that this divifion of lands, which was defigned to preferve the people's morals, does not fuit with a democracy, recourse must be had to other methods.

If a fixed body be established to serve as a rule and pattern of manners, a fenate, to which age, virtue, gravity and public fervices gain admittance; the fenators, by being exposed to public view like the ftatues of the gods, muft naturally infpire fentiments that will transfufe themfelves into the bofom of every family.

Above all, this fenate muft fteadily adhere to the ancient inftitutions, and mind that the people and the magistrates never fwerve from them.

The prefervation of the ancient customs is a very cɔnfiderable point in respect to manners. Since a corrupt people feldom perform any memorable actions, seldom eftablish focieties, build cities or enact laws; on the contrary, fince most inftitutions are derived from people of fimple or fevere morals, to recal men to the ancient maxims, is generally recalling them to virtue.

Befides, if there happens to be any revolution, by which the ftate has affumed a new form, this feldom can be effected without infinite pains and labor, and hardly ever with idlenefs and a depravation of manners. Even those who have been the inftruments of the revolution, are defirous it fhould be relifhed, which is difficult to compafs without good laws. Therefore ancient inftitutions are generally reformations, and modern ones abuses. In the courfe of a long adminiftration the defcent to vice is infenfible; but there is no reafcending to virtue without making the most generous efforts.

It has been queflioned, whether the members of the fenate we are here speaking of, ought to be for life, or chofen only for a time. Doubtlefs they ought to be for life, as was the custom at Rome,* at Sparta,† and even at Athens. For we must not confound what was called the Senate at Athens,

*The magiftrates there were annual, and the fenators for life.

+ Lycurgus, fays Xenophon de repub. Lacedæm, ordained that the fenators fhould be taken from amongst the old men, to the end that they should not be neglected in the decline of life. Thus, by making them judges of the courage of young people, he rendered the old age of the former more honor able than the ftrength and vigor of the latter.

Athens, which was a body that changed every three months, with the Areopagus, whofe members, as perpetual models, were established for life.

Let this be therefore a general maxim, That in a fenate defigned to be a rule, and the depofitory, as it were, of manners, the members ought to be chofen for life: In a fenate defigned for the adminiftration of affairs, the members may be changed.

The fpirit, fays Ariftotle, waxes old as well as the body. This reflection holds good only in regard to a fingle magiftrate; but cannot be applied to a fenatorian affembly.

At

At Athens, befides the Areopagus, there were guardians of the people's morals, and guardians of the laws.* Sparta all the old men were cenfors. At Rome the cenforfhip was committed to two particular magiftrates. As the fenate watched over the people, the cenfors were to have an eye over the people and the fenate. Their office was to reform the corruptions of the republic, to ftigmatize indolence, to cenfure irregularities, and to correct faults; and as for notorious crimes, thefe were left to the punishment of the laws.

That Roman law, which required the accufations of adultery to be public, was admirably well calculated for preserving the purity of morals; it intimidated married women, as well as those who were to watch over their conduct.

Nothing contributes more to the prefervation of morals, than an extreme fubordination of the young to the old. Thus they are both reftrained, the former by the respect they have for those of advanced age, and the latter by the respect they have for themfelves.

Nothing gives a greater force to the laws, than a perfect fubordination between the citizens and the magiftrate. The great difference which Lycurgus eftablished between Sparta and the other cities, fays Xenophon,+ confifts chiefly in the obedience the citizens fhould fhew to the laws; they run, when the magiftrate calls them. But at Athens, a rich man would be highly difpleafed to be thought dependent on the magiftrate.

* Even the Areopagus itfelf was fubject to their cenfure. + Republic of the Lacedæmonians.

Paternal

Paternal authority is likewise of great ufe towards the preservation of morals. We have already obferved, that in a republic there is not fo coercive a force as in other governments. The laws must therefore endeavor to fupply this deficiency by fome means or other; and this is done by paternal authority.

Fathers at Rome had the power of life and death over their children. At Sparta every father had a right to correct another man's child.

Paternal authority ended at Rome together with the republic. In monarchies where fuch a purity of morals is not required, they are controled by no other authority than that of the magistrates.

The Roman laws which accufiomed young people to dependence, eftablifhed a long minority. Perhaps we are miflaken in conforming to this cuftom; there is no neceffity for fo much constraint in monarchies.

