ἂν δύνασθαι ἐπανελθεῖν οἴκαδε, Iso that he would not be able to return home." Id. in Aph. Fals. Test. § 23: σt' ovdè taútηv åv τις ἐπενέγκοι τὴν αἰτίαν, “ so that no one would be able to allege this cause.” Xen. Ages. I. 26 : ὥστε τὴν πόλιν ὄντως ἡγήσω ἂν πολέμου ἐργαστήριον εἶναι, “ so that you would really have supposed the city to be a workshop of war."

(d) The illative clause is attracted into the protasis; Xen. con. I. 13: εἴ τις χρῷτο τῷ ἀργυρίῳ ὥστε κάκιον τὸ σῶμα ἔχοι, πῶς ἂν ἔτι τὸ ἀργύριον αὐτῷ ὠφέλιμον εἴη; “ if any one were to use his money, so as to be (as if he were) worse in body, how would his money be any longer useful to him?"

Obs. There are a few passages in which wore ou or as où seems to be followed by the infinitive; but in some of these (as in Soph. El. 780; Eurip. Phon. 1357; Dem. Nic. p. 1246) we ought to restore the indicative. In others (as in Herod. 1. 189; Plat. Apol. p. 26 D; Lys. x. § 15; Thucyd. v. 40, &c.) the negative ou is preferred to un, because the construction of OTE où with the indicative would have been given in oratione directa, or because the negative qualifies some single word. See Shilleto on Dem. Fals. Leg. pp. 202-205, and compare Journal of Philology, III. 206.

597 In the sense of "wherefore" wore may be used with the imperative, especially in such phrases as wσte láppel, “wherefore be of good courage" (Plat. Euthyd. 275 c; Xen. Cyr. I. 3, § 18); and even with the indicative in an interrogation, as in Dem. c. Aph. Fals. Test. § 47: ὥστε πόθεν ἴσασιν ;

598 If a comparative or superlative adjective appears in the antecedent clause, the emphatic pronoun is necessarily omitted,

as

(α) νεώτεροί εἰσιν ἢ ὥστε εἰδέναι οἵων πατέρων ἐστέρηνται.

(3) φιλοτιμότατος ἦν ὁ Κῦρος, ὥστε πάντα ὑπομεῖναι τοῦ ἐπαινεῖσθαι ἕνεκα.

599 This is also the case when olós Te with the finite verb is substituted for ὥστε. Thus, for τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε ποιεῖν ταῦτα, we write οἷός τε ἐστὶ ποιεῖν ταῦτα, substituting the relative for the relative and its antecedent, and transferring the former to the antecedent clause, so as to make it a mere predication (above, 405, Obs. 2).

600 Conversely, when olos intervenes between its antecedent TOLOÛTOS and another relative sentence, the intermediate sentence may be omitted. Thus we may write οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἁρμονία γε τοιούτόν ἐστιν ᾧ ἀπεικάζεις αὐτήν, for τοιοῦτον οἷον ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν ᾧ ἀπειKážeis avτýv (above, 403, Obs. 4); cf. Soph. Antig. 220 (above, 596).

601 When the illation or consequence is regarded as the immediate effect of the main verb, the particle wore may be omitted before the infinitive, as in Eschyl. Ag. 250:

δίκα τοῖς μὲν παθοῦσι μαθεῖν ἐπιῤῥέπει τὸ μέλλον,

where the main verb ἐπιῤῥέπει is neuter, and μαθεῖν τὸ μέλλον = ὥστε μαθεῖν τὸ μέλλον expresses the effect of learning by experience or suffering.

602 When the effect is represented as an object to be avoided or prohibited, the infinitive, preceded by μý, tò μý, or wote μý, requires to be carefully distinguished from the apparently similar construction of the objective sentence after verbs of denying, &c. (above, 595), and from that of the final sentence, when the end is negative (below, 609). The difference of the three cases of un with the infinitive is simply this: in the objective sentence, ǹpvoûvтo μǹ TETTWKÉvaι means "they denied the fact that they had fallen-they said that they had not fallen;" in the illative sentence, Ovŋтoùs ἔπαυσα μὴ προδέρκεσθαι μόρον means “I interposed a hindrance, so that, as the consequeuce of my act, they did not foresee their doom," which is much the same as saying, "and therefore they did not foresee it;” in the final sentence, ἐξευλαβοῦνται μὴ φίλοις TεúXEW ěρiv means "they are on their guard, to the end that they may not make a quarrel with their friends," whether that result is attained or not. So that we must always, in classifying these sentences, inquire whether the dependent clause indicates a fact, a consequence or a motive, and it is only in the second case that the sentence can be called illative; as in the following examples:

(α) Eurip. Hec. 867 : νόμων γραφαὶ εἴργουσι χρῆσθαι μὴ κατὰ yváμηv τρóποis, i.e. "the laws impose a hindrance, and the effect is that people do not please themselves" (for the general thesis is οὐκ ἔστι θνητῶν ὅστις ἐστ ̓ ἐλεύθερος, ν. 864).

