crushing increase of taxation and a certain sacrifice of its own time and comfort, so as to render a considerable portion of the civilian population capable of being added on emergency to the warlike forces of the country. The latter alternative may be unwelcome at first sight, and it will be strenuously resisted by a certain section in politics; but it will have to be adopted, if only because the country cannot go on increasing its Navy, which it must do, and at the same time add twenty, or perhaps forty, millions a year to the military budget. Moreover, the opposition to compulsory service will be considerably diminished when it is realised that a British 'conscription' might be a very different affair from the cast-iron system under which the youth of France and Germany are herded into barracks. In England we could naturally begin with a mild and lenient development and extension of the quasi-military organisations we already possess. We have the Militia, and we have the Volunteers; and it is possible-indeed it seems highly probable-that we shall work from them as a basis. It is conceivable that the Government, going only one short step beyond Lord Lansdowne's action last session, will actually revive balloting for the Militia. This would give us the compulsory system ready-made; any man of the specified ages might be liable to be drawn, and the regulations would be recast so that it would not be possible to escape service by an easy payment in money. Having established the universal liability to Militia service, it might also be practicable to permit any man to obtain an indemnity, by putting in a period of hard work in the Volunteers, for a couple of years or so. It would necessarily be a Volunteer force very different indeed from the present respectable body of amateurs; and service in its ranks would be a much more serious business than mere loose playing at soldiers, with a smattering of target practice, and drills attended casually or omitted, according to circumstances. The conscript Volunteer would be something like the German Einjähriger. He would not be bound to live in barracks, and he would have a large part of his time at his own disposal for his studies, avocations, or amusements. But he would be expected to attend on the parade-ground, in the barrack schoolroom, at the shooting range, and so on, daily, and for some hours a day; he would be under the strictest military discipline when on duty; he would spend three weeks or a month at least in camp; and he would have to pass a pretty severe test in shooting and field exercise before he would be permitted to obtain the certificate of discharge, which would release him from the chances of the Militia ballot. One might hope that, so far from being distasteful, this service, if sensibly conducted, would really become popular with young men. Drill-the drill of the kind beloved by sergeant-majors and many colonels-is no doubt dull work. But the Boers have shown that men who can shoot, and take

cover well, and carry out a general plan intelligently, can make pretty fair soldiers with a very limited allowance of drilling. Rifle-shooting, especially under military conditions, is a fine sport; one does not see why tens of thousands of clerks and artisans should not spend their Sundays over it. I say Sundays advisedly: for our Volunteer system has been fatally hampered by the sentiment or the prejudice which deprives it of the one day of the week on which the members of the force are at leisure. It is not perhaps more destructive to religious or social order to shoot at targets, or practise skirmishing, on a Sunday, than to play golf or ride the bicycle. How many middle-class ratepayers, pillars of Church and State, would have made acquaintance with the white ball and the bunkered green, if Sunday play were prohibited on suburban links? One would like the young Volunteer to take his Sunday soldiering as his elders take their Sunday golf. The bicycle has rendered him superior to moderate distances; it would be no great hardship for him to ride a few miles to the scene of action, as the golfer so often does. The military game might become a national sport, with 'cup ties,' in shooting and field evolutions, county championships, and the other crowns of parsley that minister to the competitive ardour of the Briton. A battalion, that could work together, with the intelligent co-operation, the alertness, and the combination of absolute discipline and individual initiative which are displayed by a good Association football team, would be invincible on the battlefield, provided that its members could shoot straight. If we could make soldiering as interesting as cricket and football, and get in as much of the competitive element, it might become equally attractive, and at least as well adapted to develop the characteristic qualities of the race.

But this is carrying us far from South Africa. It is perhaps a little premature to consider the various methods by which our military deficiencies can be amended until the campaign has drawn nearer to its conclusion. When the fighting is over, and when we have arranged for some settlement of the constitutional affairs of the Transvaal and the Free State, and paid the bill, the reorganisation of the land forces of the Empire will claim attention. It should be the next great question in practical politics, and there is none beyond it in importance.

SIDNEY LOW.

SOUTH AFRICAN PROBLEMS AND LESSONS

II

THE present hostilities in South Africa recall to mind the predictions and warnings of the late Sir Bartle Frere, one of the ablest, strongest and noblest of those great Proconsuls who have done so much to make the British Empire what it is to-day. His high reputation rests chiefly on his achievements as an Indian statesman. He went to South Africa comparatively late in life, and his knowledge of that country was necessarily limited. It may be doubted whether he ever fully understood either the Boers or the natives; but nevertheless his varied attainments, his wide experience and the philosophic bent of his mind must always command respect even from those who are unable to endorse all his conclusions. He rapidly formed decided views on every subject; he always knew his own mind, and in everything he judged and acted on fixed principles according to the highest standard of abstract right known to him. If he erred, it was only through lack of local knowledge or because he was deceived by others. That in South Africa he should sometimes have misjudged men and even made mistakes in policy was perhaps, under the circumstances, inevitable. Whether his successive native wars, so popular with the Dutch, were in every case equally politic and necessary may be open to question. Of the ultimate effects of the Zulu war as regarded his own official position and the growth of Boer power there can be no doubt. For the annexation of the Transvaal he was not personally responsible. To its retrocession he was firmly opposed. Whatever mistakes he may have made, however little he may have realised the vaulting ambition of the South African Dutch, however hopeless at that time the task of federation imposed upon him by the late Lord Carnarvon, there cannot be two opinions as to the purity of his motives, the fervour of his patriotism or the ingratitude with which he was treated.

