world, and the world against France. In a word, he set him. self to work on all the passions that usually determine the conduct of men and nations,-avarice, ambition, gratitude, resentment, hope, but above all, by terror. This was his chief dependence; and to this alone he could, on the whole safely trust. For he could neither suppose, that the greater, or at least the best, that is, the most formidable part of the French nation could be either duped by his cajoleries, or so blinded, and stupified by the splendour of his arms, as to forget all that was due to moral obligation, to themselves, their offspring, and their country; nor be quite certain that his vassal princes and kings would be more sensible of the be. nefits conferred in new titles and possessions, than mortified at the degrading and precarious tenures by which they held them. It was an astonishing as well as pitiful specta. cle, to behold one mind governing so great a portion of mankind against their dearest interests, and in. deed, for the most part, against their inclinations.

the

French retired into winter-quarters on the Vistula. The Russians fell back by Ostrolenka, on the Niemen. The king and queen of Prussia, with the ministry, the treasure, the most valuable property and guard of 1,500 troops, foot and horse, retreated to Memel. other troops remaining to the king The of Prussia, were as follows:There were 5,000 under command of general Lestocq, the, greater part of which remained in Koningsberg. There was a garrison of 6,000 Prussians in Dantzig, of 2,000 at Colberg, and of 3,000 at Graudenz. And from 15 to 20,000 were dispersed in the different gar risons of Silesia. A military officer from England, encouraged the king in this extremity, when he was lite rally cooped up in the most remote and smallest corner of his kingdom, with the promise of assistance in both money and troops, and the immediate advance of 80,000/. for maintaining the garrisons in Silesia. The Russian army was computed by some at 160,000; by others at not more than 100,000. The imagination is apt to be imposed on by the immense extent of the Russian cn. pire.

While Buonaparte advanced against the Russians and Prussians in front, with Sweden assailing, and Great Britain menacing his left wing, there was reason for the apprehension of hostility in various shapes on his right flank and in his rear. Above all, an attack in case of any disas. ter was to be apprehended from Austria. For this reason he still retained possession of the fortress of Brannau and an army of 40,000 men in Dalmatia, which might be strengthened by reinforcements from Italy, turned the flank of the defence of Austria, and even mena. ced its capital.

If we reflect on the extreme difficulty of collecting, with proper equipments, and stores, a vast army from the different regions of so widely extended an empire so thinly inhabited, the lowest estimate will probably appear the nearest to the truth.

The strength of the French army was estimated by some at above 200,000; by none at less than 150,000. Reinforcements of troops advanced from time to time during the whole of the campaign, to both armies.

The grand Russian army, to. After the battle of Pultusk, the wards the end of January, was Supported

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supported on one side, by a corps of Russians and Prussians under the generals Lestocq, Pahlen, and Gal. litzin, flanked on their right by the Frisch-haff* and the Pregel, and covered on its left flank by a corps under general Van Essen, originally destined against Moldavia. The command of the army after the battle of Pultusk, was given to general Bennigsen, who had formed a junction with general Buxhoevden after his defeat at Goly. min.

The plan of the Russian general, was, to turn the left flank of the French army, to extend his force along the river, to Graudenz and Thorn, to reduce the enemy to a necessity of evacuating Poland, to straiten his quarters, and by all means drive him into positions of difficulty and disadvantage.

As the eye of the Russian general was fixed on the Vistula, so that of Buonaparte was directed to the Pregel and the Niemen. Perceiving that it was the design of the Russians to give him no rest in his winter-quarters, he determined, according to his usual system, to take the advantage of an assailant, and to anticipate an attack, by making one. In the distribution

of the French in their winter-quarters, one of the corps into which the army was divided, under the command of Bernadotte, prince of Ponte Corvo, took possession of Elbing, where there were immense magazines filled with all manner of stores and provisions, and occupied the country around, on the shores of the Baltic. This corps, which was to be supported by that of marshal Ney, posted on the right banks of the Alla, was ordered to surprize Koningsberg, with its valuable magazines; which was attempted. But the French marshals were discomfited in the very outset of their enterprise, by the rapid advance of the Russians under the counts Pahlen and Gallitzin, who on the 24th of January compelled marshal Ney to abandon his posts on the Alla, and to retire by the way of Allenstein, behind the Dribentz, a river which runs into the Vistula, six miles southeast from Thorn; where he joined the corps under the grand duke of Berg, Murat. The Russian general having for some time made a show of following up his attack on troops under marshal Ney, bore with all his force on the detachment under the prince of Ponte Corvo, whom he met at Mohringent, where he

A bay or arm of the sea between Koningsberg and Elbing, separated from the Baltic by a narrow tongue of land, and communicating with that sea by a narrow passage near Pillau.

This account of the circumstances that led to the affair of Mohringen, is different from that given by the French bulletin; according to which the movement of the prince of Ponte-Corvo, was provoked by the boldness of "a Russian column that had gone beyond the little river of the Passarge, and had carried off half a company of the voltigeurs of the 8th regiment of the line, who were at the advanced posts of the cantoniment. 54th Bulletin of the grand French army, Warsaw, January 27, 1307.-But, in the same bulletin we read, "Some battalions of Ney's corps had advanced twenty leagues from their cantonments. The Russian army took the alarm, and made a movement on its right. The battalions have returned within the line of their cantonments." It will be asked however, by whose orders, and for what other object than that above stated, had they advanced so far beyond the line of their cantonments? The movement of Ney was plainly com

he had established his head quarters, pushing his out-posts to the distance of a league, that is, about three English miles from the town on the road to Liebstadt,

The Russian general Markow, with a division of the corps under the command of the counts Pahlen and Gallitzin, attacked the French at Mohringen, January 25. After a very sharp action in which the eagle of the 9th regiment of the French infantry was taken, the Russians were repulsed. But being afterwards reinforced by a division of cavalry under general Anrep, the battle was renewed. In these actions at Mohringen, the French, according to the Russian accounts, lost more than 1,000 men, in killed and wounded; the Russians, according to the French accounts, left 12,000, dead on the field of battle, and among these, general Anrep, whose death was greatly deplored by the whole Russian army.

