fometimes younger, to the end that they may not be a wretched part of the father's fucceffion.

In countries where there are no fundamental laws, the fucceffion to the empire cannot be fixed. The crown is then elective, and the right of electing is in the prince, who names a fucceffor either of his own or of fome other family. In vain would it be to establish here the fucceffion of the eldest fon; the prince might always choose another. The fucceffor is declared by the prince himself, or by his minifters, or by a civil war. Hence a defpotic ftate is, upon another account, more liable than a narchical government to diffolution.

mo

As every prince of the royal family is held equally capable of being chofen, hence it follows, that the prince who afcends the throne, ftrangles immediately his brothers, as in Turkey; or puts out their eyes, as in Perfia; or bereaves them of their understanding, as in the Mogul's country; or if thefe precautions are not used, as in Morocco, the vacancy of the throne is always attended with a horrid civil war.

By the conftitutions of Ruffia,* the Czar may choose whom he has a mind for his fucceffor, whether of his own or a ftrange family. Such a fettlement produces a thoufand revolutions, and renders the throne as tottering as the fucceffion is arbitrary.

The right of fucceffion being one of thofe things which are of most importance to the people to know; the best is that which moft fenfibly ftrikes them, fuch as a certain order of birth. A fettlement of this kind puts a ftop to intrigues, and ftifles ambition; the mind of a weak prince is no longer enflaved, nor is he made to speak his will as he is juft expiring.

When the fucceffion is established by a fundamental law, only one prince is the fucceffor, and his brothers have nei ther a real nor apparent right to difpute the crown with him, They can neither pretend to, nor take any advantage of the will of a father. There is then no more occafion to confine or kill the king's brother than any other fubject. But in defpotic governments, where the prince's brothers are equally his flaves and his rivals, prudence requires that their perfons be fecured; efpecially in Mahometan VOL. I. countries,

E

* See the different Conftitutions, especially that of 1722.

countries, where religion confiders victory or fuccefs as a divine decifion in their favor; fo that they have no fuch thing as a monarch de jure, but only de facto.

There is a far greater incentive to ambition, in countries where the princes of the blood are fenfible that if they do not ascend the throne, they must be either imprisoned or put to death, than amongst us, where they are placed in fuch a ftation as may fatisfy, if not their ambition, at least their moderate defires.

The princes of defpotic gevernments have always perverted the use of marriage. They generally take a great many wives, especially in that part of the world where abfolute power is in fome measure naturalized, namely, Afia. Hence they come to have fuch a multitude of children, that they can hardly have any great affection for them, nor the children for one another.

The reigning family resembles the flate; it is too weak itself, and its head too powerful; it seems very numerous and extensive, and yet is fuddenly extinct. Artaxerxes* put all his children to death for confpiring against him. It is not at all probable that fifty children fhould confpire against their father, and much less that this confpiracy fhould be owing to his having refufed to refign his concubine to his eldelt fon. It is more natural to believe that the whole was an intrigue of thofe oriental feraglios, where artifice, treachery and deceit reign in filence, involved in thick obfcurity; where an old prince, grown every day more weak, is the firft prifoner of the palace.

After what has been faid, one would imagine that human nature fhould perpetually rife in oppofition to a defpotic government. But notwithstanding the love of liberty, fo natural to mankind, notwithstanding their innate deteftation of force and violence, moft nations are fubject to this very government. This is eafily accounted for. In order to form a moderate government, it is neceffary to combine the feveral powers, to regulate, temper and fet them in motion, to give, as it were, ballaft to one, in order to enable it to refift another. This is a masterpiece of legiflation, rarely produced by hazard, and feldom attained by prudence. On the contrary, a defpotic government offers itself, as it were, at first fight; it is uniform throughout;

* See Juftin.

and

and as paffions only are requifite to eftablifh it, this is what every capacity may reach.

CHAP. XV.

The fame Subject continued.

IN warm climates, where defpotic power generally prevails, there is an earlier fenfibility, as well as an earlier extinction of the paffions ;* the understanding is fooner ripened; they are in lefs danger of fquandering away their fortunes; there is lefs facility in diftinguishing themselves in the world; lefs communication between young people, who are confined at home; they marry much earlier, and confequently they may be fooner of age than in our European climates. In Turkey they are of age at fifteen.t

Here there is no fuch thing as a ceffion of goods; in a government where there is no fixed property, people depend rather on the perfon than on his eftate.

