able to have every thing our own way.— But it is not one which can be said to be in any way essential to the security of any part of our possessions.

Disputed Territory? We have come to talk of it as if the possession of every inch of it was essential to the security of our North American possessions; as if Canada were valueless without it; as if the pos- But the main part of the objection made. session of any part of it by the Americans to Lord Ashburton's arrangement of the were to draw along with it the conquest of Boundary rests not so much on the loss of British America. But is it really so? If we had had a larger share of the Disputed Territory, should we have been able to turn it to any great account? Will the possession of the portion allotted to the Americans enable them to do us any mischief in the event of war?

themselves among the Canadians of Kamouraska and Rimouski, and gradually acquire farms and build towns along the southern bank of the St. Lawrence.

any particular advantage to ourselves, as on the acquisition by the Americans of a territory which, from its position, they may make use of to render our possession of Canada insecure. It is imagined that, no sooner will the allotted portion be placed in their hands, than an immense population It will not take much time to dispose of will straightway take possession of every the positive advantage of the Disputed Ter-acre up to the new line of boundary; and ritory to us. We do not want it for the establishing itself permanently there, intertimber or the soil; we want it for no pur- pose its formidable numbers in the shape of poses of aggression: it is only alleged to a wedge between New Brunswick and be available to us as offering a direct com- Canada. Nay, some imagine that the munication between Quebec and New boundary will be no barrier to these enBrunswick. We will not say that this croaching pioneers of the wilderness; but communication is of no importance to us. that they will cross the St. John's, occupy But its importance has been excessively the British portion of the Disputed Territoexaggerated by confounding it with another ry, and then, passing over the old accommunication, which might indeed be knowledged frontier of Canada, insinuate made of first-rate utility to Canada. If a safe and direct communication throughout the year could be established between Quebec and Halifax, which is the only harbor in British North America that is open du- We believe the whole of these apprehenring the winter, this would indeed be of the sions to be perfectly visionary, and that greatest importance to Canada. This would there is not the slightest ground for supgive us throughout the year, in war as posing that any large population will ever well as in peace, a direct communication occupy any part of the Disputed Territory. between Great Britain and Canada, lying en- The southern portion, which now becomes tirely through our own territory. But the part of the State of Maine, is undoubtedly proper line of such communication lies the best part, and possesses a good deal of quite wide of the Disputed Territory. We rich land, well adapted for grass farms. No feel confident of being correct when we say doubt some population will settle on it; but that the best military and engineering it is not very likely that this cold region authority is in favor of connecting Quebec will attract to itself any material portion of and Halifax by that line of road known by that great current of American emigration the name of the Kempt road, which coasts which sets towards the Far West, where a the St. Lawrence as high as the river Me- boundless extent of yet more fertile land is tis, and then crosses over a narrow strip of spread out under a genial climate. We land to the head of the Bay of Chaleurs.-think we can safely predict what will be the The road through the Disputed Territory, fate of this portion of the Disputed Territoabout which so much is now said, is a road ry. The high price of soft wood in the only from Quebec to St. John's, which is a United States will at first tempt a considerharbor very little, if at all, earlier open able speculation in the forests of red pine than Quebec itself. We do not say that which still exist south of the St. John's. A such a road is not of importance; that, in host of lumberers will ocupy the whole rethe event of a war with the United States, gion, and with their usual recklessness clear it may not be convenient occasionally to the forest, and float its produce down the march a regiment from New Brunswick to St. John's, for which Lord Ashburton has Canada; or that, for such purpose, it would very wisely afforded them every facility. not be better to have a somewhat shorter In some ten or twelve years at the furthest, road made through our own territory in time of peace. This would have been the better arrangement for us, had we been

but probably much sooner, every pine in the district will be cut down; the occupation of the lumberers being gone, a portion