During the action or actions near Mohringen, prince Michael Dolgorowki, with his regiment of dragoons, went round to the rear of the enemy, made his way to head-quarters without being perceived, and carried off the French marshal's equipage, his plate, some ladies, and a large sum of money, part of the pillage of Elbing. A great number of prisoners also fell into the hands of the Russians, among whom were three generals, including general Victor, who was taken by a small party belonging to the Prussian garrison of Colberg, as he was on his way to take the command of the army besieging Dantzig.

The Russian and French details of the battle of Mohringen, though different, were not very inconsistent in any material point, except that both parties claimed the victory. But judging from the immediate result of the action, we must conclude that it was in favour of the Russians. The French do not pretend that the Russians fell back beyond Liebstadt, which was only six or seven miles from the field of action; whereas, Bernadotte, according to their own accounts, retreated to Strasburg, on the Dribentz, which is situated at the distance of 60 miles from Mohringen.

The writer of the French bulle tins, Maret, Buonaparte's military secretary, in concert with the étatmajor, or generals on the staff, accounts for the retreat of Bernadotte in another manner: "After the battle of Mohringen, in which the Russian advanced guard was defeated, the enemy retreated upon Liebstadt. But the corps of general Van Essen, which was at first destined for Mol. davia, and also a number of fresh regiments from different parts of the Russian empire, having joined the Russian army in Poland, the enemy again, so early as the 27th of Jan. advanced in great force, with the design of removing the theatre of the war to the Lower Vistula. The emperor, being informed of these events, ordered the prince of PonteCorvo to retreat, and also to favour the offensive operations of the enemy, in order to draw them towards the Lower Vistula*." As it was altogether unnecessary to make use of any feint to engage the Russians in a design which they had already formed, and were indeed in the act of

bined with that of Bernadotte; but Buonaparte was unwilling to acknowledge that any design of his had been frustrated; and therefore explains matters in his own way, as just stated.

56th bulletin of the grand French army.

Arensdorf, Feb. 5.
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accomplishing,

accomplishing, the bulletin is plainly at variance with itself. The French appear evidently to have received a check from the Russians at Mohringen and the design of surprizing Koningsberg by the combined movements of the marshals Ney and Bernadotte, was frustrated. By the retreat of Ney and Bernadotte, general Bennigsen was enabled to concentrate his forces in the town and environs of Mohringen. The right wing of his army rested on the Vistula between Elbing and Culm*.

Buonaparte collected and concentrated upon one point, the flower of his forces, determined to attack the centre of the Russian army. The corps thus concentrated, were those of the marshals Davoust, Ney, Soult, and Augereau, computed to be about 80,000; the imperial guard under marshal Bessieres, 15,000 strong, and the cavalry of reserve, under Murat, or, as the bulletins styled him, the grand duke of Berg; which, at the opening of the campaign, consisted of 240 squadrons, The defeat of the plan, intended that is, 36,000, but which must to have been executed by a detach- have been greatly diminished, perment of the army under Bernadotte, haps by one third, during its proin concert with Ney, and the conse- gress. This force of about 120,000 quent advance of the Russians on horsemen and foot, exceeded the the Vistula, roused Buonaparte from army to which it was opposed, by a his temporary repose at Warsaw, and much greater number than what called into exertion all the energies might be supposed to be necessary to of his character. The corps under so consummate a leader of such galgeneral Van Essen, that covered the lant and well-disciplined troops. But left flank of the Russian army, was Buonaparte was not more distinposted at too great a distance from guished by any qualities than pruits main body to answer the par- dence and precaution. He was carepose for which it was intended: ful to provide rather a redundance and Buonaparte, with his usual than a bare sufficiency of means for decision and promptitude, took ad- the accomplishment of his ends. He vantage of this circumstance. He provided against reverses, and though broke up his cantonments on Janu- he always boasted of the favour, ary 29th and 30th. A corps under he never, if he could help it, trustthe command of general Savary, was ed to the caprice of fortune. ordered to watch the movements of Van Essen, who was posted at Wisochi Massawick on the heights of the Bug; and another under marshal le Febvre at Thorn, to keep in check the Russians and Prussians at Culm, and Marienwerder: thus to secure for Buonaparte a safe retreat across the Vistula, in the case of a failure in his attempt on the main body of the Russian army.

and

It was a prevailing maxim with Buonaparte, to out-flank, if possible, the army opposed to him, or by any other means get into its rear, cut it off from its resourIt was to this manœuve that he owed his success at Maringot, at Ulm†, and at Jena§. It would appear that the same manduvre was attempted against the Russians on the present occasion.

és.

*Relation officielle faite par le général Bennigsen de ce qui l'est passé à l'armée Russe, depuis son arrivée en Prusse, jusqu'au 31 Janvier, 1807. ↑ Vol. XLVII. (1805.) p. 150.

+ See Vol. XLII. (1800.) p. 193.

§ Vol. XLVIII. (1806.) p. 191.

The