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taken and subscribed, at some general or quarter sessions for such county, city and county, town and county, riding or division, for which he or they did or should act, or intend to act.

251. Camden's Decision against General

HIS

Warrants

(1763. 19 State Trials, 1067.)

IS lordship then went upon the warrant, which he declared was a point of the greatest consequence he had ever met with in his whole practice. The defendant claimed a right, under precedents, to force persons' houses, break open escrutores, seize their papers, etc. upon a general warrant, where no inventory is made of the things thus taken away, and where no offenders' names are specified in the warrant, and therefore a discretionary power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall. If such a power is truly invested in a secretary of state, and he can delegate this power, it certainly may affect the person and property of every man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.

And as for the precedents, will that be esteemed law in a secretary of state which is not law in any other magistrate of this kingdom? If they should be found to be legal, they are certainly of the most dangerous consequences; if not legal, must aggravate damages.

* It is my opinion the office precedents, which had been produced since the Revolution, are no justification of a practice in itself illegal, and contrary to the fundamental principles of the constitution; though its having been the constant practice of the office, might fairly be pleaded in mitigation of damages.

252. Mansfield's Decision against General Warrants

(1764. 19 State Trials, 1026-1027.)

THE last point is, 'whether this general warrant be good.'

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At present as to the validity of the warrant, upon the single objection of the incertainty of the person, being neither named nor described the common law, in many cases, gives authority to arrest without warrant; more especially, where taken in the very act and there are many cases where particular acts of parliament have given authority to apprehend, under general warrants; as in the case of writs of assistance, or warrants to take up loose, idle, and disorderly people. But here, it is not contended, that the common law gave the officer authority to apprehend; nor that there is any act of parliament which warrants this

case.

Therefore it must stand upon principles of common law.

It is not fit, that the receiving or judging of the information should be left to the discretion of the officer. The magistrate ought to judge; and should give certain directions to the officer. This is so, upon reason and convenience.

Then as to authorities - Hale and all others hold such an uncertain warrant void: and there is no case or book to the contrary.

It is said 'that the usage has been so; and that many such have been issued, since the Revolution, down to this time.'

But a usage, to grow into law, ought to be a general usage, communiter usitata et approbata; and which, after a long continuance, it would be mischievous to overturn.

This is the only usage of a particular office, and contrary to the usage of all other justices and conservators of the peace.

There is the less reason for regarding this usage; because the form of the warrant probably took its rise from a positive statute; and the former precedents were inadvertently followed, after that law was expired.

Mansfield's Decision

253. Somerset's Case.

(1771. 20 State Trials, 82.)

THE only question before us is, whether the cause on the return [to a habeas corpus] is sufficient? If it is, the negro must be remanded; if it is not, he must be discharged. Accordingly, the return states, that the slave departed and refused to serve; whereupon he was kept, to be sold abroad. So high an act of dominion must be recognized by the law of the country where it is used. The power of a master over his slave has been extremely different, in different countries. The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by positive law, which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself from whence it was created, is erased from memory. It is so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law. Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may follow from the decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or approved by the law of England; and therefore the black must be discharged.

254. Dunning's Resolution

(1780, April 6. Resolution of the House of Commons. 21 Parliamentary History, 347.)

I. "THAT it is the opinion of this committee, that it is necessary to declare, that the influence of the crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished."

II. "That it is competent to this house, to examine into, and to correct, abuses in the expenditure of the civil list revenues, as well as in every other branch of the public revenue, whenever it shall appear expedient to the wisdom of this house so to do."

255. Dissolution of Parliament does not impair Impeachment.

(1790, December 20. 28 Parliamentary History, 1035.)

[R. BURKE moved: "That it appears that an impeachment

Britain, in the parliament assembled, and of all the commons of Great Britain, against Warren Hastings, Esq., late governor general of Bengal for sundry high crimes and misdemeanours is now depending." Passed.

WHE

256. Fox's Libel Act

(1792. 32 George III. c. 60. 37 S. L. 627.)

WHEREAS doubts have arisen whether on the trial of an indictment or information for the making or publishing any libel, where an issue or issues are joined between the king and the defendant or defendants, on the plea of not guilty pleaded, it be competent to the jury impanelled to try the same to give their verdict upon the whole matter in issue; be it therefore declared and enacted by the king's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that, on every such trial, the jury sworn to try the issue may give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty upon the whole matter put in issue upon such indictment or information; and shall not be required or directed, by the court or judge before whom such indictment or information shall be tried, to find the defendant or defendants guilty, merely on the proof of the publication by such defendant or defendants of the paper charged to be a libel, and of a sense ascribed to the same in such indictment or information.

II. Provided always, that, on every such trial, the court or judge before whom such indictment or information shall be tried, shall, according to their or his discretion, give their or his opinion and directions to the jury on the matter in issue between the king

and the defendant or defendants, in like manner as in other criminal cases.

III. Provided also, that nothing herein contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, to prevent the jury from finding a special verdict, in their discretion, as in other criminal cases.

IV. Provided also, that in case the jury shall find the defendant or defendants guilty, it shall and may be lawful for the said defendant or defendants to move an arrest of judgment, on such ground and in such manner as by law he or they might have done before the passing of this act; anything herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding.

257. Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

WHER

(1794. 34 George III. c. 54. 39 S. L. 556.)

THEREAS a traitorous and detestable conspiracy has been formed for subverting the existing laws and constitution, and for introducing the system of anarchy and confusion which has so fatally prevailed in France: therefore, for the better preservation of His Majesty's sacred person, and for securing the peace and the laws and liberties of this kingdom; be it enacted by the king's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that every person or persons that are or shall be in prison within the kingdom of Great Britain at or upon the day on which this act shall receive His Majesty's royal assent, or after, by warrant of His said Majesty's most honourable privy council, signed by six of the said privy council, for high treason, suspicion of high treason, or treasonable practices, or by warrant, signed by any of His Majesty's secretaries of state, for such causes as aforesaid, may be detained in safe custody, without bail or mainprize, until the first day of February one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five; and that no judge or justice of the peace shall bail or try any such person or persons so committed, without order from His said Majesty's privy council, signed by six of the said privy council, till the said first day of February one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five; any law or statute to the contrary notwithstanding.

II. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that

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