of them will move off to some uncleared line, they will undoubtedly, as long as they country, while the steadier among them will can keep them, be able to interrupt these settle down upon patches of the land that communications. But this is an evil incithey have cleared. But remote as the coun- dental to every partition of the Disputed try is from any of the reat markets, un- Territory. The more reasonable assailants suited as it is to the growth of any of the of Lord Ashburton, who see that nobody more valuable kinds of crop, and destitute will go with them in blaming him for not as it is of any facilities for commerce or having got the whole of the country in dismanufactures, it may confidently be assum- pute, confine themselves to saying that he ed that it will be slowly occupied, and ought to have got us the St. John's as our never support more than a scanty population. boundary throughout its whole course. That any population will pass on northward Would such a line have freed us from this of the St John's is hardly to be conceived. evil? From Mars' Hill up to the Great The whole of the portion of the Disputed Falls of the St. John's, and from the Falls to Territory acquired by us is an elevated, the confluence of the St. Francis, the road bleak, barren, swampy region, destitute would have gone within gun-shot of their even of valuable timber. Nature seems to line; and it would only have become safer have intended it for a "Debatable" land, to from that point. And if a road is necessabe interposed between two great countries rily to be unsafe for some eighty or hunin order to keep their population asunder. dred miles, does it much matter whether it Yet more extravagant is the notion that the is exposed for some twenty or thirty more? Americans are not only to swarm across the Our getting the whole of the Disputed TerSt. John's, but to traverse this poor and un-ritory could not have made the road beinviting country to the northward in order tween New Brunswick and Quebec safe. to get to the southern bank of the St Law-The reader has only to cast his eye on any rence. The southern bank of the St Law-map, and he will see that from the Monurence below Quebec is completely occupied ment up to the south of the Tobique, the road by a population quite as numerous as the in question, which follows the bank of the country can support. Very superior to the St. John's, runs within a few miles of the rest of their race in Canada, the French undisputed portion of the State of Maine, population of this district are an enterpris- and must therefore be menaced by it. The ing and flourishing race. Their land is said Butery raised against the treaty on this to be as well farmed, their farm-buildings as score is, therefore, a great outcry against a good as any on any part of the American very slight aggravation of a danger that continent. The pilotage of the St Lawrence must have been incurred under any arrangeenriches this people by a very large annual ment that could have been devised. outlay. And any American settler in this district would find that the present occupiers are competitors with whose wealth and skill it would not be easy to cope on equal

terms.

The danger to the St. Lawrence we cannot view with great alarm, because though we admit that the Americans might get to the river, we cannot understand why it is supposed that they would act so very foolishly as to build forts, and to concentrate troops and stores at the point furthest from their resources, in order, by crossing a very difficult country, to occupy a position that would be of no use to them. It is a mistake to suppose that by occupying the southern bank of the St. Lawrence in the part of

We put aside therefore, as perfectly groundless, the notion that the Disputed Territory will ever become formidable to us from the mere numbers of the American population which it will support. Their people will never come down from it and occupy the valley of the St. Lawrence. If their possession of it is to be in any way it in question, the navigation of that river formidable to us, it must be by their establishing several strong military positions along their new frontier, in which they may, in time of war, concentrate an army in order to get possession of the southern bank of the St. Lawrence. These positions would also, it is said, enable them to command the road between New Brunswick and Quebec, which will, during almost its whole course, pass very near the new fron

tier.

If the Americans establish forts on their

would be commanded. As high as Quebec the river is so wide, that ships might sail along the northern without any danger from the southern shore. If, therefore, an American army occupied the south bank of the St. Lawrence, it would occupy a position most remote from its own resources, in a district that does not raise its own food, and of which the possession would not in the slightest degree influence the fortunes of a war. When we calculate on war with the Americans, it would be as well to calculate

on their carrying on the war with something like common sense. While Montreal and Quebec, the most populous portions of Upper Canada, and St. John's and Fredericton, are within a short distance of their own amplest resources, they are more likely to strike at these strongholds of our power, than to send their armies from the most remote points of their own territory to explore remote corners of our possessions, and remove themselves at a distance from the real theatre of the struggle.

referred to the King of Holland. The King of Holland decided that the strip belonged to us; but that as the Americans had occupied it, and built a fort in perfect good faith, on what was an universal misconception of the true latitude, they should retain Rouse's Point. It is now, as we explained before, part of the arrangement, that this strip should be given up to the Americans; and Rouse's Point of course is included in it. Here also it would be difficult to show how, after our acceptance of the King of HolWith respect to the military defence of land's award, we could now have refused Canada, there was undoubtedly one point of what we then pressed the Americans to acgreat importance to be looked to in the set- cept. And we think that it will not be diffitlement of the Disputed Boundary. Look-cult to show, that the possession of Rouse's ing to the event of a war, it is important that Point would do either us or the United States the American frontier should not be brought little good in the event of war. materially nearer to Quebec. It doubtless would facilitate an attack on that most important position, if the Americans were enabled to establish any strong place at which they might concentrate an invading force in security, and come down upon Quebec by a shorter and easier march than that which they would now have to make from the nearest point of their present frontier. The King of Holland's boundary would have given them this advantage. The great object Lord Ashburton seems to have had in view in stipulating for a deviation from that boundary, must have been to guard against this evil; and he has been perfectly successful. The new frontier may, for a short space, be brought some seven or eight miles nearer Quebec. But the points of such slightlyincreased proximity are all in a peculiarly barren and swampy country. And it is obvious, that the only practicable road from the State of Maine to Quebec is that along the valley of the Kennebec, along which all the incursions on Quebec from the United States have been effected. In this, the only important point, the Americans therefore gain no military advantage by the Treaty of Washington.

