laws. Moderate governments admit of it fometimes; but with this difference, that the former exercife it in full rigor, and among the latter it always receives fome kind of limitation. The law of the twelve tables admitted two; firft, it nev er condemned to retaliation but when the plaintiff could not be fatisfied in any other manner; * fecondly, after condemnation they might pay damages and interest,+ and then the corporal punishment was changed into a pecuniary one.t С НА Р. XX. Of the Punishment of Fathers for the Crimes of their Children. IN China fathers are punifhed for the crimes of their children. This was likewife the cuftom at Peru ;§ a cuftom derived from the notion of defpotic power. Little does it fignify to fay, that in China the father is punished for not having exerted that paternal authority which nature has eftablifhed, and the laws themselves have improved. This ftill fuppofes that there is no honor among the Chinese. Amongst us, parents whofe children are condemned to punishment, and children whose parents have undergone the like fate, are as feverely punished by fhame as they would be in China by the lofs of their lives. CHA P. XXI. Of the Clemency of the Prince. CLEMENCY is the peculiar characteristic of monarchs. In republics whose principle is virtue, it is not * Si membrum rupit, ni cum eo pacit, talio efto. Aulius Gellius, lib. 20, сар. 1. + See Kempfer. See alfo the law of the Vifigoths, book vi. tit- 4, § 3, & 5, Inftead of punishing them, fays Plato, they ought to have been com mended for not having followed their fathers' examples. Book 9 of laws. not fo neceffary. In defpotic governments, where fear predominates, it is lefs cuftomary, because the great men are to be reftrained by examples of feverity. It is more neceffary in monarchies, where they are governed by honor, which frequently requires what the very law forbids. Difgrace is here equivalent to chastisement; and even the formalities of juftice are punishments. This is because particular kinds of punishment are formed by fhame, which on every fide invades the delinquent. The great men in monarchies are fo heavily punished by difgrace, by the lofs (though often imaginary) of their fortune, credit, acquaintances and pleasures, that rigor in refpect to them is needlefs. It can tend only to divest the fubject of the affection he has for the person of his prince, and of the respect he ought to have for public posts and employments. As the inftability of the great is natural to a defpotic government, fo their fecurity is interwoven with the nature of monarchy. So many are the advantages which monarchs gain by clemency; fuch love, fuch glory attends it, that it is generally a point of happiness to have an opportunity of exercifing it, which in these parts is feldom wanting. Some branch, perhaps, of their authority, but never hardly the whole, will be difputed; and if they fometimes fight for their crown, they do not fight for their life. But fome may afk, when is it proper to punish, and when to pardon? This is a point that is easier felt than prescribed. When there is danger in the exercise of clemency, the danger is visible; it is an eafy matter to distinguish it from that imbecility which expofes princes to con tempt, and to the very incapacity of punishing. The emperor Maurice* made a refolution never to spill the blood of his fubjects. Anaftaufist punished no crimes at all. Ifaac Angelus took an oath that no one should be put to death during his reign. Those Greek emperors had forgot that it was not for nothing they were intrufted with the sword. 3 BOOK * Evagr. hift. + Frag. of Suidas in Conftant. Porphyrog. CONSEQUENces of the DIFFERENT PRINCIPLES of THE THREE governmENTS WITH RESPECT TO SUMPTUARY LAWS, LUXURY AND THE CONDITION OF WOMEN. CHAP. I. Of Luxury. LUXURY is always in proportion to the inequal ity of fortunes. If the riches of a flate are equally divided, there will be no luxury; for it is founded merely on the conveniencies acquired by the labor of others. In order to have this equal diftribution of riches, the law ought to give each man only juft what is neceffary for nature. If they exceed those bounds, fome will spend, and others will acquire, and by this means an inequality will be established. Suppofing what is neceffary for the fupport of nature to be equal to a given fum, the luxury of those who have only what is barely neceffary, will be equal to a cypher; if a perfon happens to have double that fum, his luxury will be equal to one; he that has double the latter's fubftance, will have a luxury equal to three; if this be ftill doubled, there will be a luxury equal to feven; so that the property of the fubfequent individual being always fuppofed