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tages which would be more fenfibly, more universally felt, were our law of nations exactly followed, and established over all the earth.

Conquered countries are, generally speaking, degenerated from their original inftitution. Corruption has crept in, the execution of the laws has been neglected, and the government is grown oppreffive. Who can queftion but fuch a ftate would be a gainer, and derive fome advantages from the very conqueft itfelf, if it did not prove deftructive? When a government is arrived to that degree of corruption, as to be incapable of reforming itself, it would not lofe much by being new moulded. A conqueror that enters triumphant into a country, where the moneyed men have by a thousand wiles and artifices infenfibly practifed innumerable ways of ufurping; where the miferable people, who grieve to fee abuses grow into laws, live under oppreffion, and think they have no right to complain; conqueror, I fay, may make a total change, and then the masked tyranny will be the first thing expofed to his fury.

We have seen, for inftance, countries oppreffed by the farmers of the revenues, and eased afterwards by the conqueror, who had neither the engagements nor wants of the legitimate prince, Even the abufes have been often redreffed without any interpofition of the conqueror.

Sometimes the frugality of a conquering nation has enabled them to allow the conquered thofe neceffaries, of which they have been deprived under a lawful prince.

A conqueft may deftroy pernicious prejudices, and place, if I may prefume to make ufe of the expreffion, the nation under the influence of a better genius.

What good might not the Spaniards have done to the Mexicans? They had a mild religion to impart to them; but they gave them a mad fuperftition. They might have fet flaves at liberty; they made free men flaves. They might have undeceived them with regard to the abuse of human facrifices; instead of that they deftroyed them. Never should I have done, were I to recount all the good they did not, and all the mischief they did.

It is a conqueror's bufinefs to repair a part of the mifchief he has committed. The right therefore of conqueft I define thus: A neceffary, lawful and unhappy right,

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which leaves always an immenfe debt to discharge, in order to clear the obligations of human nature.

CHAP. V.

Gelon King of Syracufe.

THE nobleft treaty of peace ever mentioned in hiftory, is, in my opinion, that which Gelon made with the Carthaginians. He infifted upon their abolishing the cuftom of facrificing their children.* Glorious indeed! After having defeated three hundred thousand Carthaginians, he required a condition that was advantageous only to, themselves, or rather he ftipulated in favor of human nature.

CHAP. VI.

Of Conquests made by a Republic.

IT is contrary to the nature of things, that, in a

confederate government, one ftate fhould make any conqueft over another, as in our days we have feen in Swifferland. In mixed confederate republics, where the affociation is between small republics, and fmall monarchies, this is not fo abfurd.

It is alfo contrary to the nature of things, that a democratical republic fhould conquer towns, which cannot enter into the sphere of its democracy. It is necessary that the conquered people fhould be capable of enjoying the privileges of fovereignty, as was fettled in the very beginning among the Romans. The conqueft ought to be limited to the number of citizens fixed for the democracy.

If a democratical republic fubdues a nation in order to govern them as fubjects, it expofes its own liberty, because it intrufts too great a power to the officers fent into the conquered provinces.

How great would have been the danger of the republic of Carthage, had Hannibal made himself mafter of Rome ?

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*See M. Barbyerac's collection, art. 112. With regard to Tockenburgh.

What

What would not he have done in his own country, had he been victorious, he who caufed fo many revolutions after his defeat.*

Hanno could never have diffuaded the fenate from fending fuccors to Hannibal, had he ufed no other argument than his own jealoufy. The Carthaginian fenate, whofe wifdom is fo highly extolled by Ariftotle, (and which has been evidently proved by the profperity of that republic) could never have been determined by other than fenfible reafons. They must have been ftupid not to fee, that an army at the distance of three hundred leagues would neceffarily be exposed to loffes that ought to be repaired.

Hanno's party infifted that Hannibal fhould be delivered up to the Romans. They could not at that time be afraid of the Romans; they were therefore afraid of Hannibal.