The possession, by the United States, of Rouse's Point is represented as a consequence of Lord Ashburton's Treaty, most fatal to us in the event of a war. We have already alluded to the cause of the dispute at this point. The line 45° has always been the boundary between Lower Canada and the States of New York and Vermont. In the old maps of the country this line was erroneously laid down about half a mile too far to the north. Within this space the United States granted land, and partly built a fort called Rouse's Point. When the mistake was discovered, we claimed this strip of land; and this was one of the questions

The higher end of Lake Champlain, for about ten or twelve miles, gradually narrows until it discharges itself into the Chambly river, which falls into the St. Lawrence between Montreal and Quebec. About a couple of miles below the point at which the lake may be said to narrow itself into the river, runs the erroneous line 45°, close to which the Americans built a fort, on a spot called Rouse's Point. The spot has no natural strength, nor does it command the lake more than any other spot for a couple of miles above, or than any point below. Its strength can be the result of nothing but artificial means; and as it has been deserted by the Americans since their retention of it became dubious, the fortifications were never finished, and are now in a state of ruin. Neither for purposes of aggression nor of defence would it be of any use to us, inasmuch as a few miles above we have two good forts commanding the entrance of the lake; and one of these, Isle aux Noix, is not only of great natural strength, but being situated on an island in the middle of the river, effectually commands the entrance of the lake. Therefore, whatever forts we want, to prevent the entry of an army from Lake Champlain into the Chambly river, we already have. Nor would the possession of Rouse's Point enable us to prevent the Americans from navigating Lake Champlain. In order, however, to prevent us in time of war from entering that lake, which is in fact an American lake, the Americans must have some fort on the narrow part. Any other point on their own side within a couple of miles might be made to serve their purpose as well as Rouse's Point; so that, if it had been decided that we should keep the Point, the Americans would simply have had to retire within the true boundary, and build

another fort within half a mile of Rouse's | When a territory, long in dispute, has been Point. The simple question was, whether occupied by scattered settlers from both it was worth while to prevent a settlement the litigant countries, every partition must by insisting upon keeping possession of throw some of the subjects of each power Rouse's Point, with the sole object of put- within the dominion of the other; and if ting the United States to the expense of Mr. Webster had consented to leave the constructing a new fort instead of availing southern bank of the St. John's in our pos themselves of the money they had already session, he would have transferred a numlaid out at Rouse's Point. As that Point ber of his own countrymen to the jurisdicpossessed no advantage of position, it was tion of Great Britain. And after all, it must a mere question of expense; and certainly, be recollected that the government under if a good understanding was an object, we which the Madawaska settlers are now did well not to insist on our supposed right placed is not that of Turkey or Morocco, of annoyance, in direct defiance of the but one under which their property, reKing of Holland's award, and of the obvi-ligion, and feelings will meet with due reous equity of the case. spect. For the farmers of a remote rural

cient allegiance, they will probably get in some measure reconciled to it, when they find their land rising to the value which land generally bears on the American side of the line.

the navigation of the St. John's. The cry has been that the free navigation of that important river has been given up to the Americans: and all the undefined consequences of the free navigation of great rivers have been represented as certain to accrue from this dangerous concession. Fleets of American vessels have been pictured to us sailing up and down the river under their own flag, free from any subjection to our laws; fomenting imaginary rebellions in New Brunswick, and conveying boat-loads of sympathizers to aid the insurgents.

There is one point connected with the district of North America, it cannot be redivision the Disputed Territory, which has presented as a cruel fate to become citizens given occasion to criticism of a perfectly of the United Sates; and however they different nature. A rather sentimental out-may at first feel the disruption of their ancry has been raised about what is called the "sacrifice" of the Madawaska settlers. Along both sides of the St. John's river there have for a long time existed a long line of settlements, held for the most part by descendants of the French of Lower The last topic which it will be necessary Canada or the ancient Acadie, but among to discuss with reference to the Boundary whom there are now intermingled many is the stipulation, in favor of the United settlers from the United States. The whole States, of certain privileges in respect of population of these settlements is estimated at about four thousand, more than half of whom inhabit the southern bank, and, consequently, fall by the Treaty within the new limits of the State of Maine. A piteous picture is drawn of the loyalty of the French population thus severed from the British empire, of their devoted attachment to her Majesty, and of their aversion to the United States, duly authenticated, as we are told, by their signatures to a recent petition. We cannot deny that it would have been desirable that those persons should, if possible, have remained under the government to which they were accustomed and attached; and Lord Ashburton did very right in endeavoring to induce Mr. Webster on this ground to give up the southern bank of the St. John's. But we confess we cannot but agree with Mr. Webster, that the feelings of so small a number of persons could not be consulted at the cost of giving up the convenient boundary of a broad river. The banks of that great river are obviously in every way the most valuable portion of the whole territory; and it could hardly be expected that, however much in other parts the Americans might consent to recede from the King of Holland's boundary, they would, on such a ground, abandon it where it secured them this most important advantage.

