abandoned; and the intermediate dependent powers* do not choose that the people should have too much the upper hand. It rarely happens that the ftates of the kingdom are entirely corrupted. The prince adheres to these, and the feditious, who have neither will nor hopes to fubvert the government, have neither power nor will to dethrone the prince.

In thefe circumftances men of prudence and authority interfere, moderate measures are first propofed, then complied with, and things at length are redreffed; the laws resume their vigor, and command submission.

Thus all our hiftories are full of civil wars without revolutions, while the hiftories of defpotic governments abound. with revolutions without civil wars.

The writers of the hiftory of the civil wars of some countries, even they who fomented them, fufficiently demonftrate how little reafon princes have to fufpect the authority with which they inveft particular bodies of men for their fervice; fince even in their very going aftray, they fighed only after the laws and their duty; and restrained, more than they were capable of inflaming, the impetuofity of the revolted.t

Cardinal Richlieu, reflecting perhaps that he had too much reduced the ftates of the kingdom, has recourse to the virtues of the prince and of his minifters for the fupport of the government; but he requires fo many things, that indeed there is none but an angel capable of fuch attention, of such resolution and knowledge; and scarce can we flatter ourselves ever to fee fuch a prince and ministers, no, not while monarchy fubfifts.

As people who live under a good government, are happier than those who without rule or leaders, wander about the forefts; fo monarchs who live under the fundamental laws of their country, are far happier than defpotic princes, who have nothing to regulate either their own or their fubjects' hearts.

* See the first note of book ii. ch. iv.

+ Memoirs of Cardinal de Retz and other hiftories.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

The fame Subject continued.

LET us not look for magnanimity in defpotic governments; the prince cannot impart a grandeur which he has not himfelf; with him there is no fuch thing as glory.

It is in monarchies we fee the fubjects around the prince, receiving the influence of his beams; there it is that each perfon, filling, as it were, a larger space, is capable of exercifing thofe virtues which adorn the foul, not with independence, but with grandeur.

CHA P. XIII

An Idea of Defpotic Power.

WHEN the favages of Louisiana are defirous of fruit, they cut the tree to the root, and gather the fruit.* This is an emblem of defpotic government.

CHAP. XIV.

In what Manner the Laws are relative to the Principles of Defpotic Government.

THE principle of defpotic government is fear; but a timid, ignorant and faint fpirited people have no occafion for a great number of laws.

Every thing ought to depend here on two or three ideas ; therefore there is no neceffity that any new notion should be added. When we want to break a horfe, we take care not to let him change his mafler, his leffon or his pace.

Edifying Letters, 11 coll. p. 315.

Thus

Thus an impreffion is made on his brain by two or three motions, and no more.

If a prince is fhut up in a feraglio, he cannot leave this voluptuous abode without alarming those who keep him confined. They cannot bear that his perfon and power fhould pafs into other hands. He feldom therefore wages war in perfon, and hardly ventures to intrust the command to his generals.

A prince of this ftamp, unaccustomed to refiftance in his palace, is enraged to fee his will oppofed by armed force ; hence he is generally governed by wrath or vengeance.

Befides, he can have no notion of true glory. War therefore is carried on under fuch a government in its full natural fury, and a lefs extent is given to the law of nations. than in other states.

Such a prince has fo many imperfections, that they are afraid to expofe his natural flupidity to public view. He is concealed in his palace, and the people are ignorant of his fituation. It is lucky for him, that the inhabitants of thofe countries need only the name of a prince to govern

them.

When Charles XII was at Bender, he met with some oppofition from the Senate of Sweden; upon which he wrote word home, that he would fend one of his boots to command them. This boot would have governed like a

defpotic prince.

If the prince is a prifoner, he is fuppofed to be dead, and another mounts the throne. The treaties made by the prifoner are void, his fucceffor will not ratify them, in effect, as he is the law, the state and the prince; when he is no longer a prince, he is nothing; were he not therefore deemed to be dead, the flate would be fubverted.

