and prudent owner would require his vessel to have at the commencement of her voyage, having regard to all the probable circumstances of it" (Channell J. in McFadden v. Blue Star Line (1905), 1 K.B., at p. 706 quoting Carver, p. 23). As interpreted by the English courts seaworthiness means fitness not only in the sense that the ship shall be "tight, staunch and strong," but also fitness for the carriage of the particular kind of cargo to be carried (Stanton v. Richardson (1874), L.R. 9, C.P. 390). As to refrigerating machinery see Cargo on Maori King v. Hughes (1895), 2 Q.B., 550, and Rowson v. Atlantic Transport Co. (1903), 2 K.B., 666. Fitness further means that the ship shall be in a proper condi- . tion to receive the particular cargo-Tattersall v. National S.S. Co. (1884), 12 Q.B.D., 297.

The Rules have been criticised on the ground that they require only the exercise of due diligence to make the ship seaworthy, while the Canadian Act obliges the carrier to make and keep the ship seaworthy. On this point it is material to note that the implied absolute warranty of seaworthiness under British law is fulfilled if the ship is seaworthy when she leaves her moorings (the Rona (1884), 5 Asp. M.C., 259), and the warranty does not include any undertaking that the ship will continue seaworthy. It is manifest, moreover, that if a ship is made seaworthy for the intended voyage (which is the meaning of seaworthy) a further requirement to "keep" her seaworthy does not add much to the obligation,

Responsibility for Goods.

The second clause of this Article is one of the most important in the code. It lays down that "The carrier. shall be bound to provide for the proper and careful handling, loading, stowage, carriage, custody, care, and unloading of the goods carried."

These words are similar to, but not identical with, those appearing in existing American and Dominions legislation. The form of expression is different. By existing legislation the insertion of any clause relieving the carrier from certain liabilities is prohibited. In the Hague Rules the liabilities themselves are positively stated. As to Dominions legislation the report of the Imperial Shipping Committee remarked that:

"The governing terms of the existing Dominions legislation on this subject are to the effect that the owner, manager, agent, master, or charterer of any ship must not be relieved from liability for loss or damage arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the proper loading, stowage, custody, care, or delivery of goods received by him to be carried in or by the ship, nor must the obligations of the master, officers, agents, or servants of any ship to handle and stow goods carefully, and to care for, preserve and properly deliver them be lessened, weakened, or avoided."

As to this clause in the Hague Rules it has been objected (see pamphlet by Dr. A. E. Jackson) that the carrier's obligation is limited to "providing" for proper

and careful handling, etc., and suggested that, withou lessening the liabilities imposed by the Rules, the carrie can insert a clause freeing himself from responsibility for the negligence of his servants.

It does not appear, however, how this can be so. An clause lessening the carrier's liability otherwise than a provided in the Rules is of no effect. The Rules them selves (Article IV., clause 2) free the carrier from respor sibility for the acts of his servants "in the navigation o in the management of the ship," but not in the handlin of the cargo. The clause suggested would lessen th carrier's liability otherwise than as provided in the Rule and therefore be of no effect.

Moreover, the analogy of the general position unde English law seems to be material here. It was pointe out by Lord Macnaghten (in the Xantho (1887), 12 A.C at p. 515) that, implied and involved in the contra evidenced by the common form of bill of lading, there an engagement on the part of the carrier to use due car and skill in carrying the goods. Coupled with this the fact that the tendency of the courts is to constru clauses exempting the carrier from liability for negl gence of servants strongly against him unless expresse with the utmost clearness. The Hague Rules expressly throw upon the carrier the implied duty referred to by Lord Macnaghten, and expressly prohibit the insertio of additional clauses lessening the carrier's liability. view of this the suggestion that an exception of negli gence of carrier's servants can be added may be dismisse as insupportable. Indeed, from the reference to servant or agents in Article V., it would seem that a shipping

document subject to the Rules, and containing the exception suggested, could not be issued as a bill of lading at all.

With reference to this clause of the Rules in general it should be noted that the obligations imposed on the carrier are greater than under clauses hitherto common in bills of lading, the continued use of which would be inconsistent with the Rules, such, for example, as clauses negativing claims for loss or damage from bad stowage or pilferage.

The period covered by the Rules extends, it will be remembered, under the definition of "carriage of goods," from the receipt of the goods on the ship's tackle to their being unloaded. The present clause deals with various operations from loading to unloading, and, in this conhection, some references to judgments in which these >perations have been discussed will help to illustrate the egal view of them.

Loading and Unloading.-"The business of both parties," said Lord Selborne in Grant v. Coverdale *1884), 9 A.C., 470, “meets and concurs in that operation of loading." In that case the ship was, according to charter-party, to load "in the customary manner from the agents of the freighter" a cargo of iron at Cardiff. "When the charterer has tendered the cargo," proceeded the judge, "and when the operation has proceeded to the point at which the shipowner is to take charge of it, everything after that is the shipowner's 'business, and everything before the commencement of *the operation of loading... is the charterer's part only." ¿The ordinary operation of delivery by ship to con

signee was analysed by Lord Esher in Petersen v. Freebody (1895), 2 Q.B., 294. "The shipowner," he observed, "acts from the deck or some part of his own ship, but always on board his ship. The consignee's place is alongside the ship where the thing is to be delivered to him. If the delivery is to be on to another ship, he must be on that ship; if into a barge or lighter, on that barge or lighter; if on to the quay, on the quay. Wherever the delivery is to be, the shipowner, on the one hand, must give delivery. If he merely puts the goods on the rail of his ship, he does not give delivery; that is not enough. If, on the other hand, the consignee merely stands on the other ship, or on the barge or lighter, or on the quay, and does nothing, he does not take delivery. The shipowner has performed the principal part of his obligation when he has put the goods over the rail of his ship; but I think he must do something more-he must put the goods in such a position that the consignee can take delivery of them. He must put them so far over the side as that the consignee can begin to act upon them; but the moment the goods are put within reach of the consignee he must take his part in the operation. At one moment of time the shipowner and the consignee are both acting-the one in giving and the other in taking delivery; at another moment the joint act is finished."

"Apart from custom," said A. L. Smith L.J., in Brenda SS. Co. v. Green (1900), 1 Q.B., 518, "a ship has delivered her cargo when it is put over the rail, and, as has been frequently pointed out, that is a joint operation of shipowner and charterer." "The general law,"