Let us calmly examine the practical nature and results of the concessions which have been really made. The third article in the Treaty of Washington provides—

"That where, by the provision of the present treaty, the river St. John is declared to be the line of boundary, the navigation of the said river shall be free and open to both parties, and shall in no way be obstructed by either."

This is, in the plainest terms, a stipula tion for the free navigation of the river, where it lies between the two countries; and no one can complain that where the river runs between two shores belonging to each party, it should be open to one as to the other. The complaints we have given above are grounded on the supposition that this

stipulation for "free navigation" is ex-sible, by placing the great Falls of the St. tended to that part of the river which lies John's and those of the Aroostook just withentirely within her Majesty's dominions. in the frontiers of New Brunswick. The For this supposition there is not the slight-American will be allowed to bring his boats est foundation in fact. These stipulations to the edge of these Falls; and he may unwith respect to "free navigation" stop at doubtedly, if he chooses, dash them to the point where the St. John's ceases to wash pieces over these Falls. But if he wishes to the American territory: the language of the bring any goods but mere logs safely to Treaty is immediately changed in the most market, he will have to unship them and marked manner; and directly after the carry them by land round the Falls, at the words quoted above, it is provided- foot of which he must reship them in the "That all the produce of the forest, in logs, lum-boats of New Brunswick. All, therefore, ber, timber, boards, staves, or shingles, or of agri- that is said about the free navigation of the culture not being manufactured, grown on any of St. John's is pure delusion. Lord Ashburton those parts of the State of Mame, watered by the refused to grant it, and he never did grant St. John, or its tributaries, of which fact reasonable it. All that he has practically granted is evidence shall, if required, be produced, shall have permission to bring the produce of the Disfree access into and through the said river and its puted Territory down the St. John's free tributaries having their source within the State of from all duties except such as the legislaMaine, to and from the seaport at the mouth of the said river St. John, and to and round the Falls of ture of New Brunswick may choose to imsaid river, either by boats, rafts, or other convey-pose on internal transit within its own limits. This is a mere fiscal question, which intersts no one but the people of New Bruns

ance:"

And

"That, when within the province of New Brunswick; and the people of New Brunswick wick, the said produce shall be dealt with as if it were the produce of the said province."

The article closes with a proviso that this agreement is to give the Americans

have been notonly ready but anxious to give up all chance of revenue from this source, in order to induce the Americans to bring the timber of the Disputed Territory down the St. John's. Had such concession been

"No right to interfere with any regulations not refused, the Americans would have gained inconsistent with the terms of this Treaty," which the government of New Brunswick may make respecting the navigation of the river, where it flows entirely within its own territory. This is no right of "free navigation," with its large privileges and vague consequences. Nothing is conceded here but a specific privilege of being put on the footing of our own people in respect of one particular species of traffic. The foreigner who is thus secured these privileges is subject to a preliminary search, and to all regulations and all duties imposed on the subjects of Great Britain; and he is nowhere and in no degree exempted from the most complete subjection to our laws while with in our territory.

nothing, or next to nothing, by the settlement of the Boundary question. Their object is to cut down the timber on the portion allotted to them, and carry it off to the ports of New England and New York. The concession of a portion of the territory would have been almost useless for this end had Great Britain remained at liberty to bar the passage of the timber through New Brunswick, either by express prohibition or by the imposition of prohibitory duties. On the other hand, it is of great importance to the town of St. John's that it should become the emporium of the timber trade of the valley of the St. John's; and in order to promote the prosperity of that town, and consequently of the whole province of New Brunswick, it was necessary, first, that the timber of the Disputed Territory should be rendered available by the settlement of the dispute; and secondly, that no obstacle should be raised to its coming down the St. John's. Had the Boundary question been settled without any such stipulation, the interests of New Brunswick would have compelled us to make such a stipulation the subject of a separate Treaty. If the stipulation were injurious to any one, it must be to New Brunswick. Not only has New Bruns

The privilege is restricted to one particular species of goods-namely, the agricultural produce and timber of a particular district, and to the transit of this down the river. American goods and vessels coming in from the sea are to be treated just as they were before; the American carrier of the privileged produce is to have liberty to go along with his goods, and to return home. But whatever privileges the Treaty may appear to accord to him, it does not, because it cannot, give him the privilege of carrying his produce down the St. John's in his own wick made no complaints, but it is well asboats for nature has rendered that impos-certained that the Legislature of the ProvVOL. I. No. IV.

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