One thing which chiefly determined the Turks to conclude a feparate peace with Peter I, was the Muscovites telling the vizir, that in Sweden another prince had been fet upon the throne.*

The prefervation of the ftate is only the prefervation of the prince, or rather of the palace where he is confined. Whatever does not directly menace this palace or the capital, makes no impreffion on ignorant, proud and prejudiced

* Continuation of Pffendorff's introduction to the hiftory of Europe, in the article of Sweden, chap. 10.

diced minds; and as for the concatenation of events, they are unable to trace, to foresee, or even to conceive it. Politics, with its feveral fprings and laws, muft here be very much limited; the political government is as fimple as the civil.*

The whole is reduced to reconciling the political and civil administration with the domeftic government, the offices of ftate with those of the feraglio.

Such a ftate is happieft, when it can look upon itself as the only one in the world, when it is environed with deferts, and feparated from thofe people whom they call Barbarians. Since it cannot depend on the militia, it is proper it should deftroy a part of itself.

As fear is the principle of defpotic government, its end is tranquillity; but this tranquillity cannot be called a peace; no, it is only the filence of thofe towns which the enemy is ready to invade.

Since the ftrength does not lie in the ftate, but in the army that founded it, in order to defend the ftate, the army must be preserved; but the army is formidable to the prince. How then can we reconcile the fecurity of the ftate with that of the prince's perfon?

Obferve how induftriously the Ruffian government endeavors to temper its arbitrary power, which is more burthenfome to it than to the people themfelves. They have broke their great bodies of troops, mitigated criminal punishments, erected tribunals, entered into a knowledge of the laws, and inftructed the people. But there are particular caufes, that will oblige them to return to the very mifery which they now endeavor to avoid.

In those states religion has more influence than any where else ; it is a fear added to fear. In Mahometan countries it is partly from their religion that the people derive the furprifing veneration they have for their prince.

It is religion that amends in fome measure the Turkish conftitution. The fubjects, who have no attachment of honor to the glory and grandeur of the flate, are attached to it by the force and principle of religion.

* According to Sir John Chardin there is no council of state in Perfia.

Of

Of all defpotic governments, there is none that labors more under its own weight, than that wherein the prince declares himself proprietor of all the lands, and heir to all his fubjects. Hence the neglect of agriculture arifes ; and if the prince intermeddles likewife in trade, all manner of induftry is ruined.

Under this fort of government nothing is repaired or improved.* Houses are built only for the neceffity of habitation; there is no fuch thing as digging of ditches, or planting of trees; every thing is drawn from, but nothing restored to the earth; the land lies untilled, and the whole country becomes a desert.

Is it to be imagined that the laws which abolish the property of land and the fucceffion of eftates, will diminith the avarice and cupidity of the great? By no means. They will rather ftimulate this cupidity and avarice. The great men will be prompted to use a thousand oppreffive methods, because they think they have no other property, but the gold and filver which they are able to feize upon by violence, or conceal.

To prevent therefore the utter ruin of the ftate, the avidity of the prince ought to be moderated by fome established cuftom. Thus in Turkey the prince is fatisfied with the right of three per cent. on the value of inheritances.+ But as the Grand Seignior gives the greateft part of the lands to his foldiery, and difpofes of them as he pleases; as he feizes on all the eftates of the officers of the empire at their decease; as he has the property of the estates of thofe who die without iffue, and the daughters have only the ufufruct; it thence follows, that the greatest parts of the eftates of the country are poffeffed in a precarious

manner.

By the laws of Bantam, the king feizes on the whole inheritance, even wife, children and habitation. In order to elude the crueleft part of this law, they are obliged to marry their children at eight, nine or ten years of age, and fometimes

Sce Ricault's State of the Ottoman empire, p. 196. + See the Treatife concerning the inheritances of the Turks, ancient and modern Sparta. See alfo Ricault on the Ottoman empire.

Collection of voyages that contributed to the establishment of the Eastindia Company, tome 1. The law of Pegu is lefs cruel; if there happens to be children, the king fucceeds only to two thirds. Ibid. tome 3, p. 1.