The provision in the Rules that no carrier shall be bound to issue a bill of lading showing particulars which he has reasonable ground for suspecting do not accurately represent the goods actually received is presumably merely a safeguard upon which the carrier may fall back if necessary, and would be acted on only in exceptional cases. If acted on, and the issue of a bill of lading declined, there would be no completed transaction at all, and it does not seem necessary to comment further on this provision.

Bulk Cargoes: Bill not Prima Facie Evidence.-The special instances above referred to in which the bill of lading is (under the Rules) not prima facie evidence of receipt of the goods as described are goods carried in bulk and whole cargoes of timber. In some trades (notably coal) it is not customary for the carrier to accept responsibility as to quantity or weight, and the provision in the Rules is adapted to that custom. In some other trades, however, where bulk cargoes are carried (notably timber and corn), it is usual to insert a clause (known as the conclusive evidence clause) to the effect that the bill of lading shall be conclusive evidence against the carrier of the quantity of cargo received (see Lishmann v. Christie (1887), 19 Q.B.D., 333). It might appear, at first sight, as if the Rules introduce something directly contrary to the practice of this trade, but it must be remembered that the code of conditions contained in the Rules, while appropriate to the majority of cases, may be made, in special trades, merely a nucleus to which special clauses may be added as required, so long as they do not conflict. In this connection it should

accordingly be observed that, while clause 8 of the present Article makes non-effective any clause lessening the carrier's liability, a later clause gives the carrier liberty to surrender any of his rights or immunities (see Article IV., clause 7). The insertion of the conclusive evidence clause is a surrender by the carrier of a right, or immunity-it does not lessen, but increases his liability and accordingly there seems to be nothing which would prevent the continued use of this special clause, which is usual in the timber and corn trades, along with the Rules, where the bill of lading relates to the commodities dealt with in those special trades.

Comparison with Existing Legislation. The provisions of the Rules as to description and shipment of goods. correspond closely with those in the Harter Act and in the Canadian Act (see Harter Act, Section 4, and Canadian Act, Section 9, with exclusion of wood goods by section 2 as amended, in Appendix II.).

Notice of Claim for Damage.

Clause 6 of this Article provides (1) that unless written notice of a claim for loss or damage is given before removal of the goods, such removal shall be prima facie evidence of due delivery, and further (2) that, in any event, liability for loss or damage shall cease unless suit is brought within twelve months after delivery.

On the first point, as indicated in the Introduction, the clause deals not with rights but with evidence. It lays down a rule of evidence as to proof of claim, and does not in any way affect the question of what claims

can be made. If a claim for loss or damage arises written notice indicating the general nature of the claim is to be given before removal of the goods. Removal without such notice will be prima facie evidence of delivery of the goods as described in the bill of lading.

This puts the person who takes delivery in very much the same position as that in which he would be under the general principles of law if there had been no such provision in the Hague Rules. If he were to accept delivery without raising any question of loss or damage, and afterwards made a claim, he would, on general principles, be required to show that the loss or damage did not occur after he took delivery. He would not succeed in his claim unless he disposed of the prima facie presumption that the delivery he had accepted without question was a delivery of the goods in the condition contracted for.

If the fact was that the damage could not be discovered till the goods had been unpacked, evidence of that fact and evidence that no damage had been done since delivery would counter the prima facie presumption of due delivery as much under the Hague Rules as it would if general principles applied.

Some criticism of this clause has been based on the assumption that "removal" is the same point of time as unloading from the ship's tackle, but clearly this is not necessarily so. The Hague Rules, as has been pointed out several times, deal primarily with a period which ends when the goods leave the ship's tackle, but by this particular clause it is expressly laid down that a presumption of due delivery arises only in the absence of

notice "at the port of discharge before the removal of the goods." If, under some clause in the bill of lading, the carrier acts as wharfinger or warehouseman, "removal" can hardly be said to take place until the carrier, in that other capacity, finally delivers the goods. When delivery is taken the receipt can, of course, be given for goods "not examined," or a precautionary notice of claim can be embodied in the receipt if thought desirable.

The circumstances in which the greatest practical difficulty may arise will perhaps be where goods leave the carrier's custody by discharge from ship to lighter, but, even here, the position of the person who takes delivery by the lighterman as his agent is no worse under the Rules than under the general principles of law. In this connection it is worthy of note that the "London Lighterage Clause" has recently been modified. Instead of accepting goods for conveyance entirely at owner's risk, the lighterman now undertakes responsibility for loss arising from pilferage and theft of goods on board a lighter while in course of transit, such loss or damage being limited to £20 per package and not exceeding £50 per ton. Under these altered lighterage conditions master lightermen will, it may be assumed, feel bound to exercise closer supervision over those they employ.

In considering how the adoption of this clause of the Hague Rules as the basis of contract affects the relative/ position of carrier and merchant, the comparison must of course be made with clauses previously in use. For this purpose the clause which formed part of the bill of lading in question in Moore v. Harris (1876), I A.C., 318, may

serve as an illustration. In that case packages of tea were carried from London under a bill of lading and were "to be delivered from the ship's deck, where the ship's responsibility shall cease, at the port of Montreal" . . . unto the Grand Trunk Railway Company, and by them to be forwarded thence per railway to the station nearest to Toronto, and at the aforesaid station delivered to the consignees or their assigns." The instrument contained a condition that "No damage that can be insured against will be paid for, nor will any claim whatever be admitted unless made before the goods are removed." No notice of damage was given until some time after delivery. It was held that the condition, though in its first clause limited to insurable damage, clearly applied as regards its second clause to all damage, whether apparent or latent, which could by examination of the packages conducted with reasonable care and skill at the place of removal have been discovered. The Privy Council, it may be noted in passing, were of opinion that the "place of removal" was not Montreal, but Toronto, thus confirming the view above expressed as to the meaning of "removal." The merchants failed to establish a claim for damage. The condition in the bill of lading did not merely throw the burden of proof on them in the absence of notice before removal, but in that event absolutely barred their claim (see also Chartered Bank of India v. British India S.N. Co. (1909), A.C., 369).

The second provision of the clause of the Rules under discussion, that the carrier's liability shall cease at the end of a year unless an action is commenced within that time, should be compared, not with the rule of English law