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stand there as the advocate of the Bank; his only object was the public interest. If the Bank Directors had not done their duty he would have been as ready to censure them as any man. But as to their resumption of cash payments it was altogether out of the question. It was impossible for them to find specie to pay. If there existed a possibility of their resuming cash payments, he would be willing to compel them to do so at whatever expence. If they could find specie at any price, their profits had been so large that he thought they ought to pay in cash. (Hear! hear!) But the truth was that specie was not to be found.-The Committee in their Report proposed that the Bank Directors should reduce their issues of paper. How could they do this when gold was not to be had? In his opinion they could not possibly do so without the most material injury to trade and manufactures, and the most serious inconvenience even to labourers and almost every description of persons in the community. His Honourable Friend had said that gold might be had in exchange for other commodities. But every thing that the country could spare was sent out for other purposes. They could not send more, and how was the gold to be procured? His Hon. Friend said that it might be procured here, but it was well known that foreigners purchased it here at the rate of 41. 158. per ounce, and one of them had a commission to take it at any price. Whatever the price might be, bis instructions were to give a shilling more, but to get the gold. It was impossible, therefore, for the Bank to procure it and if the Bank could not procure it, what did they propose? He had seen an order under the administration of the Earl of Oxford, by which a ship was directed to proceed in search of gold, This order had appeared to him sufficiently whimsical; but he protested that he did not think it more extravagant than the proposition now made to compel the resumption of cash payments by the Bank within a certain period, when gold was not to be had. Mr. Locke had stated, that the only way to procure gold was by the surplus of trade. If more commodities were exported than imported, gold must be imported in order to equalize the balance. But at present the balance of trade was against us. If the issues of bank notes were not checked, our difficulties might be surmounted (Hear! hear! from Mr. Perceval and others)-but if they

should be checked, the worst consequences would follow. Gold could not be procured. The balance of trade was not only against us, but the system of tyranny prevalent on the continent prevented the payment of money there even when it be came due. This was so monstrous, that it could hardly continue. One would hope that it would soon find its own end. But even if the Bank could find gold, would the country be the better for it? How long would the coin issued remain in this country? The price of gold was 4. 168.; but supposing it only 41. 14s. or 13, or 12, it would be melted and exported. Unless then they could reduce the price of gold, it would be perfectly nugatory to call upon the Bank to pay in the precious metals. If the public were to derive any advantage from it, he would have no hesitation in diminishing the. profits of the Bank; but when no advantage could be gained for the public by the measure, he had no inclination to interfere. He would only farther say, that under this system of Bank Restriction, the country had flourished for 14 years, with the exception of the two last years, as far as concerned the exchange. That had fallen, but it was owing to the unexampled tyranny under which the Continent at present groaned. Were they to assist the enemy in this monstrous work by checking the issues of bank-paper, at a moment when the scarcity of the precious metals rendered them essential to the commercial' and manufacturing industry of the country? In the whole history of Parliament he had never heard of a Report so totally contradicted by facts as this. Having prospered so long under this system, he hoped they would not now put an end to it, at a time when it became of the greatest consequence to continue it. He trusted Gentlemen would take care that whatever mischief was done us, should be the work of the enemy; and that we should not madly assist his schemes, by bringing. that destruction upon ourselves in which he vainly attempted to involve us (Hear! hear !)

Mr. HENRY THORNTON said it was impossible at present to follow the right Honourable Gentleman, who had just sat down, through the variety of calculations which he had submitted to the House. Neither would he attempt at present to decide upon the accuracy or the inaccuracy of the Bullion Committee Report,

