest in the case of Pope Victor, when he would have reduced the churches of Asia to his will, in the time of celebrating Easter. In the time of Cyprian it was deemed tyrannical for one pastor to prescribe to another. "For none of us," says he, "makes himself a bishop of bishops, or by a tyrannical terror compels his colleagues to a necessity of obedience; since every bishop, according to the license of his own liberty and power, hath his own freedom, and can no more be judged by another than he himself can judge another."* If any new law were then introduced, it was done by the general consent of bishops or pastors, or a majority of them; to whom the rest generally yielded compliance. But the whole authority of such laws was founded on human consent. In 4. When the emperors became Christians a different custom prevailed. General councils were then instituted. The pope then had more influence than formerly, as having the Пporeta Tuns, the privilege of honour in ecclesiastical assemblies. Yet he had no casting vote, or negative above others, as all things passed by a majority of votes. the Acts of the fifth council we read, This is a thing to be granted, that in councils, we must not regard the interlocution of one or two, but those things which are commonly defined by all, or by most." In the sixth council, George, bishop of Constantinople, says, "Seeing everywhere the will of the multitude, or of the most, doth prevail, it is necessary to anathematize the persons before mentioned." the : 5. Metropolitan bishops, in their provinces, had far more power than pope had in the whole church; yet they had not a negative voice in synodical decisions. For it is decreed in the Nicene Council, canon sixth, that in the designation of bishops plurality of votes should prevail. It is indeed said in that canon, xwpis yvwuns, without the opinion of the metropolitan but this does not mean that he possesses a negative voice, but that the transaction should not pass in his absence, or without his knowledge or advice and vote. For so the twenty-fourth apostolical canon, to which the Nicene refers, interprets it, viz., that the metropolitan should do nothing without the opinion of all, or the majority. So the Council of Antioch interprets it, decreeing that bishop should not be ordained without a synod; and the presence of the metropolitan of the province." And the same synod determines, that "plurality of votes should carry." a Now, as provincial were more ancient than general councils, and furnished the pattern for them; and should we grant the same privilege to the pope in general councils that the metropolitans had in provincial, which is more than can be granted in truth, yet the pope could not pretend to make laws by himself. 6. The pope was anciently bound to yield to the judgment of his colleagues. So the emperor Constantine told Pope Liberius: "The vote of the plurality of bishops ought to prevail." When Pope Julius broke a rule of the church, by communicating with persons condemned by councils, the fathers of Antioch "speedily reproved him, showing that they were not to receive canons from him."¶ |