people, they ought never to have a power of increafing the fervice or tribute. Befides it is right the prince should be fatisfied with his own demefne and the military fervice. But if he wants to raise taxes on the bondmen of his nobility, the lords of the feveral diftricts ought to be anfwerable for the tax, and be obliged to pay it for the bondmen, by whom they may afterwards be reimburfed. But if this rule is not followed, the lord and the collectors of the prince's taxes will harrafs the poor bondman by turns, till he perishes with mifery, or flies into the woods.

CHAP. VI.

Of a defpotic Government in the like Cafe.

WHAT has been above faid, is ftill more in difpenfably neceffary in a defpotic government. The lord who is every moment liable to be ftripped of his lands and bondmen, is not so eager to preserve them.

When Peter I thought proper to follow the custom of Germany, and to demand his taxes in money, he made a very prudent regulation which is ftill followed in Ruffia, The gentleman levies the tax on the peasants, and pays it to the Czar. If the number of peafants diminishes, he pays the fame; if it increases he pays no more: So that it is his intereft not to worry or opprefs his vaffals.

CHAP. VII.

Of Taxes in Countries where Villainage is not established,

WHEN the inhabitants of a state are all free fubjects, and each man enjoys his property with as much right as the prince his fovereignty, taxes may then be laid either

on

This is what induced Charlemagne to make his excellent inftitutions upthis head. See the 5th book of the capitularies, art. 393. + This is the practice in Germany.

either on perfons, on lands, on merchandifes, on two of thefe, or on all three together.

In the taxing of perfons, it would be an unjuft proportion to conform exactly to that of property. At Athens the* people were divided into four claffes. Those who drew five hundred measures of liquid or dry fruit from their eftates, paid at talent to the public; thofe who drew three hundred measures, paid half a talent; those who had two hundred measures, paid ten minæ ; those of the fourth clafs paid nothing at all. The tax was fair, though it was not proportionable: If it did not follow the proportion of people's property, it followed that of their wants. judged that every man had an equal fhare of what was neceffary for nature; that whatsoever was neceffary for nature ought not to be taxed; that to this fucceeded the ufeful, which ought to be taxed, but lefs than the superfluous; and that largenefs of the taxes on what was fuperfluous, prevented fuperfluity,

It was

In the taxing of lands it is cuftomary to make lifts or registers in which the different claffes of eftates are ranged. But it is very difficult to know thefe differences, and ftill ⚫ more fo to find people that are not interested in mistaking them. Here therefore are two forts of injuftice, that of the man, and that of the thing. But if in general the tax be not exorbitant, and the people continue to have plenty of neceffaries, these particular acts of injuftice will do no harm. On the contrary, if the people are permitted to enjoy only just what is neceffary for fubfiftence, the leaft difproportion will be of the greatest confequence.

If fome fubjects do not pay enough, the mischief is not fo great; their convenience and eafe turn always to the public advantage: If fome private people pay too much, their ruin redounds to the public detriment. If the government proportions its fortune to that of individuals, the eafe and conviency of the latter will foon make its fortune rife. The whole depends upon a critical moment. Shall the ftate begin with impoverishing the fubjects to enrich itself? Or had it better wait to be enriched by its wealthy fubjects? Is it more adviseable for it to have the firft or fecond advantage? Which shall it choose, to begin, or to end, with being rich?

04

Pollux, book 8. chap. 10. art. 130.

+ Or 60 ming.

The

The duties felt leaft by the people are thofe on merchandife, because they are not demanded of them in form. They may be fo prudently managed, that the people themfelves fhall hardly know they pay them. For this purpose it is of the utmoft confequence, that the perfon who fells the merchandise fhould pay the duty. He is very fenfible that he does not pay it for himself; and the confumer who pays it in the main, confounds it with the price. Some authors have observed that Nero had abolished the duty of the five and twentieth part arifing from the fale of flaves ;* and yet he had only ordained that it fhould be paid by the feller inftead of the purchaser; this regulation, which left the impoft entire, feemed nevertheless to fupprefs it.