or

The question had been certainly ably and fully opened that night by the Learned Chairman of that Committee; but however ably and fully he might have opened the question, there were some parts of his speech which, perhaps, required farther amplification. The main question, it was to be observed, was not whether cash payments were to be resumed at the Bank of England, within a limited time? whether this resumption should at all take place? but it was, whether they ought to agree to the sentiment of the Learned Gentleman on this particular point; namely, that the present high price of bullion was to be attributed to the quantity of paper circulated in the country? It is necessary, therefore, that the House should decide as to this point between the Bank Directors and the Búllion Committee. He himself had already given an incidental opinion in the House on this subject; but it was a subject which could not be too fully canvassed in the House; because when they gave the Bank an unlimited and discretionary power to issue out paper, it was their duty carefully to guard against any excess in that issue. It became necessary then in the first place, to enquire in what manner quantity had an influence on exchange. He had to shew what, in his opinion, was as plain as any point could well be, nay, that was demonstrable; that the quantity of paper must necessarily influence the price of commodities. The Irish Bank Directors, though they denied that the Exchange was anywise affected by the issue of paper, did not deny that the price of commodities was affected by it. One of the English Bank Directors said something to the same effect. Indeed, he had never met with any one who denied that the quantity of paper influenced the price of commodities. The same effect was produced by the quantity of gold. Indeed, the general principle of quantity was admitted the other day in the House, when a certain amount of Exchequer bills was voted to prevent some persons in Scotland, engaged in manufactures, from experiencing a fall in the price of their commodities. They had heard that the paper of all the Banks of Ireland had been diminished. The consequence of this measure was a fall in the price of commodities, but it was also a rise in exchange. Here he wished to be understood, that he did not mean to say that a great diminution of paper might not be a great evil, but at

present it was to be kept in mind, they were searching for principles-they were inquiring whether the augmentation of the circulating medium of the country did not diminish the value of that circulating medium. Of this principle he could no more doubt than he could doubt of his own existence. On the 31st of December 1795, the exchange was unfavourable to this country. The Bank immediately li mited their paper. He found at that time a general refusal to discount. It would have been very convenient to himself at that time to have received an accommodation from the Bank. He had goods which he was compelled, in consequence, to sell at a loss. He found, when he went to the Bank, a sugar baker in the same predicament with himself, who was compelled to have recourse to the same remedy. Now if this fact be established, that the augmentation of the quantity of paper increases the price of commodities, was it possible to deny that bullion shared the fate of all other commodities? Why should not the produce of the mine be affected as well as the produce of the earth? What was exchange but the relative value of the circulating medium of one country compared with the value of the circulating medium of all other countries? Now this country had taken a different relative value in her circulation to that of other countries, and therefore the exchange with those countries identified itself with the price of bullion in them. This, it was to be remarked, was the great fundamental question. It was like a primary law of nature, and ought to be constantly kept in mind. Not that he meant to say an invariable proportion was maintained between the price of bullion and the issue of paper. (Hear! from the Ministerial Benches). He could suppose that on any great alarm the proportions might be doubled-even tripled. There were indeed a variety of causes which might operate more strongly at one period than another. But to this point he wished to call the attention of the House, that they had never on any former occasion had any thing like so great an excess as now. If at any time the balance of trade was against us, and the value of gold rose in consequence, the temptation to export occasioned a drain on the Bank. The Bank then drew in their issues. He wished to call to their recollection three periods illustrative of this. The first of these periods was 1782, when, as appears from

the evidence given before this House in 1797, there was a considerable fall in exchange, and the Bank refused to make any payments on the loan of 1782. The second of these periods was 1795, when the exchange was also unfavourable. The Bank began immediately to restrict their loans. The third of these periods was 1797, when there was a drain on the Bank from another cause, not connected with an unfavourable exchange. To have then extended their issues, would have been highly liberal, but the fact was, that they on the contrary drew them in. It was necessary then to inquire how they would be freed from this drain of gold, and not permit the evil to go on enlarging, in the same manner as if the present period were antecedent to the restriction. If there were no restriction at the Bank, and no law against the exportation of gold coin, no Parliament to interfere with the course of proceeding, how would nature act? Supposing that the stamp of the coin nierely ascertained the quantity and quality of the metal contained in it; supposing an unfavourable trade and an unfavourable harvest. If people from abroad send articles hither, something in return must be sent to them, commodities as far as they go, and if any gold in the country, some of it must also be sent, but just so much as would put the gold on the footing at which it might be in the exporting country. This might be very inconvenient; but he was merely shewing the course that would be taken. The gold going abroad would occasion it to be cheaper there, while the high rate of interest here would gradually restore the balance between this and foreign countries, so that the standard would still continue to be the same, as if all was but one country. He asked, whether in such a case there would not necessarily be a limitation of the circulating medium? Surely there would. The law, no doubt, would prove some obstruction to the exportation of coin; but the value of that difficulty was known. How did this stand antecedent to 1797? It was necessary to examine the principle of the thing. They knew for a hundred years back there had been a constant tendency to excess in the issues; but that excess had always been prevented by limitation. He had already stated three cases where the Bank had limited their issues. When the Bank felt an alarm, they very naturally reduced their issues. It was altogether out of the