This very fubordination in a republic might make it neceffary for the father to continue in the poffefsion of his children's fortune during life, as was the custom at Rome. But this is not agreeable to the spirit of monarchy.

CHAP. VIII.

In what Manner the Laws ought to be relative to the Principle of Government in an Ariftocracy.

IF F the people are virtuous in an aristocracy, they enjoy very near the fame happinefs as in a popular government, and the flate grows powerful. But as a great fhare of virtue is a very rare thing where men's fortunes are fo unequal, the laws muft tend as much as poffible to infuse a spirit of moderation, and endeavor to reestablish that equality which was neceffarily removed by the conftitution.

The

We may fee in the Roman hiftory, how ufeful this power was to the republic. I fhall give an inftance even in the time of its greatefl corruption. Aulus Fulvius was fet out on his journey in order to join Catiline; his father called him back, and put him to death. Salluft de bello Catil.

The fpirit of moderation is what we call virtue in an arifocracy; it fupplies the place of the fpirit of equality, in a popular state.

As the pomp and fplendor, with which kings are furrounded, form a part of their power; fo modefty and fimplicity of manners conftitute the strength of an aristocratic nobility.* When they affect no diftinction, when they mix with the people, drefs like them, and with them fhare all their pleafures, the people are apt to forget their fubjection and weakness.

Every government has its nature and principle. An ariftocracy must not therefore affume the nature and principle of monarchy; which would be the cafe were the nobles to be inveffed with perfonal and particular privileges diftinct from thofe of their body; privileges ought to be for the fenate, and simple respect for the fenators.

In aristocratical governments, there are two principal fources of diforder; exceffive inequality between the governors and the governed, and the fame inequality between the different members of the body that governs. From thefe two inequalities, hatreds and jealoufies arife, which the laws ought always to prevent or reprefs.

The first inequality is chiefly, when the privileges of the nobility are honorable only as they are ignominious to the people. Such was the law at Rome by which the patricians were forbidden to marry plebians ;† a law that had no other effect than to render the patricians on the one side more haughty, and on the other more odious.‡

This inequality occurs likewife when the condition of the citizens differs with regard to taxes; which may happen four different ways; when the nobles affume the privilege of paying none; when they commit frauds to ex

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empt

* In our days the Venetians, who in many respects may be faid to have a very wife government, decided a difpute between a noble Venetian and a gentleman in Terra Firma, with refpect to prececency in a church, by declaring that out of Venice a noble Venetian had no preeminence over any other citizen.

+ It was inferted by the decemvirs in the two last tables. See Dionyf.

Halicar. I. 10.

It is eafy to fee the advantages the tribunes drew from thence in their fpeeches.

empt themselves; when they engrofs the taxes to themfelves, under pretence of rewards or appointments for their respective employments; in fine, when they render the common people tributary, and divide among their own body the profits arifing from the feveral fubfidies. This laft cafe is very rare; an ariftocracy fo inftituted would be the moft intolerable of all governments.

While Rome inclined towards aristocracy, fhe avoided all these inconveniences. The magistrates never received any emoluments from their office. The chief men of the republic were taxed like the rest, nay heavier, and fometimes the taxes fell upon them alone. In fine, far from fharing among themselves the revenues of the flate, all they could draw from the public treasure, and all the wealth that fortune flung in their way, they bestowed freely on the people, that they might not envy them their honors. +

It is a fundamental maxim, that however pernicious the effects of largeffes be to the people in a democracy, in the fame degree are they falutary in an ariftocratical government: The former make them forget they are citizens, the latter bring them to a sense of it.

If the revenues of the ftate are not diftributed among the people, they must be convinced at least of their being well administered; to feaft their eyes with public treafure, is with them the fame thing almoft as enjoying it. The golden chain difplayed at Venice, the riches exhibited at Rome in public triumphs, the treasures preserved in the temple of Saturn, were in reality the riches of the people.

It is a very effential point in an ariftocracy, that the nobles themselves fhould not levy the taxes. The first order of the ftate in Rome never concerned themselves with it; the levying of taxes was committed to the fecond, and even this in process of time was attended with great inconveniences. In an ariftocracy of this kind, where the nobles levied the taxes, the private people would be all at the difcretion of those who were in public employments; and there would be no fuch thing as a fuperior tribunal to check

As in fome ariftocracies in Italy; nothing is more prejudicial to the government.

+ See in Strabo, 1. xiv. in what manner the Rhodians behaved in this refpect.