howing the flag in distant seas. Similarly, with refernce to destroyers, the tabular statement shows that 108 of these vessels were built eleven or more years ago; and the time has come to replace them.

This policy is all the more urgent owing to the change in the new disposition of the ships in home waters. The older destroyers were designed for operating in the English Channel; but, now that the manoeuvring area is the North Sea, a more seaworthy type of ship is necessary. These contentions are admitted, as is shown, not only by the increased provision for destroyers which has been made during the past two years, but by the fact that the boats which are now being constructed are of between 900 and 1000 tons; whereas ten years ago, for work in the Channel, the Admiralty were building craft of from 275 to just over 300 tons. Germany is building twelve torpedo-boat destroyers annually. We cannot afford to construct less than twenty-four a year.

The Admiralty have wisely utilised ships on the subsidiary list for conversion into auxiliaries. At present the navy possesses upwards of twenty auxiliary ships of various types-repair ships, depôt ships for destroyers, mother-ships for submarines, and oil-supply vessels; while six second-class cruisers of the Naval Defence Act have been converted into mine-layers, and a number of trawlers have been purchased for use in sweeping areas laid with submerged mines. In no respect has the Admiralty shown more foresight and activity than in the provision of these antennæ of a fighting fleet. Until the present Board took office, practically no provision in this respect had been made, whereas now there is no fleet in the world which is so adequately equipped. For the United States fleet an ammunition ship is about to be built. British navy requires at least two such supply vessels, since they cannot be improvised on the outbreak of war. There is also only one hospital ship, the Maine, which was presented to the Admiralty by the American Committee after the South African war. In view of the growth of the fleet, another is desirable. It need not be kept in full commission in peace time, but it should be ready for use immediately hostilities appear probable.

This does not exhaust the needs of the

The

navy, because

there is a grave deficiency in docking accommodation the East Coast, which ought speedily to be remedied present there is no Government dock and only private dock on the East Coast, in which armoured ship of the largest type could be placed, The new naval be at Rosyth will not be completed for six years; and this will provide only one graving dock. It is in these cir cumstances that provision has been made this year for the construction of two floating docks of the largest size. This is the readiest and cheapest solution of the problem. Such docks can be moved from point to point as circumstances dictate, and will thus confer upon the fleet & mobility which it has never hitherto possessed. But the number of such docks is quite inadequate, seeing that by 1912 there will be twenty of the largest ships stationed in the North Sea. At least two more docks of this char acter should be included in the estimates next year, and provision should be made for a fifth in 1911. There is no reason why these floating docks should not be in effect self-contained dockyards and be stationed, one at Rosyth or other suitable Scottish port, another in the Tyne, a third in the Humber, and a fourth in the Medway. The Admiralty would have taken adequate means in this respect for the necessities of the fleet in the North Sea; and a fifth dock is required at Portsmouth, which at present has no accommodation suitable for a vessel of the largest type which may have suffered serious injury and be drawing more than its normal draft.

In no respect has Admiralty policy been more griev ously inadequate than in this matter of docks. In January 1902 a Committee appointed by Lord Selborne found that the existing facilities were inadequate, and recommended that another naval port should be estab lished. In his statement explanatory of the estimates in 1903, Lord Selborne announced that,

navy

' after an examination of all the available sites and a thorough consideration of the question in its industrial and strategical aspects, necessarily extending over a good many months, the Board selected the Firth of Forth as fulfilling all the requirements of the navy. Provisional negotiations have been proceeding for some weeks past, and proposals will be submitted to Parliament in the course of this session for the acquisition of the land necessary to establish there a fourth home port.'

Seven years have been allowed to pass since this Comnittee reported, and yet the work of constructing such a ase has only just been begun. It will not be completed for six years, whereas it should have been practically finished by next summer. Under the pressure of public opinion, the Government have at last taken effective action to repair this grave naval deficiency; and it may be hoped that the nation will insist on provision being made for the construction of the three additional floating docks which are also essential.

