fhall find, that these are not mere airy fpeculations, but things confirmed by a fad and melancholy experience.

Ambition joined to idlenefs, and bafenefs to pride; a defire of obtaining riches without labor, and an aversion to truth; flattery, treafon, perfidy, violation of engagements, contempt of civil duties, fear of the prince's virtue, hope from his weakness, but above all, a perpetual ridicule caft upon virtue, are, I think, the characteristics by which most courtiers in all ages and countries have been conftantly diftinguished. Now, it is exceeding difficult for the leading men of the nation to be knaves, and for the inferior fort of people to be honeft; for the former to be cheats, and for the latter to reft fatisfied to be only dupes.

But if there fhould chance to be fome unlucky honeft man* among the people, Cardinal Richlieu in his political teftamentt feems to hint that a prince fhould take care not to employ him. So true it is that virtue is not the spring

of this government !

CHAP. VI.

In what manner Virtue is supplied in a Monarchical Government;

BUT it is high time for me to have done with this fubject, left I should be fufpected of writing a fatire again ft monarchical government. Far be it from me; if monarchy wants one fpring, it is provided with another. Honor, that is, the prejudice of every perfon and every rank, supplieth the place of virtue, and is every where her reprefentative; here it is capable of infpiring the most glorious actions, and joined with the force of laws may lead us to the end of government, as well as virtue itself.

Hence, in well regulated monarchies, they are almost all good fubjects, and very few good men; for to be a good man, a good intention is neceffary.§

*This is to be understood in the fenfe of the preceding note.

CHAP.

+ This book was written under the infpection, and from the memoirs of Cardinal Richlieu, by Meff, de Bourfeis and de who were strongly his adherents.

We must not, fays he, employ people of mean extraction; they are too auftere and difficult.

See the note above,

CHAP. VII.

Of the Principle of a Monarchy.

A MONARCHICAL government fuppofeth, as we have already obferved, preeminences and ranks, and likewife a noble defcent. Now, as it is the nature of honor to afpire to preferments and diftinguishing titles, it is therefore properly placed in this government.

Ambition is pernicious in a republic. But in a monarchy it has fome good effects; it gives life to the government, and is attended with this advantage, that it is no way dangerous, because it may be continually checked.

It is with this kind of government as with the fyftem of the univerfe, in which there is a power that conftantly repels all bodies from the centre, and a power of gravitation that attracts them to it. Honor fets all the parts of the body politic in motion; by its very action it connects them; and thus each individual advances the public good, while he only thinks of promoting his own particular intereft.

but

True it is, that, philofophically fpeaking, it is a falfe honor which moves all the parts of the government; even this falfe honor is as ufeful to the public, as true honor could poffibly prove to private people.

It is not a very great point, to oblige men to perform the most difficult actions, fuch as require a great degree of fortitude and fpirit, without any other recompenfe, than the fame and reputation arifing from the actions themselves.

CHA P. VIII.

That Honor is not the Principle of Defpotic Government.

HONOR is far from being the principle of def

potic government; men being here all upon a level, no

one

one can prefer himself to another; men, being here all flaves, can give themselves no preference at all.

Befides, as honor has its laws and rules, as it knows not how to fubmit, as it depends in a great measure on a man's own caprice, and not on that of another person; it can be found only in countries in which the conftitution is fixed, and where they are governed by settled laws.

How can a defpotic prince bear with any fuch thing as honor? Honor glories in contempt of life, and here the prince's whole ftrength confifts in the power of taking it away. How can honor ever bear with a defpotic prince? It has its fixed rules, and conftant caprices; but a defpotic prince is directed by no rule, and his own caprices deftroy all others.

Honor therefore, a thing unknown in defpotic governments, where very often they have not fo much as a fit word to exprefs it, is the prevailing principle in monarchies; here it gives life to the whole body politic, to the laws, and even to the virtues themselves.

CHA P. IX.

Of the Principle of Defpotic Government.

As virtue is neceffary in a republic, and in a monarchy honor; fo fear is neceffary in defpotic government; with regard to virtue, there is no occafion for it, and honor would be extremely dangerous.

