rius inlifted all forts of people into his army, and foon after the republic was loft.* Befides, the knights were the farmers of the public revenues; a fet of rapacious men, who fowed new miseries amongst a miserable people, and made a sport of the public calamity. Inftead of giving to such men as those the power of judging, they ought to have been conftantly under the eye of the judges. This we must say in commendation of the ancient French laws; they have ftipulated with the officers of the revenues, with as great a diffidence as would be obferved between enemies. When the judiciary power at Rome was transferred to the farmers of the revenues, there was then an end of virtue, policy, laws, magistracy and magiftrates. Of this we find a very ingenious defcription in fome fragments of Diodorus Siculus and Dio. "Mucius Scævola, (fays Diodorust) wanted to revive the ancient morals, and the laudable cuftom of fober and frugal living. For his predeceffors having entered into a contract with the farmers of the revenue, who at that time were poffeffed of the judiciary power at Rome, they had filled the province with all manner of crimes. But Scævola made an example of the publicans, and imprisoned those who had fent others to prifon." Dio informs us, that Publius Rutilius, his lieutenant, was equally obnoxious to the equestrian order, and that, upon his return, they accufed him of having received fome prefents, and condemned him to a fine, upon which he inftantly made a ceffion of his goods. His innocence appeared in this, that he was found to be worth a great deal less than what he was charged with having extorted, and that he fhewed a juft title to what he poffeffed: But he would not live any longer in the fame city with fuch profligate wretches. The Italians, fays Diodorus again, bought up whole droves of flaves in Sicily, to till their lands, and to take care of their cattle; but refused them a neceffary fubfiftThese wretches were then forced to go and rob on ence. 2 the Capitæ cenfos plerofque. Salluft. de bello Fug. Fragment of his hiftory, taken from the extract of virtues and vices. the highways, armed with lances and clubs, covered with beafts skins, and followed by large maftiff dogs. Thus the whole province was laid wafte, and the inhabitants could not call any thing their own, but what was fecured within the walls of towns. There was neither proconful nor prætor, that could or would oppofe this disorder, or that prefumed to punish thefe flaves, because they belonged to the knights, who at Rome were poffeffed of the judi ciary power. And yet this was one of the causes of the war of the flaves. But I fhall add only one word more. A profeffion that neither has, nor can have any other view than lucre, a profeffion that was always forming fresh demands, without ever granting any, a deaf and inexorable profeffion, that impoverished the rich, and increas ed even the mifery of the poor; fuch a profeffion, 1 fay, fhould never have been intrufted with the judiciary power at Rome. * CHA P. XIX. Of the Government of the Roman Provinces. SUCH was the diftribution of the three powers in Rome. But they were far from being thus diftributed in the provinces: Liberty was at the centre, and tyranny in the extreme parts. While Rome extended her dominions no farther than Italy, the people were governed as confederates; and the laws of each republic were preserved. But as foon as the enlarged her conquefts, and the fenate had no longer an immediate inspection over the provinces, nor the magif trates refiding at Rome were any longer capable of govern ing the empire, they were obliged to fend prætors and proconfuls. Then it was that the harmony of the three powers was loft. Thofe who were fent on that errand, were intrufted with a power which comprehended that of all the Roman magiftracies; nay even that of the fenate and of the * Penes quos Romæ tum judicia erant, atque ex equeftri ordine folerent. fortito judices eligi in caufa prætorum et proconfulum, quibus post adminiftratam provinciam dies dicta erat. the people. They were defpotic magistrates, extremely proper for the distance of the places to which they were fent. They exercifed the three powers; being, if I may prefume to use the expreffion, the bashaws of the republic. We have elsewhere obferved, that in a commonwealth the fame magiftrate ought to be poffeffed of the executive power, as well civil as military, To this it is owing that a conquering republic can hardly communicate her government, and rule the conquered ftate according to the form of her own conftitution. In fact, as the magiftrate she fends to govern is invested with the executive power, both civil and military, he must also have the legislative For who is it that could make laws without him? He muft likewife have the judiciary power? For who could pretend to judge independently of him? It is neceffary therefore that the governor fhe fends be intrufted with the three powers, as was practifed in the Roman provinces. It is more eafy for a monarchy to communicate its gov ernment, because the officers it fends, have, fome the civil executive, and others the military executive power; which does not neceffarily imply a defpotic authority, It was a privilege of the utmoft confequence to a Roman citizen, to have none but the people for his judges, Were it not for this, he would have been fubject in the provinces to the arbitrary power of a proconful or of a proprætor. The city never felt the tyranny, which was exercifed only on conquered nations. Thus in the Roman world, as at Sparta, thofe who were free were extremely fo, while those who were flaves labored under the extremity of flavery. While the citizens paid taxes, they were raifed with great juftice and equality. The regulation of Servius Tullius was obferved, who had diftributed the people into fix classes according to their difference of property, and fixed the feveral fhares of the public taxes in proportion to that which each perfon had in the government. Hence they bore with the greatness of the tax because of their proportionable greatnefs of credit, and confoled themfelves for the fmallnefs of their credit, because of the fmallnefs of the tax. There was also another thing worthy of admiration, which is, that as Servius Tullius's divifion into claffes was 3 * They made their edicts upon coming into the provinces. in in fome measure the fundamental principle of the conftitution, it thence followed that an equal levying of the taxes was fo connected with this fundamental principle, that the one could not be abolished without the other. * But while the city paid the taxes without trouble, or paid none at all, the provinces were plundered by the knights, who were the farmers of the public revenues. We have already made mention of their oppreffive extortions, with which all hiftory abounds. "All Afia, (fays Mithridatest) expects me as its deliverer; fo great is the hatred which the rapaciousness of the proconfuls, the confifcations made by the officers of the revenue, and the quirks and cavils of judicial proceedings, have excited against the Romans." Hence it was that the ftrength of the provinces made no addition to, but rather weakened the ftrength of the republic. Hence it was that the provinces looked upon the lofs of the liberty of Rome as the epocha of their own freedom. CHA P. XX. End of this Book. I SHOULD be glad to inquire into the distribu tion of the three powers, in all the moderate governments we are acquainted with, and to calculate thereby the degrees of liberty which each may enjoy. But we must not always exhauft a fubject fo far, as to leave no work at all for the reader. My bufinefs is not to make people read, but to make them think. BOOK *After the conqueft of Macedonia the Romans paid no taxes. + Speech taken from Trogus Pompeius, and related by Juftin, book 38. See the orations against Verres. It is well known what fort of a tribunal was that of Varus which provok ed the Germans to revolt. BOOK XII. OF THE LAWS THAT FORM POLITICAL LIBERTY AS RELATIVE TO THE SUBJECT. CHAP. I. Idea of this Book. It is not fufficient to have treated of political liberty as relative to the conftitution; we muft examine it likewise in the relation it bears to the fubject. We have observed, that in the first cafe it is formed by a certain diftribution of the three powers: But in the fecond we must confider it under another idea. It confifts in fecurity, or in the opinion people have of their fecurity. The conftitution may happen to be free, and the fubject not. The fubject may be free, and not the conftitution. In those cases, the conftitution will be free by right and not in fact, the subject will be free in fact, and not by right. It is the difpofition only of the laws, and even of the fundamental laws, that conftitutes liberty in its relation to the conftitution. But as it relates to the fubject; morals, customs, or received examples may give rife to it, and particular civil laws may favor it, as we shall presently fee in this book. Farther, as in moft ftates, liberty is more checked or depreffed than their conftitution demands, it is proper to treat of the particular laws that in each constitution are apt to affift or check the principle of liberty, which each state is capable of receiving. 4 CHAP, |