Russia, would it not have been an indelible disgrace to this country, if we had violated good faith on our part? And what were the terms that were offered to us, as the price of disgrace and dishonour? We were to keep, what the French could not without a naval superiority take from us-Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, India, and the Island of Tobago!-It had been stated in the papers now before the house, that if we had made peace at the period alluded to in the papers, the treaty of the confederation of the Rhine, would never have been signed, or at least, would not have been published. It appeared however, that supposing peace to have been concluded with the utmost rapidity, after the arrival of our ministers at Paris, the treaty could not have been signed before the publication of the last German treaty. This very confederation must unavoidably have preceded the treaty, and supposing it to have happened the day after, it would have necessarily been a cause for war. Lord Grenville concluded by moving," That an humble address be presented to his majesty, to as sure his majesty that that house had taken into serious consideration the papers relative to the late negotiation which he had been pleased to lay before them, and that they saw with gratitude, that he had employed every means to restore the blessings of peace, in a manner consistent with the interests and glory of his people, and at the same time, with an observance of that good faith with our allies, which this country was bound to retain inviolate. That, while we lamented that by the unbounded ambition of the enemy, those laudable endeavours to his kingdom had been frustrated, no exertion should be

wanting on their part to support and assist him, in the adoption of such measures as might yet be found necessary, either for the restoration of peace, or to meet the various exigencies of the war in that most important crisis.”

The same motion, introduced by a speech to the same effect, was made by lord Howick, in the house of commons, January 5.-Never did any motion meet with more cordial and unanimous support in either house, and yet none, perhaps, ever gave rise to a longer conversation; which turned, for the most part, on the mode and course that had been pursued in the negotiation.

In the house of peers, lord Hawkesbury expressed his complete concurrence with lord Grenville, on the great points he had stated, but at the same time said, that if he did agree to the address, it must be with some qualifications. It had been stated in his majesty's dec.aration, that the French, from the outset of the negotiation, had agreed to proceed on the basis of actual possession, subject to the interchange of such equivalents as might be for the advantage and honour of the two countries. Now, he confessed, that after a careful examination of the papers before them, he found no. thing in the whole of them, that could be considered as a certain and unequivocal foundation for such a declaration. Before the arrival of lord Yarmouth in London, the basis of actual possession was so far from being actually agreed on, that another, very different, was express!y stated to be the grounds on which the French government would enter on a negotiation. Lord Yarmouth, indeed, had given a statement in writing, of a conversation he had E 4

had

had with Talleyrand, and he, no doubt, believed that Talleyrand had proposed the basis of actual possession. The words were: Vous l'avez, nous ne vous la demandons pas." But in order to affix the proper and precise meaning to these words, they ought to look at the context, and this shews that the words are not general, and that they refer only to Sicily. Ministry ought to have demanded a precise and categorical recognition, of the basis of negotiation, before they gave full powers to treat to their negotiator. Yet lord H most heartily concurred in the general result of the negotiation, and with the above exception joined in the address, and in the assurances of support to his majesty in prosecuting the war, which it had been found impossible immediately to put an end to, on grounds in any degree consistent with the security and honour of this country, or the maintenance of good faith to our allies.

His lordship proceeded to shew both that the war was necessary, and that we possessed the means of supporting it. At the commencement of the treaty with France in 1801, that country was in a very different situation from what it is in now. At that time, Holland and Switzerland, though subject to the influence of France, were not completely united to it. Naples was entire, and Austria, though she had lost much of her military reputation, was still a great power; and in point of population and extent of territory, equal to what she had been at the commencement of the war with France. Many, therefore, thought, and lord H. confessed he had joined in the opinion, that if France were to be left to her.

self, her power would sink to its natural level. Now, however, all the states to which he had alluded, had been either completely subdued by France, or reduced within comparatively narrow limits.