Here the immenfe power of the prince is devolved entirely upon thofe to whom he is pleafed to intruft it. Perfons capable of fetting a value upon themselves would be likely to create revolutions. Fear muft therefore depress their fpirits, and extinguish even the least sense of ambition.

A moderate government may, whenever it pleases, and without any danger, relax its fprings; it fupports itfelf by its laws, and by its own force. But when a defpotic prince ceases one fingle moment to lift up his arm, when he cannot inftantly demolish thofe whom he has intrufted with

*See Perry, P. 447.

the

the firft poft and employments, all is over; for as fear, the fpring of this government, no longer fubfifts, the people are left without a protector.

It is probably in this fenfe the Cadis maintained that the Grand Signior was not obliged to keep his word or oath, when he limited thereby his authority.t

It is neceffary that the people fhould be judged by laws, and the great men by the caprice of the prince; that the lives of the loweft fubjects fhould be fate, and the bafhaw's head always in danger. We cannot mention these monftrous governments without horror, The Sophi of Perfia, dethroned in our days by Mahomet the fon of Miriveis, faw the conftitution fubverted before this revolution, because he had been too fparing of blood.‡

Hiftory informs us, that the horrid cruelties of Domitian ftruck fuch a terror into the governors, that the people recovered themselves a little under his reign. Thus a torrent lays one fide of a whole country waite, and on the other leaves fields untouched, where the eye is refreshed with the fight of fome diftant meadows.

CHAP. X.

Difference of Obedience in Moderate and Defpotic Governments

IN N defpotic ftates the nature of the government re, quires the most paffive obedience; and when once the prince's will is made known, it ought infallibly to produce its effect.

Here they have no limitations or reftrictions, no mediums, terms, equivalents, parleys or remonftrances; nothing equal or better to propofe; man is a creature that submits to the abfolute will of a creature like himfeif.

In a country like this, they are no more allowed to reprefent their fears in refpect to a future event, than to excuse their bad fuccefs by the capricioufnefs of fortune. Man's portion

* As it often happens in a military aristocracy.

+ Ricault on the Ottoman empire.

See the hiftory of this revolution by Father Du Cerceau.

His was a military government, which is one of the fpecies of defpotic governments.

portion here, like that of beafts, is inftinet, compliance and punishment.

Little does it then avail to plead the fentiments of nature, refpect for a father, tenderness for a wife and children, the laws of honor, or an ill state of health; the orders are given, and that is fufficient.

In Perfia, when the king has condemned a person, it is no longer lawful to mention his name, or to intercede in his favor. Though he were drunk and befide himself, yet the decree must be executed ;* otherwise he would contradict himself, and the law admits of no contradiction. This has been the way of thinking in this country in all ages; as the order which Ahafuerus gave to exterminate the Jews, could not be revoked, they contrived to allow them the liberty of defending themselves.

The

There is one thing, however, that may be opposed to the prince's will; namely, religion. They will abandon a parent, nay they may kill him, if the prince fo com. mands ; but he cannot oblige them to drink wine. laws of religion are of a fuperior nature, because they bind the prince as well as the fubject. But, with refpect to the law of nature, it is otherwife; the prince is no longer fuppofed to be a man.

In monarchical and moderate fates, the power is limited by its very spring; I mean, by honor, which like a monarch reigns over prince and people. They will not here allege to their prince the laws of religion; a courtier would think this would render him ridiculous. But the laws of honor will be alleged on all occafions. Hence arise the restrictions necessary to obedience; honor is naturally subject to whims, by which the subject's obedience will be always directed.

Though the manner of obeying be different in these two kinds of government, yet the power is the fame. On which fide foever the monarch turns, he inclines the scale, and is obeyed. The whole difference is, that in a monarchy the prince has the affiftance of inftruction, and his minifters. have a far greater capacity, and are far better versed in affairs than the minifters of a defpotic government.

СНАР.

*See Sir John Chardin.

+ Ibid.