[Book XII. the evil. Particular laws facilitated to debtors the means of paying, and in the year of Rome 428 the confuls propofed a law, which deprived creditors of the power of confining debtors in their own houfes. An ufurer, by name Papirius, attempted to corrupt the chastity of a young man named Publius, whom he kept in irons. Sextus's crime gave to Rome its political liberty; that of Papirius gave it alfo the civil

Such was the fate of this city, that new crimes confirmed the liberty, which those of a more ancient date had pro.. cured it. Appius's attempt upon Virginia, flung the people again into that horror against tyrants with which the misfortune of Lucretia had firft infpired them. Thirtyfeven years after the crime of the infamous Papirius, an action of the like criminal nature, was the caufe of the people's retiring to the Janiculum, and of giving new vigor to the law made for the fafety of debtors.

After that time creditors were oftener profecuted by debtors for having violated the laws against ufury, than the latter were fued for refusing to pay them.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Things that frike at Liberty in Monarchies.

LIBERTY has been often weakened in monar chies by a thing of the leaft use in the world to the prince : This is, the naming of the commiffioners to try a private perfon.

The prince himself derives fo very little advantage from thofe commiffioners, that it is not worth while to change

for

See what follows in the 24th chapter of the book of laws as relative to the ufe of money.

+ One hundred and twenty years after the law of the twelve tables, eo anno plebi Romana, velut aliud initium libertatis factum eft, quod neƐti defierant. Liv. lib. 8.

Bona debitoris, non corpus obnoxium effet. Ibid.

The year of Rome 465.

That of Plautius who made an attempt on the body of Veturius. Valerius Maximus, book 6. art. 9. These two events ought not to be confounded; they are neither the fame perfons, nor the fame times.

See a fragment of Dionyf. Halicarn. in the extract of virtues and vices; Livy's epitom. book 11. and Freinshemius, book 14.

for their fake the common course of things. He is morally fure that he has more of the spirit of probity and juftice than his commiffioners, who always think themselves fufficiently juftified by his orders, by a dubious intereft of ftate, by the choice that has been made of them, and even by their very apprehenfions.

Upon the arraigning of a peer under Henry VIII, it was cuftomary to try him by a committee of the house of lords: By this means he put to death as many peers as he pleased.

С НА Р. ХХІІІ.

Of Spies in Monarchies.

SHOULD I be asked whether there is any necefSity for fpies in monarchies ; my answer would be, that the ufual practice of good princes is not to employ them. When a man obeys the laws, he has difcharged his duty to his prince. He ought at least to have his own house for an afylum, and the rest of his condu&t fhould be exempt from inquiry. The fpying trade might perhaps be tolerable, were it practifed by honeft men; but the neceffary infamy of the perfon is fufficient to make us judge of the infamy of the thing. A prince ought to act towards his fubjects with candor, frankness and confidence. He has fo much difquiet, fufpicion and fear, as an actor embarrassed in playing his part. When he finds that the laws are generally observed and refpected, he may judge himself fate. The general behavior of the public answers for that of every individual. Let him not be afraid: He cannot imagine how natural it is for his people to love him. And how fhould they do otherwife than love him? fince he is the fource of almoft all the favors that are fhewn; punifhments being generally charged to the account of the laws. He never thews himself to his people but with a ferene countenance: They have even a fhare of his glory, and they are protected by his power. A proof of his being beloved is, that his fubjects have a confidence in him; what the minifter refufes, they imagine the prince would

have

have granted: Even under public calamities they do not accuse his perfon; they are apt to complain of his being mifinformed, or befet by corrupt men: "Did the prince but know, fay the people; thefe words are a kind of invocation, and a proof of the confidence they have in his per

for.

CHA P. Xxiv.

Of anonymous Letters.

*

THE Tartars are obliged to put their names to their arrows, that the arm may be known that fhoots them. When Philip of Macedon was wounded at the fiege of a certain town, thefe words were found on the javelin, Af ter has given this mortal wound to Philip. If they who accufe a perfon did it merely to ferve the public, they would not carry their complaint to the prince, who may be eafily prejudiced, but to the magiftrates who have rules that are formidable only to calumniators. But if they are unwilling to leave the laws open between them and the accufed, it is a prefumption they have reafon to be afraid of them; and the leaft punishment they ought to fuffer, is not to be credited. No notice therefore thould ever be taken of thofe letters but in cafes that cannot admit of the delays of the ordinary courfe of justice, and where the prince's welfare is concerned. Then it may be imagined that the accufer has made an effort which has untied his tongue and made him fpeak. But in other cafes one ought to fay with the emperor Conftantius, "We cannot fufpect a perfon who has wanted an accufer, whilft he did not want an enemy."+

CHAP.

* Plutarch's morals, comparison of fome Roman and Greek hiftories, tom. 2. p. 487.

+ Leg. 6. code. Theod. de famof. libellis,

CHAP. XXV.

Of the Manner of governing in Monarchies.

THE royal authority is a great fpring that ought

to move eafily, and without noife. The Chinese boaft of one of their emperors, who governed, they fay, like heaven, that is, by his example.

There are fome cafes in which a fovereign ought to exert the full extent of his power; and others in which he ought to reduce it within its proper limits. The fublimity of adminiftration confifts, in knowing perfectly the proper degree of power that should be exerted on different occafions.

The whole felicity of our monarchies confifts in the opinion people have of the lenity of the government. A wrongheaded minifter always wants to remind us of our flavery. But granting even that we are flaves, he ought to endeavor to conceal our, miferable condition from us. All he can fay or write, is, that the prince is uneasy, that he is furprised, and that he will fet things to rights. There is a certain ease in commanding; the prince ought only to encourage, and leave the menacing part to the laws.*

CHA P. XXVI.

That in a Monarchy the Prince ought to be of ealy Accefs.

THE utility of this maxim will appear better

from the inconveniency attending the contrary practice. "Czar Peter I, fays the Sieur Perry,t has published a new edict, by which he forbids any of his fubjects to offer him a petition, till after having prefented two to his offi. In case of refufal of juftice, they may present him a third, but upon pain of death, if they are in the wrong.

cers.

Nerva, fays Tacitus, increafed the ease of the empire. + State of Ruffia, p. 173. Paris edition, 1717.

After

After this, no one ever prefumed to offer a petition to the Czar."

THE manners of a prince contribute as much as the laws themfelves to liberty; like these he may transform men into beafts, and beafts into men. If he likes free and noble fouls, he will have fubjects; if he likes base, daftardly spirits, he will have flaves. Does he want to know the great art of ruling? let him call honor and virtue around his perfon, let him invite perfonal merit. He may even fometimes caft an eye on talents and abilities. Let him not be afraid of thofe rivals who are called men of merit; he is their equal as foon as he loves them. Let him gain the hearts of his people without bringing their fpirits into fubjection. Let him render himfelf popular; he ought to be pleased with the affection of the loweft of his fubjects, for they too are men. The common people require fo very little deference, that it is fit they fhould be humored; the infinite diftance between the fovereign and them will furely prevent them from giving him any uneafinefs. Let him be exorable to fupplication, and refolute against demands; let him be fenfible, in fine, that his people have his refusals, while his courtiers enjoy his favors.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of the Regard which Monarchs owe to their Subjects.

PRINCES ought to be extremely circumfpect in point of raillery. It pleases when moderate, because it opens the way to familiarity; but a biting raillery is lefs excufable in them than in the meaneft of their subjects, for it is they alone that give a mortal wound.

Much less ought they to offer a notorious infult to any

of