The ceffion of goods is naturally admitted in moderate governments, but especially in republics, because of the greater confidence which arifes from the probity of the citizens, and becaufe of the lenity and moderation that a form of government, which every one feems to have framed for himself, ought to infpire.

Had the legiflators of the Roman republic eftablished the ceffion of goods, they never would have been exposed to fo many feditious and civil difcords, nor would they have experienced the danger of the evils, or the inconvenie ency of the remedies.

Poverty and the precarioufnefs of property in a defpotic ftate, render ufury natural, each perfon railing the value of his money in proportion to the danger he fees in lending it. Mifery therefore pours in from all parts into thofe unhappy countries; they are bereft of every thing, even of the refource of borrowing.

* See the book of laws as relative to the nature of the climate.

+ Languilletiere, ancient and modern Sparta, p. 463.

Hence

The fame may be said of compositions in regard to fáir bankrupts. There was no fuch eftablishment made till the Julian law, de ceffi ne bonorum which preferved them from priton, and from an ignominious divino of their goods.

Hence it is, that a merchant under this government is unable to carry on a great trade; he lives from hand to mouth; were he to encumber himself with a large quantity of merchandises, he would lofe more by the exorbitant intereft he must give for money, than he could poffibly get by the goods. Wherefore there are no laws here relating to commerce; they are all reduced to what is called the civil polity.

A government cannot be unjuft without having hands. to exercise its injuftice. Now, it is impoffible but these hands will be grafping for themselves. The embezzling of the public money is therefore natural in defpotic states. As this is a common crime under this government, confifcations are very useful. By thefe the people are eased; the money drawn by this means being a confiderable tribute which could hardly be raised on the exhaufted fubjects; neither is there in thofe countries any one family which the prince would be glad to preserve.

In moderate governments it is quite a different thing. Confifcations would render property uncertain, would ftrip innocent children, would deftroy a whole family, instead of punishing a fingle criminal. In republics they would be attended with the mischief of fubverting equality, which is the very foul of this government, by depriving a citizen of his neceffary fubfiftence.*

In coun

There is no Roman lawt againft confifcations except in the cafe of high treafon of the most heinous nature. It would be a prudent thing to follow the spirit of this law, and to limit confifcations to particular crimes. tries where a local cuftom has rendered real estates alienable, Bodin very juftly obferves, that confifcations fhould extend only to fuch as are purchased or acquired.‡

CHAP.

* They seemed to have been too fond of confifcations in the republic of Athens.

+ Authentica bona damnatorum, Cod. de bon. damn.

Book v. chap. 3.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Communication of Power.

IN a a defpotic government the power is communicated entire to the perfon intrufted with it. The vizir himfelf is the defpotic prince; and each particular officer is the vizir. In monarchies the power is lefs immediately applied, being tempered by the monarch as he gives it.* He makes fuch a diftribution of his authority, as never to communicate a part of it, without referving a greater share to himself.

Hence, in monarchies the particular governors of towns are not fo dependent on the governor of the province, as not to be still more fo on the prince; and the private officers of military bodies are not fo far fubject to their general, as not to owe still a greater fubjection to their fovereign.

In most monarchies, it has been wifely regulated, that those who have an extenfive command, fhould not belong to any military body; fo that as they have no authority but through the prince's particular pleasure, and as they may be employed or not, they are in fome measure in the fervice, and in fome measure out of it.

This is incompatible with a defpotic government. For if those who are not actually employed, were nevertheless invested with privileges and titles, the confequence must be that there would be a kind of men in the state, who might be faid to be great of themselves; a thing directly opposite to the nature of this government.

Were the governor of a town independent of the Bafhaw, expedients would be daily neceffary to make them agree; which is highly abfurd in a defpotic ftate. Besides, if a particular governor might refufe to obey, how could the other anfwer for his province with his head ?

In this kind of government authority must ever be wavering; nor is that of the lowest magiftrate lefs fteady than

3

* Ut effe Phobi dulcius lumen folet

Jamjam cadentis

that