check their power.

The members appointed to remove the abuses would rather enjoy them. The nobles would be like the princes of defpotic governments, who confifcate whatever eftates they please.

Soon would the profits hence arifing be confidered as a patrimony, which avarice would enlarge at pleasure. The farms would be lowered, and the public revenues reduced to nothing. This is the reafon that fome governments, without having ever received any remarkable fhock, have dwindled away to fuch a degree, as not only their neighbors, but even their own fubjects have been furprifed at it. The laws fhould likewife forbid the nobles all kind of commerce: Merchants of fuch unbounded credit would monopolize all to themselves. Commerce is a profeffion of people who are upon an equality; hence among despotic ftates the moft miferable are those in which the prince applies himself to trade.

The laws of Venice* debar the nobles from commerce, by which they might even innocently acquire exorbitant wealth.

The laws ought to employ the most effectual means for making the nobles do juftice to the people. If they have not established a tribune, they ought to be a tribune themfelves.

Every fort of afylum in oppofition to the execution of the laws deftroys aristocracy, and is foon fucceeded by

tyranny.

They ought always to mortify the pride of domineering. There fhould be either a temporary or perpetual magiftrate to keep the nobles in awe, as the Ephori at Sparta, and the fate inquifitors at Venice, magiftrates that are fubject to no formalities. This fort of government

stands in need of the strongest springs: Thus a mouth of ftonet is open to every informer at Venice, a mouth to which one would be apt to give the appellation of that of tyranny.

These tyrannical magiftrates in an aristocracy bear some analogy to the cenforthip of democracies, which of its own

4

nature

* Amelot de la Houffaye, of the government of Venice, part 3. The Claudian law forbade the fenators to have any ship at sea, that held above forty bufhels.

Liv. 1. xxi.

The informers throw their fcrolls into it

nature is equally independent. In fact, the cenfors ought to be fubject to no inquiry in relation to their conduct during their office; they should meet with a thorough confidence, and never be difcouraged. In this refpe&t the prac tice of the Romans deferved admiration; magiftrates of all denominations were accountable for their administration, except the cenfors.+

*

There are two very pernicious things in an ariftocracy; either excefs of poverty, or excess of wealth, in the nobility. To prevent their poverty, it is neceffary above all things to oblige them to pay their debts in time. To moderate the excefs of wealth, prudent and fenfible regulations hould be made; but no confifcations, no agrarian laws, no expunging of debts, thefe are things that are productive of infinite mischief.

The laws ought to abolish the right of primogeniture among the nobles,† to the end that, by a continual divifion of the inheritances, their fortunes may be always upon a level.

I here fhould be no fubftitutions, no powers of redemp. tion, no rights of majority or adoption. The contrivances for perpetuating the grandeur of families in monarchical governments, ought never to be employed in ariftocracies.§.

After the laws have made families equal, the next thing they have to do, is to preserve a proper harmony and union amongst them. The quarrels of the nobility ought to be quickly decided; otherwife the contefts of individuals become thofe of families. Arbiters may terminate, or even prevent the rife of difputes.

In fine, the laws must not favor the diftinctions raised by vanity among families, under pretence that they are more noble or ancient; pretences of this nature ought to be ranked among the weakneffes of private perfons.

We

*See Livy, l. 49. A cenfor could not be troubled even by a cenfor, each made his remark without taking the opinion of his colleague; and when it other wife happened, the cenforfhip was in a manner abolished.

At Athens, the Logifle, who made all the magiftrates accountable for their conduct, gave no account themselves.

+ It is to practifed at Venice. Amelot. de la Houfaye, p. 30 & 31.

The main defign of fome ariftocracies feems to be lefs the fupport of the ftate than of what they call their nobility.

We have only to caft our eyes on Sparta; there we may fee how the Ephori contrived to check the foibles of the kings, as well as those of the nobility and of the com mon people,

CHAP. IX.

In what Manner the Laws are relative to their Principle in Monarchies.

As honor is the principle of a monarchical government, the laws ought to be relative to this principle. They fhould endeavor to fupport the nobility in respect to whom honor may be, in fome measure, deemed both child and parent.