It was impoffible, fome will fay, for them to imagine that Hannibal had been fo fuccefsful. But how was it poffible for them to doubt of it? Could the Carthaginians, a people fpread all over the earth, be ignorant of what was tranfacting in Italy? No; they were fufficiently ac quainted with it, and for that reafon they did not care to fend fupplies to Hannibal.

Hanno became more refolute after the battle of Trebia, after the battle of Thrafimenes, after that of Cannæ; it was not his incredulity that increased, but his fear.

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CHAP. VII.

The fame Subject continued.

THERE is fill another inconveniency in conquefts made by democracies: Their government is always odious to the conquered ftate. It is apparently monarch. ical But, in reality, it is much more oppreffive than monarchy, as the experience of all ages and countries evinces. The conquered people are in a melancholy fituation

He was at the head of a faction.

They

+ Hanno wanted to deliver Hannibal up to the Romans, as Cato wanted to deliver up Cæfar to the Gauls.

They neither enjoy the advantages of a republic, nor those of a monarchy.

What has been here faid of a popular state is applicable to aristocracy.

CHAP. VIII.

The fame fubject continued.

WHEN a republic therefore keeps another na

tion in fubjection, it should endeavor to repair the inconveniences arising from the nature of its fituation, by giving it good laws both for the political and civil government of the people,

*

We have an inftance of an ifland in the Mediterranean fubject to an Italian republic; whofe political and civil Jaws, in respect to the inhabitants of that island, were extremely defective. The act of amnefty, by which it ordained that no one fhould be condemned to bodily punishment in confequence of the private knowledge of the governor, ex informata confcientia, is ftill recent in every body's memory. There have been frequent inftances of the people's petitioning for privileges: Here the fovereign grants only the common right of all nations,

CHAP. IX.

Of Conquests made by a Monarchy.

If a monarchy can for a long time fubfift before

it is weakened by its increase, it will become formidable;

and

* Of the 18th of October 1738 printed at Genoa, by Franchetty, Vietiamo al noftro general gouvernatore in detta ifola, di condannare in avenire folamente ex informata confcientia perfona alcuna nazionale, in pena afflittiva, potra ben fi far arreftare ed incarcerare le perfonne che gli faranno fofpette, falvo di renderne poi a noi conto follecitamente. Art. 6. See also the Amfterdam Gazette of the 23d of September 1738.

and its ftrength will remain entire, while pent up by the neighboring monarchies.

It ought not therefore to aim at conquefts beyond the natural limits of its government. As foon as it has paffed thefe limits, it is prudence to stop.

In this kind of conquest things must be left as they were found; the fame courts of judicature, the fame laws, the fame cuftoms, the fame privileges: There ought to be no other alteration than that of the army, and of the name of the fovereign.

When a monarchy has extended its limits by the conqueft of fome neighboring provinces, it should treat those provinces with great lenity.

If a monarchy has been a long while endeavoring at conquefts, the provinces of its ancient demelne are generally ill used, They are obliged to fubmit both to the new and to the ancient abufes; and to be depopulated by a vast metropolis that fwallows up the whole. Now, if after having made conquefts round this demefne, the con quered people were treated like the ancient fubjects, the ftate would be undone; the taxes fent by the conquered provinces to the capital would never return; the inhabitants of the frontiers would be ruined, and confequently the frontiers would be weaker; the people would be difatfected; and the fubfiftence of the armies defigned to act and remain there, would become more precarious.

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Such is the necessary state of a conquering monarchy; a fhocking luxury in the capital; mifery in the provinces fomewhat diftant; and plenty in the most remote. the fame with fuch a monarchy as with our planet; fire at the centre, verdure on the furface, and between both a dry, cold and barren land.

CHAP. X.

Of one Monarchy that fubdues another.

SOMETIMES one monarchy fubdues another.

The fmaller the latter, the better it is checked by fortreffes; and the larger it is, the better it is preferved by colonies.

CHAP.

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