question to think of ascertaining the excess from the quantity; for there were a variety of circumstances which made the quantity elude their discovery. The situation of Europe might make a diminution indispensibly necessary. The war had such a tendency. Between 1783 and 1792, years of peace, the exchange was always in favour of this country; and accordingly it would be found, the years of excess were during the war in 1795 and 1797.- Gentlemen might consider what a low rate of interest five per cent. was, in time of war, and what a temptation it afforded to apply for discounts. The legal rate of interest was, no doubt, five per cent. and it might be imagined that all the money that was borrowed during war was borrowed at that rate; but no man could borrow money, except from the Bank, without paying additional sums, in name of commission, which really went to increase the rate. A person who borrowed at 5 per cent. would find, on balancing his books, that, independent of the profits of trade, his goods were, from time to time, worth more and more in value, so that in time, by the mere rise in stock alone, he would be enabled to pay off the debt. In the same manner, a person who in 1790 laid out 100%. in the purchase of land, if it were traced back, would be found soon to have got the' whole into his own pocket. It was easy to see then what a great temptation there was for borrowing. It was well known in the banking business, that nobody lent to the full extent of the demand, for it would be perfectly impossible to equal the measure of the demand. The borrower pays more than 5 per cent. interest to any other person than the Bank. It may easily be imagined then, that if the Bank with such a low interest measure their issues by any think like demand, they must run into excc69. In the Hamburgh Bank the limitation against excess is found in the rate of interest; and it may be said, that the Bank of England will be constantly-in danger of excess, if the rate of interest be ever so little higher than the legal rate. Since 1797 there had been no limitation whatever on the Bank; and this was the turning point. The Right Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Rose) was displeased at the comparison between the Bank of England and the Mississippi Scheme of Law; and he agreed with him, that nothingcould be more opposite in general than they were. But though, in many points,

they might be opposed, it was no less
true that there might be certain points of
similarity between them, and that this
country may be in danger of suffering
from the same calamity which befel
France, from Law. Mr. Law looked to
security, and the Bank looked, in 1797,
to security. Law did not issue paper for
more than two-thirds of the value of the
land. The rate of interest fell to 3 per
cent. Many good things resulted at first
from this; but he got at last more than all
the circulating medium of the rest of
Europe. He thought he could not issue
too much, while he lent at low interest on
good security. In the same manner-let
the Bank look that they do not lend too
much at low interest. Another case ap-
plicable to the present was the Bank of
Paris. The Bank of Paris was not the
Government Bank. It lent out money
on moderate interest, and was founded
on good security. In 1785, the Go-
vernment, wishing for money, contrived
to borrow from the Bank, and to interfere
with the paper currency. The Bank
having furnished loans to Government,
augmented their paper. This again pro-
duced a run on the Bank: at last the
Bank stopt. But the Bank immediately
limited their paper; and though the ex-
change had fallen 10 per cent. the Bank
felt no difficulty. This example was
made for the instruction of this country.
A Committee was appointed to inquire
into the business, and they stated three
things as particularly to be attended to.
The first was, that Government should not
borrow from the Bank, very different from
the practice in this country. They next
stated that the Bank Funds should only
be laid out on short securities, that they
might always have it in their power to
restrict their issues; and in the third
place they stated that the Bank should
draw in their discounts in case of a drain,
for the meaning of a drain was, that more
re-
notes had been issued than were
quired. This could not be difficult if at
tention were paid to the first symptoms of
superabundance. Gentlemen would per-
haps say that this case was not similar to

ours.

But he would maintain that drain was a proof of superabundance. The paper of the Paris Bank amounted only to ninety millions when it stopped, while 100 miilions at another period was not found too much; but then there arose circumstances,