They fhould render the nobility hereditary, not as a boundary between the power of the prince and the weaknefs of the people, but as the bond and conjunction of

both.

In this government, fubftitutions which preferve the eftates of families undivided, are extremely ufeful, though in others not fo proper.

Here the power of redemption is of fervice, as it reftores to noble families the lands that had been alienated by the prodigality of a parent.

The lands of the nobility ought to have privileges as well as their perfons. The monarch's dignity is infeparable from that of his kingdom; and the dignity of the nobleman from that of his fief.

All these privileges must be peculiar to the nobility, and incommunicable to the people, unless we intend to act contrary to the principle of government, and to diminish the power of the nobles together with that of the people.

Subftitutions are a reftraint to commerce; the power of redemption produces an infinite number of proceffes; every effate in land that is fold throughout the kingdom, is in fome measure without an owner for the space of a year. Privileges annexed to fiefs give a power that is very burthenfome to thofe governments which tolerate them. Thefe are the particular inconveniencies of nobility; inconveni

ences

ences however that vanish when compared with the general utility which refults from it; but when these privileges are communicated to the people, every principle of government is broke through to no manner of purpose.

In monarchies a perfon may leave the bulk of his eftate to one of his children; a permiffion improper in any other government.

The laws ought to favor all kinds of commerce* confiftent with the conftitution of this government, to the end that the fubjects may, without ruining themfelves, be able to fatisfy the continual cravings of the prince and his

court.

They should eftablish fome fixed regulation, in the manner of collecting the taxes, that this may not be more burthenfome than the taxes themselves.

The weight of duties produces labor, labor weariness, and weariness the spirit of indolence.

Of the Expedition peculiar to the Executive Power in Monarchies.

GREAT is the advantage which a monarchical government has over a republic; as the state is conducted by a fingle perfon, the executive power is thereby enabled to act with greater expedition. But as this expedition may degenerate into rapidity, the laws fhould use some contrivance to flacken it. They ought not only to favor the nature of each conftitution, but likewife to remedy the abuses that might refult from this very nature.

Cardinal Richlieut advises monarchs to permit no focieties or communities that raife difficulties upon every thing. If this man's heart had not been bewitched with the love of defpotic power, ftill these arbitrary notions would have

filled his head.

The bodies intrufted with the depofitum of the laws, are never more obedient than when they proceed flowly,

and

* It is tolerated only in the common people. See the third law, Cod, de comm, et mercatoribus, which is full of good fenfe.

+ Teftam. Polit.

and ufe that reflection in the prince's affairs which can fcarcely be expected from the ignorance of the laws which prevail in a court, or from the precipitation of its councils.*

What would have become of the finest monarchy in the world, if the magiftrates, by their delays, by their complaints, by their prayers, had not ftopped the rapidity even of their prince's virtues, when thefe monarchs, confulting only the generous impulfe of great minds, wanted to give a boundless reward to fervices performed with a boundless courage and fidelity?

CHA P. XI.

Of the Excellence of a Monarchical Government.

MONARCHY has a great advantage over a defpotic government, As it naturally requires there fhould be feveral orders belonging to the conftitution under the prince, the ftate is more fixed, the conftitution more steady, and the perfon of him that governs more fecure.

Cicerot is of opinion, that the establishing of the tribunes was the prefervation of the republic. "In fact," fays he, "the violence of a headless people is more terrible. A chief or head is fenfible that the affair depends upon himself, and therefore he thinks; but the people in their impetuofity are ignorant of the danger into which they hurry themselves." This reflection may be applied to a defpotic government, which is a people without tribunes; and to a monarchy, where people have fome fort of trib

unes.

In fact, it is obfervable, that, in the commotions of a defpotic government, the people, hurried away by their paffions, pufh things always as far as they can go. The diforders they commit are all extreme; whereas in monarchies things are feldom carried to excefs. The chiefs are afraid on their own account, they are afraid of being abandoned;

Barbaris cunctatio fervilis, ftatim exequi regium videtur. Tacit. Anaal. l. 5.

+ Lib. 3. de leg.