have nowhere presumed to pronounce a general censure on the conduct of the Papacy in the Middle Ages. That is a vast question, reaching far beyond my knowledge or capacity. I believe much is to be justly said in praise, much as justly in blame. But I can not view the statement that Papal claims and conduct created the civilization of Europe as other than thoroughly unhistorical and one-sided; as resting upon a narrow selection of evidence, upon strong exaggeration of what that evidence imports, and upon an 'invincible ignorance' as to all the

rest.

Many things may have been suited, or not unsuited, to rude times and indeterminate ideas of political right, the reproduction of which is at the least strange, perhaps even monstrous. We look back with interest and respect upon our early fire-arms as they rest peacefully ranged upon the wall; but we can not think highly of the judgment which would recommend their use in modern warfare. As for those weapons which had been consigned to obscurity and rust, my answer to Dr. · Newman's question is that they should have slept forever, till perchance some reclaiming plow of the future should disturb them.

2

As to the proof of my accusation, it appeared to me that it might be sufficiently given in a summary but true account of some important portions of the Encyclica of December 8, 1864, and especially of the accompanying Syllabus of the same date.

The replies to the five or six pages in which I dealt with this subject have so swollen as to reach fifteen or twenty times the bulk. I am sorry that they involve me in the necessity of entering upon a few pages of detail which may be wearisome. But I am bound to vindicate my good faith and care, where a failure in either involves results of real importance. These results fall under the two following heads: (1.) The Syllabus; what is its language?

(2.) The Syllabus; what is its authority?

2

Erroneously called by some of my antagonists a translation, and then condemned as a bad translation. But I know of no recipe for translating into less than half the bulk of the original.

As to the language, I have justly represented it: as to its authority, my statement is not above, but beneath the mark.

1. The Contents of the Syllabus.

My representation of the language of the Syllabus has been assailed in strong terms. I proceed to defend it: observing, however, that my legitimate object was to state in popular terms the effect of propositions more or less technical and scholastic; and, secondly, that I did not present each and every proposition for a separate disapproval, but directed attention rather to the effect of the document as a whole, in a qualifying passage (p. 13; Am. ed. p. 14) which no one of my critics has been at the pains to notice.

Nos. 1-3.-The first charge of unjust representation is this: I have stated that the Pope condemns (p. 25; Am. ed. p. 21) liberty of the press and liberty of speech. By reference to the original, it is shown that the right of printing and speaking is not in terms condemned universally; but only the right of each man to print or speak all his thoughts (suos conceptus quoscunque), whatever they may be. Hereupon it is justly observed that in all countries there are laws against blasphemy, or obscenity, or sedition, or all three. It is argued, then, that men are not allowed the right to speak or print all their thoughts, and that such an extreme right only is what the Pope has condemned.

It appears to me that this is, to use a mild phrase, mere trifling with the subject. We are asked to believe that what the Pope intended to condemn was a state of things which never has existed in any country of the world. Now he says he is condemning one of the commonly prevailing errors of the time, familiarly known to the bishops whom he addresses. What bishop knows of a State which by law allows a perfectly free course to blasphemy, filthiness, and sedition? The world knows quite well what is meant by free speech and a free press. It does mean, generally, perhaps it may be said universally, the right of declaring all opinions whatsoever. The limit of freedom is not the justness of the opinion, but it is this, that it shall be opinion in good

1 The Month, December, 1874, p. 494. Coleridge, Abomination of Desolation, p. 20. Bishop Ullathorne, Pastoral Letter, p. 16. Monk of St. Augustine's, p. 15. Dr. Newman, pp. 59, 72, in some part.

2 'Probè noscitis hoc tempore non paucos reperiri, qui,' etc.—Encycl., December 8, 1861.

faith, and not mere grossness, passion, or appeal to violence. The law of England at this moment, allowing all opinions whatever, provided they are treated by way of rational discourse, most closely corresponds to what the Pope has condemned. His condemnation is illustrated by his own practice as Governor in the Roman States, where no opinion could be spoken or printed but such as he approved. Once, indeed, he permitted a free discussion on Saint Peter's presence and prelacy in the city; but he repented quickly, and forbade the repetition of it. We might even cite his practice as Pope in 1870, where every thing was done to keep the proceedings of the Council secret from the Church which it professed to represent, and even practically secret from its members, except those who were of the governing cabal. But there can be no better mode of exhibiting his real meaning than by referring to his account of the Austrian law. Hac lege omnis omnium opinionum et librariæ artis libertas, omnis tum fidei, tum conscientiæ ac doctrina, libertas statuitur.1 To the kind of condemnation given, I shall again refer; but the matter of it is nothing abstract or imaginary, it is actual freedom of thinking, speaking, and printing, as it is practiced in a great civilized and Christian empire. I repel, then, the charge against me as no better than a verbal subterfuge; and I again affirm that in his Syllabus, as in his acts, the Pope has condemned liberty of speech and liberty of the press.