In 1801, the British government wished to try the feelings of France, and to find out what would be the policy of its government on the restoration of peace. It might endeavour to acquire confidence at home and abroad, which could be done only by a system of moderation; or it might consider its security to lie in pursuing that system of aggression which had marked the progress of that revolution from whence it had sprung. It had adopted the latter system: so that scarcely three months had elapsed from the time of signing the treaty of Amiens, till the spirit of the treaty was violated by repeated aggressions. Ever since that time, these aggressions had been continued ; as an instance of which, their lordships had only to look at the confederation of the Rhine, to which lord Grenville had adverted.-In considering the question of peace or war, they would observe, that while they continued at war they had at least this advantage, that whatever exertions France might make, they must be confined to the continent of Europe. But peace would open to her the way to Asia, Africa, and America. To these at least, he hoped, her power could not extend. Another thing to be considered was, that while we were at war, we were on perfect equality with our enemies. We were as powerful by sea as they were by land. But if peace should take place, from the very nature of the two cases, their power would not be made less, while our superiority

superiority would be gradually diminished; for peace would furnish them with the means of advancing in that particular sort of power, in which our superiority was undisputed. These were not arguments for eternal war, but they were circumstances that ought to have, great weight with their lordships, in considering what we gained by a peace, as a proper compensation for what we lose. It was with great pleasure and pride that lord H. reflected on the flourishing state of our finances, which was to be ascribe to two great measures, namely the sinking fund, (which lord H., cons.tered as unqestionably the greatest measure ever produced by the ingenuity and wisdom of man!") brought forward, and matured by his right onourable friend, the late Mr. Pitt: the other, that of raising a considerable part of the supplies within the year, also first brought forward by his right honourable deccased friend, and which had been acted upon, and in some degree improved by lord Sidmouth. The permanent taxes, were not less than eighteen millions. But the sinking fund at this time, produced eight millious and an half. And if

we had but perseverance to go on, for a few years, with a strict regard to economy in our general system of expenditure, we should arrive at the happy period when the sinking fund would equal all the loans that might be necessary for the expences of the community.

Lord Sidmouth, was willing to admit, that in the documents which had been submitted their lordships, there was not to be found any spe. cific offer of the uti possidetis, on the part of the French government. But, he contended, the whole nego.

tiation had been conducted on that very basis. In the letter addressed by M. Talleyrand to Mr. Fox, in the early stage of the correspondence between the two governments, M. Talleyrand states, that France desires nothing of Great Britain that she already possesses.-Lord Sid mouth, further, put the question, what was it that caused a temporary suspension of the negotiation? Was it any demur on the part of the French government on the point of uti possidetis? No. It was a delay occasioned by a matter of form, as to the manner in which the negotiation was to be conducted, and not any objection that was started to that understood basis. In five or six weeks afterwards lord Yarmouth arrived from Paris, when, by desire of ministers, he committed to wri ting the substance of the various com munications he had held with M. Talleyrand, who, it appeared, in the name of the government of France, had made use of the following expression, "Nous ne vous deman dons rien," words which he afterwards energetically repeated. appeared clearly from the papers before them, that previously to the 20th of July last, when M.D’Oubril signed the provisional treaty with France, in the name of the Russian government. Lord Yarmouth did not entertain the smallest doubt that the state of actual possession was the mutually acknowledged basis of negotiation. In fact, the first attempt to question it, though even then not expressly in words, was, after this period, when M. Talleyrand avowed that circumstances had altered, and that, in consequence, the French government had deter. mined not to agree to that which was consented to originally, and that

It

they

they must insist on having possession of Sicily. On three subsequent occasions, attempts were made by the French negotiators to deny the statements of lord Yarmouth; but, though one of them endeavoured to evade and shuffle, they could not deny them, directly, when met by by our minister, face to face. This had been stated by lord Lauderdale. The French plenipotentiaries unquestionably wished our negotiators to understand the basis of negoti. ation to be the uti possidetis, although they cautiously avoided formally committin it to writing, in order, no doubt, to have room to cavil. But why, it was demanded, were they not called upon to avow their agreement to this principle in writing? There had been a clear admission originally, that such was the mutually under stood agreement.