There are two ftates in Europe where there are very heavy impofts upon liquors; in one the brewer alone pays the duty, in the other it is levied indifcriminately upon all the confumers: In the first nobody feels the rigor of the impoft, in the fecond it is looked upon as a grievance. In the former the fubject is fenfible only of the liberty he has of not paying, in the latter he feels only the neceffity that compels him to pay.

Farther, the obliging the confumers to pay, requires a perpetual rummaging and fearching into their houses. Now, nothing is more contrary than this to liberty; and thofe who eftablish thefe fort of duties, have not furely been fo happy in this refpect, as to hit upon the best method of administration.

CHAP. VIII.

In what Manner the Illufion is preferved.

IN N order to make the purchaser confound the price of the commodity with the impoft, there must be fome proportion between the impoft and the value of the commodity; wherefore there ought not to be an exceffive duty

upon

Vectigal quinta et vicefimæ venalium mancipiorum remiffum fpecie magis quam vi, quia cum venditor pendere juberetur, in partem pretii emptoribus accrefcebat. Tacit. Annal, lib, 13.

upon merchandifes of little value. There are countries in which the duty exceeds feventeen or eighteen times the value of the commodity. In this cafe the prince removes the illufion; his fubjects plainly fee they are dealt with in an unreasonable manner; which renders them moft exquifitely fenfible of their flavish fituation,

Befides, the prince, to be able to levy a duty fo difproportioned to the value of the commodity, must be himfelf the vender, and the people must not have it in their power to purchase it elsewhere; A practice fubject to a thousand inconveniencies.

Smuggling being in this cafe extremely lucrative, the natural and most reasonable penalty, namely the confiseation of the merchandise, becomes incapable of putting a ftop to it, efpecially as this very merchandise, is intrinsically of an inconfiderable value. Recourse muft therefore be had to extravagant punishments, fuch as thofe inflicted for capital crimes. All proportion then of punishment is at an end. People that cannot really be confidered as bad men, are punished like villains; which, of all things in the world, is the most contrary to the spirit of a moderate ⚫government.

I add, that the more the people are tempted to cheat the farmer of the revenues, the more the lattter is enriched, and the former impoverished. To put a stop to fmuggling, the publican must be invefted with extraordinary means of oppreffing, and then the country is ruined.

CHA P. IX.

Of a bad Kind of Impoft.

WE fhall here take fome curfory notice of an impoft laid in particular countries on the different articles of civil contracts. As thefe are things fubject to very nice difquifitions, a vaft deal of knowledge is neceffary to make any tolerable defence against the farmer of the revenues, who interprets, in that case, the regulations of the prince, and exercifes an arbitrary power over people's

fortunes.

fortunes. Experience has demonftrated that a duty on the paper on which the deeds are drawn, would be of far greater fervice.

CHAP. X.

That the Greatness of Taxes depends on the Nature of the Govern

ment.

TAXES ought to be very light in defpotic gov

ernments; otherwife who would be at the trouble of till- . ing the land? Befides, how is it poffible to pay heavy taxes in a government that makes no manner of return to the different contributions of the subject?

The exorbitant power of the prince, and the extreme depreffion of the people, require that there fhould not be even a poffibility of the least mistake between them. The taxes ought to be fo easy to collect, and fo clearly settled, as to leave no opportunity to the collectors to increase or diminish them. A portion of the fruits of the earth, a capitation, a duty of fo much per cent, on merchandises, are the only taxes fuitable to that government.

Merchants in defpotic countries ought to have a perfonal fafeguard, to which all due refpect fhould be paid. Without this, they would ftand no chance in the difputes that might arise between them and the prince's officers,

CHAP. XI.

Of Fifcal Punishments,

WITH respect to fiscal punishments, there is

one thing very particular, that, contrary to the general cultom, they are more fevere in Europe than in Afia. In Europe, not only the merchandifes, but even fometimes the fhips and carriages, are confifcated; which is never practifed in Afia. This is because in Europe the merchant has judges, who are able to shelter him from oppreffion; in Afia the defpotic judges themselves would be the greate

oppreffors,