ness of the prince's refolutions fhould fupply the distance. of the places they are sent to; that fear fhould prevent the careleffnefs of the remote governor or magiftrate; that the law fhould be derived from a fingle perfon, and should change continually according to the accidents which inceffantly multiply in a state in proportion to its extent.

СНАР. XX.

Confequence of the preceding Chapters.

If it be therefore the natural property of small ftates to be governed as a republic, of middling ones to be fubject to a monarch, and of large empires to be fwayed by a defpotic prince, the confequence is, that in order to preferve the principles of the established government, the ftate must be fupported in the extent it has acquired, and that the fpirit of this ftate will change in proportion as it contracts or extends its limits.

СНАР.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Empire of China.

BEFORE I finish this book, I fhall answer an objection that may be made to what has been here advanced. Our miffionaries tell us that the vaft empire of China has an admirable government, in which there is a proper mixture of fear, honor and virtue. Confequently I muft have given an idle distinction, in establishing the principles of the three governments.

But I cannot conceive what this honor can be among people that will not do the least thing without blows.* Again, our mercantile people are far from giving us any idea of that virtue fo much talked of by the miffionaries;

14

*It is the cudgel that governs China, fays Father du Halde.

we

we need only confult them in relation to the robberies and extortions of the mandarins.*

Befides, Father Parennin's letters concerning the emperor's proceedings against some new converted princes of the blood,t who had incurred his displeasure, plainly fhew us a continued plan of tyranny, and inhuman injuries committed by rule, that is, in cool blood.

We have likewife Monfieur de Mairan's and the fame Father Parennin's letters on the government of China. I find therefore, that, after fome pertinent queftions and anfwers, the whole wonder vanishes.

Might not our miffionaries have been deceived by an appearance of order? Might not they have been struck with that continual exercife of a single person's will, an exercise by which they themselves are governed, and which they are fo pleased to find in the courts of the Indian princes; because as they go thither only in order to introduce great changes, it is much easier to convince thofe princes that there are no bounds to their power, than to perfuade the people that there are none to their fubmiffion?

In fine, there is frequently fome kind of truth even in errors themselves. It may be owing to particular, and perhaps very fingular circumftances, that the Chinele government is not fo corrupt as one might naturally expect. The climate and fome other phyfical caufes may, in that country, have had fo ftrong an influence on the morals, as in fome measure to produce wonders.

The climate of China is furprisingly favorable to the propagation of the human fpecies. The women are the moft prolific in the whole world. The most barbarous tyranny can put no ftop to the progrefs of propagation. The prince cannot fay there like Pharaoh, Let us deal wifely with them, left they multiply. He would be rather reduced to Nero's wifh, that mankind had all but one head. fpite of tyranny, China, by the force of its climate, will always

Among others, De Lange's relation.

In

+ Of the family of Sourniama; Edifying Letters, 8th collection. See in Father du Halde, how the miffionaries availed themselves of the authority of Can Hi, to filence the mandarins, who conftantly declared, that, by the laws of the country, no foreign worship could be eftablished in the empire.

a

always be populous, and will triumph over the tyrannical oppreffor.

China, like all other countries that live chiefly upon rice, is fubject to frequent famines. When the people are ready to ftarve with hunger, they difperfe in order to feek for nourishment; in confequence of which, fmall gangs of robbers are formed on all fides. Most of them

are extirpated in their very infancy; others increase, and are likewife fuppreffed. And yet, in fo great a number of fuch diftant provinces, fome gang or other may happen to meet with fuccefs. In that cafe they maintain their ground, ftrengthen their party, form themselves into a military body, march ftraight up to the capital, and their leader afcends the throne,

From the very nature of things, a bad administration is here immediately punished. The want of fubfiftence in fo populous a country, produces fudden disorders. The reafon why the redress of abuses is in other countries attended with fuch difficulty, is, because their effects are not immediately felt; the prince is not informed in fo fudden and fenfible a manner as in China.

The emperor of China is not taught like our princes, that if he governs ill, he will be lefs happy in the other life, lefs potent and lefs rich in this. He knows, that if his government is not good, he will be ftripped both of empire and life,

As China grows every day more populous, notwithstanding the expoling of children, the inhabitants are inceffantly employed in tilling the land for their fubfiftence.

This requires a very extraordinary attention in the government. It is their perpetual concern that every body fhould be able to work without any apprehenfion of being deprived of the fruits of his labor. Confequently this is not fo much a civil as a domeftic government.

Such has been the origin of thofe regulations which have been fo greatly extolled. They wanted to make the laws reign in conjunction with defpotic power; but whatever is joined with the latter, lofes all its force.

In vain did this arbitrary fway, laboring under its own misfortunes, defire to be fettered; it armed itfelf with its chains, and is become ftill more terrible.

* See book 23, chap. 14.

China

China is therefore a defpotic ftate, whofe principle is fear. Perhaps in the earlieft dynafties, when the empire had not fo large an extent, the government might have deviated a little from this fpirit; but the cafe at prefent is otherwise.

BOOK IX.

OF LAWS IN THE RELATION THEY BEAR TO A DEFENSIVE FORCE.

CHA P. I.

In what Manner Republics provide for their Safety.

IF a republic is fmall, it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it be large, it is ruined by an internal imperfec

tion.

To this twofold inconvenience both democracies and ariftocracies are equally liable, and that whether they be good or bad. The evil is in the very thing itself, and no form can redress it.

It is therefore very probable, that mankind would have been at length obliged to live conftantly under the government of a fingle perfon, had they not contrived a kind of conftitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a confederate republic.

This form of government is a convention, by which several small eftates agree to become members of a larger one which they intend to form. It is a kind of affemblage of focieties, that conftitute a new one, capable of increafing by means of new affociations, till they arrive to such a degree of power, as to be able to provide for the fecurity of the united body.

It was these affociations that contributed so long profperity of Greece. By thefe the Romans attacked the

univerfe,

universe, and by these alone the universe withstood them; for when Rome was arrived to her higheft pitch of grandeur, it was the associations behind the Danube and the Rhine, affociations formed by the terror of her arms, that enabled the Barbarians to refift her.

From hence it proceeds, that Holland,* Germany and the Swifs Cantons are confidered in Europe as perpetual republics.

The affociations of cities were formerly more neceffary than in our times. A weak defenceless town was expofed to greater dangers. By conqueft it was deprived, not only of the executive and legislative power, as at present, but moreover of all human property.+

A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may fupport itself without any internal corruption; the form of this fociety prevents all manner of inconveni

ences.

If a single member should attempt to ufurp the fupreme authority, he could not be fuppofed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate ftates. Were he to have too great an influence over one, this would alarm the reft; were he to fubdue a part, that which would still remain free, might oppofe him with forces independent of those which he had ufurped, and overpower him before he could be fettled in his ufurpation.

Should

Should a popular infurrection happen in one of the confederate ftates, the others are able to quell it. abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain found. The ftate may be deftroyed on one fide, and not on the other; the confederacy may be diffolved, and the confederates preserve their fovereignty.

As this government is compofed of petty republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of each; and with refpect to its external fituation, it is poffeffed, by means of the affociation, of all the advantages of large monarchies.

CHAP.

It is compofed of about fifty different republics. State of the United Provinces, by M. Janifon.

+ Civil liberty, goods, wives, children, temples, and even buryingplaces,