ance

such as war, which totally altered the re-
He protested,
lation of the sum wanted.
therefore, against the laying down a par-
ticular maximum: The only rule of guid-
They
was necessarily the drain.
were exactly like the Bank of Paris.
There were a variety of other circumstances
to the same point, and he believed Sweden
was one. The Swedish Bank, like the Bank
It had been
of Paris, lent at interest.
said that the difference between this
country and the Continent made all these
foreign instances inapplicable; but were
there no limits to this proposition; were
there no countries on the Continent situate
like ourselves? The Swedish Bank, he
was persuaded, was of that description-
they lent at interest; but they lent some-
what too largely, and stopt at a depre-
ciation of 70 per cent. They also say a
great difference in the price of commodi-
ties is highly inconvenient, that trade
would suffer, they wish to temporize, and
are indisposed to reduce their issues of
paper. The excess of America was also
in point. Their paper was also issued on
very good security. Demerara and Su-
rinam were also in point. It was very
natural for us to think that we were the
centre of our own system; in the same
way as was supposed that the sun kept
running round the earth, and not the
earth round the sun, we always imagine
that the bullion keeps on rising, and not
that our currency goes on depreciating.
He said he understood that in Sweden
also bullion was said to rise. He remem
bered when he was in a Russian counting-
house, he had no ideas how the exchange,
now down to 11, and now up, was con-
tinually against that country, in the same
manner as a leading tide, though it ap-
pears for a little to go back, keeps gra-
dually gaining more and more ground.
The general unfavourable exchange was
to be attributed to the paper money
issued by several successive rulers of
Russia, and these variations had their
origiu in causes that might somewhat re
duce, but could never substantially effect
that unfavourable exchange. Will it be
said, that the same measure may be fa-
vourable here and unfavourable there?
It appears from Marshall's Life of Wash-
ington, how unwilling the Americans
were in 1791 and 1792, to own the depre
ciated state of their currency.
(To be continued.)

Published by R. BAGSHAW, Brydges-Street, Covent Garden :-Sold also by J. BUDD, Pall-Mall,

LONDON :—Printed by T: C. Hansard, Peterborough-Court, Fleet-Street.

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Report of the Bullion Committee:

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

RADESMEN AND FARMERS
IN AND NEAR SALISBURY.

[1215

guinea was worth 26s. or 27s. they answered, that it was very true, that Gold and Silver had risen; but, that the Bank paper had not fallen.

They were then asked, how, since they would insist upon it that it was a rise of Gold and Silver, it had come to pass at this time above all others. Allowing, for argument's sake, that it was a rise in the value of the guinea, they were asked how the value of the guinea came to rise. Their answer to this was, that it was owing chiefly to the injury done to our commerce by Injury to Commerce by Buonaparté — He is the extraordinary, the cruel, the savage measaid to have caused the Gold to leave Eng-sures of the inexorable tyrant Buonaparté, land-The Fault is with our Governmentwhom they designated by every appellaOur Appeals to the French People absurd- tion characteristic of a despot, and even a Forged Bank Notes sent into Kent from France-Forged Assignats- Decision in the Court of King's Bench.

LETTER XXIV.

GENTLEMEN,

fiend.

Gentlemen, we will stop here and make a few observations upon these charges against the Emperor of France; for, it would be very foolish in us, who call ourselves "the most thinking people in the

We have now to discuss the question of Depreciation. We have now to inquire, whether the Bank of England Notes have," world," to suffer ourselves to be amused or have not, depreciated; that is to say, fallen in value. After what we have seen in the former Letters, and particularly in that immediately preceding, it is, indeed, nearly useless to put this question to any man of sense, and much more so to make it a subject of serious discussion. Nevertheless, it will be right so to do; seeing that these Letters are intended to treat of every part of this great subject, and to put upon record all the material facts and arguments appertaining to it.

In the House of Commons, during the Debate on the Bullion Report and on the Resolutions thereon proposed, by Mr. FRANCIS HORNER on the one side, and Mr. NICHOLAS VANSITTART on the other, it was contended, by those who were for Mr. VANSITTART, that is to say, by the MINISTRY, and their adherents; by this part of the House it was contended, that the Bank paper had not depreciated, or fallen in value; and, being asked, how they then accounted for the fact, that a

with charges against Napoleon, when we should be considering of the real cause of the mischief that is now come upon us, and of the greater mischief that is still coming, and will come with most dreadful effect, unless we take timely measures for preventing that effect; this would be selling ourselves to laughter indeed, making ourselves an object for the contempt of Europe, not excepting the Dutch and those other nations, whom, with empty insolence, our hireling writers and others affect to pity.

We call upon the Bank for Gold and Silver in payment of their promissory | notes. They have no Gold or Silver to give us; or, at least, none do they give. They are protected by law against our demands. Some persons propose to remove this impediment to our demands. The men in power and a great majority of the House of Commons say, no; and, they, in objecting to the proposition, say, that the Bank have not the gold and silver;

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