oufnefs, on activity than prudence, on ftrength than counfel. Hence, the army will ever despise a senate, and refpect their own officers. They will naturally flight the orders fent them by a body of men, whom they look upon as cowards, and therefore unworthy to command them. So that as foon as the army depends on the legislative body, the government becomes a military one; and if the contrary has ever happened, it has been owing to fome extraordinary circumftances. It is because the army was always kept divided; it is because it was composed of feveral bodies, that depended each on their particular province; it is becaufe the capital towns were ftrong places, defended by their natural fituation, and not garrifoned with regular troops. Holland, for inftance, is ftill fafer than Venice; fhe might drown, or ftarve the revolted troops; for as they are not quartered in towns capable of furnishing them with neceffary fubfiftence, this fubfiftence is of course precarious. Whoever fhall read the admirable treatise of Tacitus on the manners of the Germans,* will find that it is from them the English have borrowed the idea of their political government. This beautiful fyftem was invented firft in the woods. As all human things have an end, the ftate we are fpeaking of will lofe its liberty, it will perifh. Have not Rome, Sparta, and Carthage perifhed? It will perish when the legislative power fhall be more corrupted than the executive. It is not my business to examine whether the English actually enjoy this liberty, or not. It is fufficient for my purpose to obferve, that it is established by their laws; and I inquire no further. Neither do I pretend by this to undervalue other governments, nor to say that this extreme political liberty ought to give uneafinefs to those who have only a moderate fhare of it. How should I have any fuch defign, I who think that even the excess of reafon is not always defirable, and that mankind generally find their account better in mediums than in extremes ? Harrington De minoribus rebus principes confultant, de majoribus omnes; ita ta men ut ea quoque, quorum penes plebem arbitrium est, apud principes pertractentur. Harrington, in his Oceana, has alfo inquired into the highest point of liberty to which the conftitution of a state may be carried. But of him indeed it may be faid, that, for want of knowing the nature of real liberty, he bufied himself in pursuit of an imaginary one, and that he built a Chalcedon, though he had a Byzantium before his eyes. CHAP. VII. Of the Monarchies we are acquainted with. THE monarchies we are acquainted with, have not, like that we have been fpeaking of, liberty for their direct view Their only aim is the fubject's, the state's, and the prince's glory. But from this glory there results a fpirit of liberty, which in those states may perform as great things, and may contribute as much perhaps to hap pinefs, as liberty itself. Here the three powers are not diftributed and founded on the model of the conftitution abovementioned; they have each a particular diftribution, according to which they border more or lefs upon political liberty; and if they did not border upon it, monarchy would degenerate into def potic government. CHAP. VIII. Why the Ancients had not a clear idea of Monarchy. THE ancients had no notion of a government founded on a body of nobles, and much less on a legislative body compofed of the reprefentatives of the people. The republics of Greece and Italy were cities that had each their own form of government, and convened their fubjects within their own walls. Before Rome had swallowed up all the other republics, there was fcarce any where a king to be found, no, not in Italy, Gaul, Spain, or Germany; thefe were were all petty ftates, or little republics. Even Africa itfelf was fubject to a great republic; and Afia Minor was occupied by Greek colonies. There was therefore no example of deputies of towns, or affemblies of the ftates; one must have gone as far as Perfia to find a country under the government of a fingle perfon. I am not ignorant that there were confederate republics; in which feveral towns fent deputies to an affembly. But I affirm there was no monarchy on the prefent model. The firft plan therefore of the monarchies we are acquainted with, was thus formed. The German nations that conquered the Roman empire, were, as it is known to every one, a free people. Of this we may be convinced only by reading Tacitus on the manners of the Germans. The conquerors spread themfelves all over the country; living moftly in the fields, and in very little towns. When they were in Germany, the whole nation was able to af femble. This they could no longer do, when they were difperfed through the conquered provinces. And yet as it was neceffary that the nation fhould deliberate on public affairs, pursuant to their ufual method before the conqueft; they had therefore recourfe to representatives. Such is the origin of the Gothic government amongst us. At first it was mixed with ariftocracy and monarchy; a mixture attended with this inconveniency, that the common people were bondmen. The cuffom afterwards fucceeded of granting letters of enfranchisement, and was foon followed by fo perfect a harmony between the civil liberty of the people, the privileges of the nobility and clergy, and the prince's prerogative, that I really think there never was in the world a government fo well tempered, as that of each part of Europe, fo long as it lafted. Surprifing, that the corruption of the government of a conquering nation, fhould have given birth to the beft fpecies of conftitution that could poffibly be imagined by man !* * It was a good government that had in itself a capacity of growing better. VOL. I. M CHAP. CHAP. IX. Ariftotle's Manner of thinking. ARISTOTLE is greatly puzzled in treating of monarchy. He makes five fpecies; and he does not diftinguish them by the form of conftitution, but by things merely accidental, as the virtues or vices of the prince; or by things extrinfical, fuch as the ufurpation of, or fucceffion to tyranny. He ranks among the number of monarchies, the Perfian empire and the kingdom of Sparta. But is it not evident, that the one was a defpotic ftate, and the other a republic? The ancients, who were strangers to the diftribution of the three powers in the government of a single person, could never form a juft idea of monarchy. CHA P. X. What other Politicians thought. To temper temper the government of a fingle perfon, Arybas kingt of Epirus found no other remedy than a republic. The Moloffi, not knowing how to limit the fame power, made two kings; by this means the ftate was weakened more than the prerogative of the prince; they wanted rivals, and they created enemies. Two kings were tolerable no where but at Sparta; here they did not form, but were only a part of the conftitution. Polit. book iii. chap. 14. See Juftin, book xvii. CHAP. CHAP. XI. Of the Kings of the Heroic Times of Greece. IN the heroic times of Greece, a kind of monarchy arofe that was not of long duration.* Those who had been inventors of arts, who had fought in their country's cause, had established focieties, or diftributed lands among the people, obtained the regal power, and tranfmitted it to their children. They were kings, priests and judges. This is one of the five fpecies of monarchy mentioned by Ariftotle ; and the only one that can give us any idea of the monarchical conftitution. But the plan of this conftitution is oppofite to that of our modern monarchies. The three powers were there diftributed in fuch a manher as the people had the legiflative, and the king the executive, together with the power of judging; whereas in modern monarchies, the prince is invested with the executive and legislative powers, or, at leaft, with part of the legislative, but does not affume the power of judging. In the government of the kings of the heroic times, the three powers were ill diftributed. Hence thofe monarchies could not long fubfift. For as foon as the people got the legiflative power into their hands, they might, as they every where did, upon the very leaft caprice, fubvert the regal authority. Among a free people poffeffed of the legislative power; . a people enclosed within walls, where every thing of an odious nature becomes ftill more odious, it is the higheft mafterpiece of legiflation, to know how to place properly the judiciary power. But it could not be in worfe hands, than in those of the person to whom the executive power had been already committed. From that very inftant, the monarch became terrible. But at the fame time, as he had no share in the legislature, he could make no defence against See what Plutarch fays in the life of Thefeus. See likewife Thucydides, book i. |