Such are the actual needs of the fleet in the near future. They may be summed up in the simple formula of two-to-one in ships, officers, and men as against the next strongest Power. A careful survey of the naval situation does not supply any justification for the exaggerated fears which have been expressed as to the burden which a policy of two keels to one would cast upon the British people. The needs of the fleet are undoubtedly considerable, but they can all be met by an expenditure which will form a relatively small insurance premium on the interests to be protected.

It is happily unnecessary to deal at length with the question of the organisation of the fleet, in view of the very complete investigation which has been carried out by the subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. For the first time in the history of the modern navy, we now possess one large homogeneous fleet.

'Since March last' (to quote the statement by Mr Asquith and his colleagues) 'the whole of the naval forces in home waters, with the exception of the Atlantic fleet, have been united in the Home fleet, under the command of a single officer. The former Nore Division is now the First Division, the old Channel fleet the Second Division, both these being fully manned; the nucleus-crew vessels form the Third Division, and the special reserve ships the Fourth Division of the Home fleet. The only portion of the force in home waters which remains outside the Home fleet organisation is the Atlantic fleet, which, though closely associated with the Home fleet, is still retained as an independent command, capable of being detached, if necessary, to show the flag elsewhere without breaking up the organisation of the fleet in home waters.'

We have here a consummation for which the Admiralty

claims to have been working since 1905, when in reserve were provided with nucleus crews, and years later were formed into the Home fleet with fully-manned division at the Nore into which all t new ships, as they were completed for sea, were passe The First and Second Divisions of the Home fleet form the most finished organisation for war which has ever existed. comprising 16 battleships, 10 armoured cruisers, 10 protected cruisers and scouts, 48 destroyers, 2 repair vessels, 2 depôt ships for destroyers, and a hospital ship. We have the satisfaction of knowing that there is now com plete unanimity in naval circles as to the character of this organisation. There is also the gratifying and consolatory fact that the Committee, after full investigation, have reached the conclusion that the Third Division of the Home fleet, consisting of older ships manned with nucleus crews, is capable of 'very rapid mobilisation, and has reached a high standard of efficiency,' while at the same time they have been able to announce that a naval war staff is in course of development.

The fleet has been passing through a transitional period, but now its organisation is by general admission on a high plane of efficiency. The aim must now be, not merely to keep it there, but to seize every opportunity to improve its war-worthiness. In this task, in educating the public, and particularly the working classes, in the essential character of our naval power, in the spread of accurate naval information by pamphlets and by public meetings, by directing attention to flaws in our naval armoury, the Navy League has a great Imperial duty to perform. Working in association with the press, it can render invaluable aid in securing the adoption of the new formula, which has become imperatively necessary.

Art. 11.-ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA: THE RÔLE OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE.

HOWEVER shifting are the political conditions on which diplomatic arrangements have to be based, however surely the truth of yesterday will be the delusion of to-morrow, there are, nevertheless, certain periods of stability, during which alliances and understandings, which really correspond to the interests that gave them birth, are proof against all attacks. This is assuredly the case with the recently-formed Triple Entente.

The very existence of the Triple Entente is a striking illustration of the incessant and radical variations in diplomacy. Less than five years ago, France still saw in England her hereditary foe, while Great Britain professed an inveterate distrust of Russia, whom she believed to be threatening India. Then it began to appear that, after all, the interests of the three countries were not antagonistic; whereupon old prejudices were quickly dissipated, and a complete transformation occurred. The fact was that an event of world-wide import had suddenly altered the relations of the forces then operating in Europe. That event was the Russo-Japanese War.

her

The defeat of Russia disorganised her Polish arsenals, laid bare the defects of her military staff, and annihilated navy; it thus obviously destroyed the balance of power which was supposed to have been established in Europe by the setting up of the Franco-Russian alliance in opposition to the Triplice. After the Peace of Portsmouth, the power of Germany appeared to have been increased by all the strength and prestige that Russia had lost; and the eventual danger involved in this growth of the force already possessed by the powerful German Empire was regarded in Paris, London, and St Petersburg as so urgent that the impossibility of yesterday became the reality of to-day. A few months later, France and England approached each other with a sincerity corresponding to the absolute identity of their essential interests; and finally, as a still more unexpected result, Russia and Great Britain have put their respective prejudices on one side, and have taken every opportunity of expressing their mutual sympathy and friendship.