double to that of the preceding, the luxury will increase double, and an unit be always added in this progreffion, 0, 1, 3, 7, 15, 31, 63, 127. In Plato's republic,* luxury might have been exactly calculated. There were four forts of cenfuses, or rates of eftates. The first was exactly the term beyond poverty, the * The first cenfus was the hereditary share in land, and Plato would not allow them to have in other effects above a triple of the hereditary fhare. See his Laws, book v. the second was double, the third triple, the fourth quadruple to the firft. In the first cenfus, luxury was equal to a cypher; in the second to one, in the third to two, in the fourth to three; and thus it followed in an arithmetical proportion. Confidering the luxury of different nations with respect to one another, it is in each ftate in a compound proportion to the inequality of the fubje&'s fortunes, and to the inequality of the wealth of the different states. In Poland, for example, there is an extreme inequality of fortunes; but the poverty of the whole hinders them from having fo much luxury as in a more opulent state, Luxury is alfo in proportion to the populoufnefs of the towns, and especially of the capital; fo that it is in a compound proportion to the riches of the ftate, to the inequality of private fortunes, and to the number of people feitled in particular places, In proportion to the populoufnefs of towns, the inhabitants are filled with vain notions, and actuated by an ambition of distinguishing themselves by trifles.* If they are fo very numerous that most of them are ftrangers to one another, the paffion of diftinguishing themselves redoubles, because there are greater hopes of fuccefs. As luxury infpires these hopes, each man affumes the marks of a fuperior condition. But by endeavoring thus at diftinction, every one becomes equal, and diftinction ceases; as all of them are defirous of respect, nobody is taken notice of. Hence arifes a general inconveniency. Those who excel in a profeffion, fet what value they pleafe upon their labor; this example is followed by people of inferior abilities, and then there is an end of all proportion between our wants and the means of fatisfying them. When I am forced to go to law, I must be able to fee counfel; when I am fick, I must be able to fee a phyfician. It is the opinion of feveral, that the affembling fo great a multitude of people in capital cities, is an obstruction to commerce, because by this means the inhabitants are no longer within a proper diftance from each other. 4 But I cannot * In a great city, fays the author of the Fable of the Bees, vol. i. p. 133, they drefs above their condition, in order to be efteemed more than what they really are by the multitude. This to a weak perfon is almost as great a pleasure as the accomplishment of his defies, cannot think fo; for men have more defires, more wants, more fancies, when they live together. CHA P. II. Of Sumptuary Laws in a Democracy. WE have obferved, that in a republic where, riches are equally divided, there can be no fuch thing as luxury; and as this equal diftribution conftitutes the excellency of a republican government, hence it follows, that the lefs luxury there is in a republic, the more perfect it is, There was none amongst the old Romans, none amongst the Lacedæmonians; and in republics where this equality is not quite loft, the spirit of commerce, industry and virtue, renders every man able and willing to live on his own property, and confequently prevents the growth of luxury. The laws concerning the new divifion of lands, infifted upon fo eagerly in fome republics, were of the most falu, tary nature. They were dangerous only as they were fudden. By reducing inftantaneously the wealth and riches of fome, and increafing that of others, they form a revolu tion in each family, and muft produce a general one in the flate. In proportion as luxury gains ground in a republic, the minds of the people are turned towards their particular intereft. Thofe who are allowed only what is neceffary, have nothing to wifh for but their own and their country's glory. But a foul depraved by luxury has many other defires, and foon becomes an enemy to the laws that confine it. The luxury in which the garrifon of Rhegio began to live, was the cause of their maffacring the inhabitants. No fooner were the Romans corrupted, than their defires became boundlefs and immenfe. Of this we may judge by the price they fet on things. A pitcher of Fa lernian wine was fold for a hundred Roman denarii; a barrel of falt meat from the kingdom of Pontus coft four hundred ; * Fragment of the 36th book of Diodorus, quoted by Conft. Porphyrogen, in his extract of virtues and vices, |