oppreffors. What remedy could a merchant have against a bafhaw that was determined to confifcate his merchandifes ?

The prince therefore reftrains his own power, finding himself under a neceffity of acting with fome kind of lenity. In Turkey they raife only a fingle duty for the importation of goods, and afterwards the whole country is open to the merchant. Falfe entries are not attended with confifcation, or increafe of duty. In China, they never open the baggage of those who are not merchants. Defrauding the customs in the territory of the Mogul is not punifhed with confifcation, but with doubling the duty. The princes oft Tartary, who refide in towns, impose scarce any duty at all on the goods that pafs through their country. In Japan, it is true, the defrauding of the cuftoms is a capital crime; but this is becaufe they have particular reafons for prohibiting all communication with foreigners; hence the fraud is rather a contravention of the laws made for the fecurity of the government, than of thofe of commerce.

CHAP. XII.

Relation between the Greatnefs of Taxes and Liberty.

IT is a a general rule, that taxes may be heavier in proportion to the liberty of the fubject, and that there is a neceffity for reducing them in proportion to the increase of flavery. This has always been, and always will be, the cafe. It is a rule derived from nature, that never varies. We find it in all parts, in England, in Holland, and in every state where liberty gradually declines, till we come to Turkey. Switzerland feems to be an exception to this rule, because they pay no taxes; but the particu

Father du Halde, tom. 2. p. 37.

+ Hiftory of the Tartars, part 3. p. 290.

lar

Being willing to trade with foreigners without having any commu. nication with them, they have pitched upon two nations for that purpose, the Dutch for the commerce of Europe, and the Chinese for that of Afia, they confine the factors and failors in a kind of prison, and lay fuch a restraint upon them as tires their patience.

lar reason for that exemption is well known, and even confirms what I have advanced. In those barren moun, tains provifions are fo dear, and the country is fo popu. lous, that a Swifs pays four times more to nature, than a Turk does to the Sultan.

A conquering people, fuch as were formerly the Athenians, and the Romans, may rid themselves of all taxes, as they reign over vanquished nations. Then indeed they do not pay in proportion to their liberty, becaufe in this refpect they are no longer a people, but a monarch.

But the general rule ftill holds good. In moderate gov ernments there is an indemnity for the weight of the taxes, which is liberty. In defpotic countries* there is an equiv alent for liberty, which is the lightness of the taxes.

In fome monarchies in Europe, there aret particular provinces, which, from the very nature of their civil gov. ernment, are in a more flourishing condition than the reft, It is pretended, that these provinces are not fufficiently taxed, because through the goodness of their government they are able to be taxed higher. Hence the minifters feem conftantly to aim at depriving them of this very government, from whence a diffufive bleffing is derived; a bleffing which fpreads its influence to diftant parts, and redounds even to the prince's advantage.

CHA P. XIII.

In what Governments Taxes are capable of Increafe.

TAXES may be increased in moft republics, because the citizen who thinks he is paying himself, willingly fubmits to them, and moreover is generally able to bear their weight through an effect of the nature of the govern

ment.

In a monarchy taxes may be increased, because the mod

eration

In Ruffia the taxes are but fmal!; they have been increased fince the defpotic power of the prince is exercifed with more moderation. See the hiftory of the Tartars, part 2.

The Pais d' Etas, where the ftates of the province affemble to deliberata en public affairs.

eration of the government is capable of procuring riches: It is a recompence, as it were, of the prince for the refpe&t he fhews to the laws. In defpotic governments they cannot be increased, because there can be no increafe of the extremity of avery.

CHAP. XIV.

That the Nature of the Taxes is relative to the Government.

A CAPITATION is more natural to flavery ; a duty on merchandifes is more natural to liberty, because it has not fo direct a relation to the perfon.

It is natural in a defpotic government for the prince not to give money to his foldiers, or to those belonging to his court, but to diftribute lands amongst them, and of courfe that there should be very few taxes. But if the prince gives money, the most natural tax he can raife, is a capitation, which can never be confiderable. For as it is impoffible to make different claffes of the contributors, because of the abuses that might arife from thence, confidering the injuftice and violence of the government, they are under an abfolute neceffity of regulating themselves by the rate of what even the poorest and most wretched are able to pay.

The natural tax of moderate governments is the duty laid on merchandifes. As this is really paid by the con fumer, though advanced by the merchant, it is a loan which the merchant has already made to the consumer. Hence the merchant must be confidered on the one fide, as the general vender for the flate, and on the other, as the ereditor of every individual. He advances to the flate the duty which the confumer will fome time or other refund, and he has paid for the confumer the duty which he has paid for the merchandife. It is therefore obvious that in proportion to the moderation of the government, to the prevalence of the fpirit of liberty, and to the fecurity of private fortunes, the more a merchant has it in his power in advance money to the ftate, and to pay confiderable

duties

duties for individuals. In England a merchant lends really to the government fifty or fixty pounds fterling for ev ery tun of wine he imports. Where is the merchant that would dare do any fuch thing in a country like Turkey? And were he fo courageous, how could he do it with a dubious or fhattered fortune ?

CHAP. XV.

Abufe of Liberty.

To thefe great advantages of liberty it is owing,

that liberty itself has been abused. Becaufe a moderate government has been productive of admirable effects, this moderation has been laid afide: Because great taxes have been raised, they wanted to raise them to excefs: And ungrateful to the hand of liberty of whom they received this prefent, they addreffed themfelves to flavery, who never grants the leaft favor.

Liberty produces exceffive taxes; but the effect of exceffive taxes is to produce flavery in their turn; and slavery produces a diminution of tribute.

Moft of the edicts of the eastern monarchies are to exempt every year fome province of their empire from paying tribute. The manifeftations of their will are favors. But in Europe the edicts of princes are disagreeable even before they are seen, because they always make mention of their own wants, but not a word of ours.

From an unpardonable indolence in the minifters of thofe countries, owing to the nature of the government, and frequently to the climate, the people derive this advantage, that they are not inceffantly plagued with new demands. The public expense does not increase, because the minifters do not form new projects; and if some by chance are formed, they are fuch as are foon executed. The governors of the flate do not perpetually torment the people, because they do not perpetually torment themfelves. But it is impoffible there fhould be any fixed

This is the practice of the emperors of China,

rule

rule in our finances, because we always know that we fhall have fomething or other to do, without ever know. ing what it is.

It is no longer cuftomary with us to give the appellation of a great minifter to a wife difpenfer of the public revenues; but to a perfon of dexterity and cunning, who is clever at finding out what we call ways and means.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Conquefts of the Mahometans.

It was this excefs of taxes that occafioned the prodigious facility with which the Mahometans carried on their conquefts. Inftead of a continual feries of extortions devised by the fubtile avarice of the emperors, the people were fubjected to a fimple tribute, which was paid and collected with eafe. Thus they were far happier in obeying a barbarous nation, than a corrupt government, in which they fuffered every inconveniency of a loft liberty, with all the horrors of a prefent flavery.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Augmentation of Troops.

A NEW distemper has spread itself over Europe; it has infected our princes, and induces them to keep up an exorbitant number of troops. It has its redoublings, and of neceffity becomes contagious. For as foon as one prince augments what he calls his troops, the rest of course do the fame; fo that nothing is gained thereby, but the public ruin. Each monarch keeps as many armies on foot as if his people were in danger of being exterminated; and they

See in hiftory the greatness, the oddity, and even the folly of thofe taxes. Anaftafius invented a tax for breathing, ut quisque pro haustu acric penderet,