Lord Eldon did not lament the failure of a pacific adjustment with an enemy, whose aggressions in times of peace, are equally hostile with their operations in war. He admitted that lord Grenville had proved in the clearest and most satisfactory manner, that the prin. ciple of actual possession was the only basis on which a beneficial treaty could have been concluded. But that the uti possidetis was the actual basis, agreed, and acted upon in the late negotiation, he really did not know in what part of the official papers presented to that house, ministers would be able to find that principle of actual possession once recognized by the French govern. ment No such proposition was made out by the evidence, even in the remotest view of the case.-In the last letter, said in the French account of the negotiation, to have

been sent by M. Talleyrand to lord Lauderdale, there were calumnies which tended to exhibit the noble lord in the most savage form; ca lumnies, which he was fully persuaded were to him unfoundedly and improperly addressed. Lord Eldon wished to hear from the noble lord, that no such letter had been ever received, or that no minister of a hos tile power, would dare to send to the plenipotentiary of Great Britain, a communication replete with the most base and injurious calumnies.— Another practice of the same inveterate malice and unprincipled audacity, was the contradiction of one of the French plenipotentiaries, to the report the earl of Yarmouth had made of his conferences with the French minister on the basis.

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Lord auderdale thought it sin. gular, unat the learned lord should apply to him for evidence, after having considered that of lord Yar. mouth as perfectly nugatory. happened, however, that lord Lau derdale could give ample testimony to the facts questioned by lord Eldon. For, independently of lord Yarmouth's having repeatedly stated these facts to him, he was enabled to confirm them from other sources, particularly from his own confer. ences with the minister of France. But, without any corroboration from his testimony, lord Lauderdale contended, that the notes, and verbal communications of lord Yarmouth, were quite sufficient to sustain the assertion, that the French, from the outset of the negotiation, agreed to proceed upon the basis of actual possession. With regard to the letter alluded to by Lord Eldon, the earl of Lauderdale could say, that during his stay at Paris, he did not experience any want of civility

whatever.

whatever. Nor did he know of any thing different, until he saw in this country, the posthumous letter addressed to him in the Moniteur.

The address was then read from the woolsack, and agreed to, nem. diss.

The same subject underwent a very long discussion in the house of commons.

Lord Howick, having moved that the papers relating to the negotiation with France, should be now taken into consideration, said, that it had become his duty to offer that proposition to the house which had been usual on similar occasions; namely, that an humble address be presented to his majesty, expressive of such sentiments as the house might think fit to convey to the throne, after a careful review of the whole of that most important question. After lamenting the failure of the negotiation, and the death of Mr. Fox, he proceeded to shew, that as, on the one hand, the king's government had not in the course of the negotia. tion, committed the honour of the crown, in any one instance, by any manifestation of a disposition to make improper concessions and sacrifices, so, on the other, it had neglected no means within its power, to conclude such a peace as was con. sistent with the honour, prosperity and interests of the country. It had been stated in Mr. Fox's first letter to M. Talleyrand, in answer to the first overture, “that a peace, to be advantageous to the two countries, should be negotiated on principles honourable to both, and, at the same time, of a nature, as far as possible, to secure the future tran. quillity of Europe." It was this principle that the ministry had made the basis of the negotiation. It was

this that they invariably pursued. They insisted that we should treat in conjunction with our ally, the emperor of Russia; and that the negotiation should be conducted on the basis of uti possidetis.-Lord Howick proceeded to shew, in nearly the same manner as had been done by lord Grenville in the house of peers, that the basis of the uti possidetis had been admitted by the French plenipotentiaries; that the English ministers always understood that to be the basis, and that they never admitted any other.-This principle the British ministers applied to Sicily, though not exactly a conquest, as we held it in conjunction with its lawful soverei n. This our faith to the king of Naples required. Hanover, being unjustly attacked for the sake of England, the honour of this country compel.ed the ministers to stipulate for its recovery. The integrity of Turkey, of Sweden, and of Portugal, was stipu lated for, and it was also their object to secure the little states from the insults and incroachments they had experienced from France. From these points they never ceded. How far they might have receded as to particular terms, it would not be proper for him in that place to discuss. But if the value of cessions was to be estimated by the probability of the advantages, and the duration of that peace for which they were made, was nothing in the aspect of affairs that cou'd induce them to make valuable sacrifices to purchase peace. Suppose that Prus sia, in making war on France, had succeeded, what would have been said to a minister ho should have concluded a peace, and thereby tied up the hands of his country from taking advantage of the new order of

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things,