In 1881 Sir Bartle Frere published in the February number of this Review an article on the Transvaal which well deserves careful reperusal at the present time. I am unable to concur unreservedly 30

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with him in all he says. Thus, for instance, I am rather inclined to agree with the view of the Natal officials that the Zulus would never have resorted to hostilities against the British in that colony, their quarrel being only with the Boers of the Transvaal. Sir Bartle Frere thought otherwise, and acted on his belief. Be this as it may, his views as to the Imperial destinies and duties of England were perfectly sound and his remarks as to the bad policy and even the positive wrong, injustice and cruelty of rescinding the annexation of the Transvaal are as true now as when they were written, and merit special consideration at the present time. He says:-'Let not the English nation suppose that by throwing off all responsibility for the fortunes of the Transvaal we shall either insure the good government of the Transvaal or make our responsibilities in the other colonies of South Africa less.' How true was this forecast is known to every one who has since lived in South Africa, and may be realised by any one who will read Mr. J. P. FitzPatrick's carefully compiled and thoroughly reliable book, The Transvaal from Within. Sir Bartle Frere's words are especially noteworthy now, on account of the warning they convey against a patched-up peace or any halfhearted or unsatisfactory settlement of the momentous questions now at issue. Happily no such warning is needed by Her Majesty's present advisers, the soundness of whose views on the South African question admits of no doubt. The idea that Her Majesty's present Government would tolerate the establishment of independent Boer Republics on the conclusion of the present hostilities would be too absurd to be entertained for a moment. But the British Empire, however strong against foreign foes, is vulnerable from within. The swing of the political pendulum in England is proverbial, and under our system of popular Government it is vitally important that the public should be kept fully informed of every fact and every argument conducive to a just estimate of all Imperial questions.

It is easy to play with words. In connection with the Transvaal we have been dosed with 'magnanimity' till our gorge rises at it. What we want henceforth is justice with power to enforce its decrees.

The present political position is plain enough. The two Republics have united to invade Her Majesty's dominions with a view to the conquest of South Africa, after having suddenly declared war by means of an ultimatum couched in terms which read like the ravings of insanity. The effect of the vast military preparations so long made by the two Republics with the object of striking a sudden and crushing blow has been to secure for the Boers at the outset advantages so great as to bring home to the British public how narrowly we have escaped a great national disaster. If we are to retain our hold on South Africa at all it can only be by the subjugation of both Republics. When that work is accomplished we

shall have the right of conquest in addition to all prior rights, and no foreign Power can be allowed to interfere in any way. Of the two Republics the Orange Free State had even less excuse than the Transvaal for thus attacking us. The Orange Free State had received nothing but good at our hands ever since we committed the initial blunder of granting them independence in 1854. I dismiss as unworthy of serious discussion the contention that the Orange Free State was unjustly deprived of the province of Griqualand West by the British Government during Sir Henry Barkly's term of office as High Commissioner. The Orange Free State never had any valid right to claim the territory of Waterboer. It is true that certain Free State Boers had received from the Government at Bloemfontein title to certain farms within the borders of Griqualand West, but I was, in my then official capacity, present in the Land Court of Griqualand West when those Boers received with expressions of satisfaction and thanks British title to those same farms free of expense to themselves; and the only possible loss or damage to the Bloemfontein Government was the comparatively trifling amount of the annual quit-rents. Moreover, I happened to he present in the Volksraad at Bloemfontein when, in reply to remonstrances from some of the members, President Brand with considerable heat told them that he had concluded a binding agreement with Lord Carnarvon on the subject and had accepted on behalf of the Treasury of the Orange Free State the sum of 90,000l. in full of all demands in respect of quit-rent on those farms and of their claims in Griqualand West generally. Lord Carnarvon had further offered to make a contribution of 15,000l. towards the cost of railway construction between Kimberley and Bloemfontein, though this offer lapsed, as the Orange Free State Government took no steps in the matter. President Brand went so far as to threaten resignation and an appeal to the country in the event of an adverse vote by the Volksraad on the question, whereupon all opposition ceased and the agreement with Lord Carnarvon was duly ratified. After that, it appears to me to be too late to attempt to manufacture a grievance out of such a transaction. The Orange Free State got more than full value for all their claims, real or imaginary, and the members of the Volksraad well knew that any attempt to govern the turbulent population of the Diamond Fields in those stormy days would have involved their little State in ruin. I cannot help thinking that if recent events had occurred during the lifetime of the late Sir John Brand, and while he was still presiding over the destinies of the Orange Free State, he would have pursued a different policy from that of Messrs. Kruger, Reitz and Steyn. He would, as I believe, have firmly declined to enter into an unnecessary and ill-advised offensive and defensive alliance with the Transvaal Republic; he would have deprecated an oppressive policy towards Uitlanders;