2

No. 5.-I have stated that the Pope condemns 'those who assign to the State the power of defining the civil rights (jura) and province of the Church.' Hereupon it is boldly stated that 'the word civil is a pure interpolation." This statement Dr. Newman's undertaking tempts him to quote, but his sagacity and scholarship save him from adopting. Anticipating some cavil such as this, I took care (which is not noticed) to place the word jura in my text. I now affirm that my translation is correct. Jus means, not right at large, but a specific form of right, and in this case civil right, to which meaning indeed the word constantly leans. It refers to right which is social, relative, extrinsic. Jus hominum situm est in generis humani societate (Cic. Tusc. 2-26). If

'From the Pope's Allocution of June 22, 1868: 'By this law is established universal liberty of all opinions and of the press, and, as of belief, so of conscience and of teaching.' See Vering, Archiv für Katholisches Kirchenrecht. Mainz, 1868, p. 171, Band xx.

The Abomination of Desolation, p. 21. Dr. Newman, p. 87.

B

a theological definition is desired, take that of Dens: Accipitur potissimum pro jure prout est in altero, cui debet satisfieri ad æqualitatem; de jure sic sumpto hic agitur. It is not of the internal constitution of the Church and the rights of its members inter se that the proposition treats, nor yet of its ecclesiastical standing in reference to other bodies; but of its rights in the face of the State—that is to say, of its civil rights. My account therefore was accurate, and Mr. Coleridge's criticism superfluous.

I must, however, admit that Vaticanism has a way of escape. For perhaps it does not admit that the Church enjoys any civil rights; but considers as her own, and therefore spiritual in their source, such rights as we consider accidental and derivative, even where not abusive.

On this subject I will refer to a high authority. The Jesuit Schrader was, I believe, one of those employed in drawing up the Syllabus. He has published a work, with a Papal Approbation attached to it, in which he converts the condemnatory negations of the Syllabus into the corresponding affirmatives. For Article XXX. he gives the following proposition:

'The immunities of the Church, and of ecclesiastical persons, have not their origin in civil right.'

He adds the remark: 'but are rooted in the Church's own right, given to her from God.' 2

No. 7.-I have said those persons are condemned by the Syllabus who hold that in countries called Catholic the free exercise of other religions may laudably be allowed. Dr. Newman truly observes that it is the free exercise of religion by immigrants or foreigners which is meant (hominibus illuc immigrantibus), and that I have omitted the words. I omitted them, for my case was strong enough without them. But they seem to strengthen my case. For the claim to a free exercise of religion on behalf of immigrants or foreigners is a stronger one than on behalf of natives, and has been so recognized in Italy and in Rome itself. I think I am right in saying that difference of tongue has generally been recognized by Church law as mitigating the objections to the toleration of dissidence. And it is this stronger claim, not the

1 Tractatus de jure et justitiâ, No. 6.

2 Der Papst und die Modernen Ideen. Von P. Clemens Schrader, S. J. Heft ii. p. 65. Dr. Newman, p. 86.

weaker one, which is condemned. So that if there be a fault, it is the fault of under, not of over statement.

Again I support myself by the high authority of Schrader the Jesuit. The following is his Article LXXVII. It draws no distinction of

countries:

'In our view it is still useful that the Catholic religion should be maintained as the only State religion, to the exclusion of every other.'1

In the appended remark he observes that on this account the Pope, in 1856, condemned the then recent Spanish law which tolerated other forms of worship.2

No. 8.-I am charged, again,3 with mistranslating under my eighth head. The condemnation in the Syllabus is, as I conceived, capable of· being construed to apply to the entire proposition as it is there given, or to a part of it only. In brief it is this: "The Episcopate has a certain power not inherent, but conferred by the State, which may therefore be withdrawn at the pleasure of the State.' The condemnation might be aimed at the assertion that such a power exists, or at the assertion that it is withdrawable at pleasure. In the latter sense, the condemnation is unwise and questionable as a general proposition; in the former sense it is outrageous beyond all bounds; and I am boldly accused of mistranslating because I chose the milder imputation of the two, and understood the censure to apply only to withdrawal ad libitum. I learn now that, in the opinion of this antagonist at least, the State was not the source of (for example) the power of coinage, which was at one time exercised by the Bishops of Durham. So that the upshot is, either my construction is right, or my charge is milder than it should have been.

Nos. 13, 14.-A grave charge is made against me respecting the matrimonial propositions, because I have cited the Pope as condemning those who affirm that the matrimonial contract is binding whether there is or is not (according to the Roman doctrine) a Sacrament, and have not at the same time stated that English marriages are held by Rome to be sacramental, and therefore valid.5

1

No charge, serious or slight, could be more entirely futile. But it is

2 Schrader, p. 80. Inf. • Ibid.

'Mr. Coleridge, Abomination of Desolation, p. 21. Monk of St. Augustine's, p. 15. Abomination, p. 22.