(6) Herod. I. 158: ̓Αριστόδικος ἔσχε μὴ ποιῆσαι ταῦτα Κυ palovs, i.e. “he hindered them, and the effect was that they did not do these things."

(c) Asch. Eumen. 210: εἰ τοῖσιν οὖν κτείνουσιν ἀλλήλους χαλᾶς τὸ μὴ τίνεσθαι (γενέσθαι) μηδ ̓ ἐποπτεύειν κότῳ, i. e. “ if (which is the reverse of hindrance) you give full scope to those who murder their relatives, so that you do not punish or even regard them with anger."

(α) Eurip. Iph. Τ. 1348: φόβος δ ̓ ἦν ὥστε μὴ τέγξαι πόδα, i.e. "there was fear, and, as a consequence, caution, to the effect that the sheet-rope was not wetted by the sea."

603 If the main clause contains a negation or interrogation, so as to become doubly negative, the particle où is appended to un in the illative clause (above, 529, Obs. 1, 530, Obs., 595); thus Soph. Εd. Τ. 1065 : οὐκ ἂν πιθοίμην μὴ οὐ τάδ' ἐκμαθεῖν σαφῶς. Xen. Apol. § 34: οὔτε μὴ μεμνῆσθαι δύναμαι αὐτοῦ οὔτε μεμνημένος μὴ οὐκ ἐπαινεῖν. Plat. Resp. p. 427 Ε: ὡς οὐχ ὅσιόν σοι ὂν μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνῃ. Ibid. p. 354 Β: οὐκ ἀπεσχόμην τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐλθεῖν ἀπ ̓ ἐκείνου. Soph. Trach. 90: οὐδὲν ἐλλείψω τὸ μὴ οὐ πᾶσαν πυθέσθαι τῶνδ ̓ ἀλήθειαν πέρι. Id. d. Τ. 283: μὴ παρῇς τὸ μὴ οὐ φράσαι. Asch. Eumen. 300: οὔτοι σ ̓ ̓Απόλλων ῥύσαιτ ̓ ἂν ὥστε μὴ οὐ παρημελημένον ἔῤῥειν. Herod. VIII. 57: οὔτε σφέας Εὐρυβιάδης κατέχειν δυνήσεται οὔτε τις ἀνθρώπων ἄλλος ὥστε μὴ οὐ διασκεδασθῆναι τὴν στρατιήν. Soph. Αnt. 96 : πείσομαι γὰρ οὐ τοσοῦτον οὐδὲν ὥστε μὴ οὐ καλῶς θανεῖν. Xen. Anab. III. 1, § 13: τί ἐμποδὼν μὴ οὐχὶ ἀποθανεῖν; Æsch. Prom. 627: τί δῆτα μέλλεις μὴ οὐ γεγωνίσκειν τὸ πᾶν; Plat. Phed. p. 72 D: τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι ;

The same applies when the main sentence is virtually negative (above, 529, Obs. 1). Thus Xen. de Rep. Lac. VI. 2 : αἰσχρόν ἐστι μὴ οὐκ ἄλλας πληγὰς ἐμβαλεῖν τῷ υἱεῖ. Herod. I. 187: Δαρείῳ δεινὸν ἐδόκεε εἶναι μὴ οὐ λαβεῖν τὰ χρήματα. Xen. Anab. II. 3, § 11: ὥστε πᾶσιν αἰσχύνην εἶναι μὴ οὐ συσπουδάζειν.

604 The illative clause may become demonstrative and independent, and in this case it is regularly connected with that which would otherwise be its apodosis, by the particles ἄρα, τοίγαρ, τοίνυν, &c., or by some such combination as πρὸς ταῦτα. Thus, for ὥστε θάῤῥει (597) we might have θαῤῥεῖ οὖν οι πρὸς ταῦτα θάῤῥει. The particle ov is indicative rather of continuation and retrospect (above, 548, (31)) than of inference: and, in general, it should be

rendered rather "accordingly," "as was said," "to proceed," than "therefore," which is properly expressed by apa and its compounds. It is to be remarked, however, that in their origin the ideas of continuation and inference are identical: apa signifies "farther" (548, (4)); and in Thucyd. VI. 89, κaì àπ' èkeivov stands for åpa in the conclusion of a regular syllogism.

§ VIII. Final Sentences.

605 The end or intention of an action may seem to be regarded sometimes as an object or as an inferential consequence. It is not surprising, therefore, that the final sentence should so often approximate in form to the objective or illative sentence. Thus, such objective constructions as βούλομαι λέγειν, ὁ ἄνθρωπος πέφυκε pixeîv may be regarded as expressing the end no less than the object of action. And an illative clause with wore may be apparently tantamount to the expression of an end. The true distinction of the three cases is that which has been already pointed out, namely, we have to inquire whether the dependent clause indicates a fact, a consequence, or a motive; and it is only in the third case that the sentence can be called final. When we say, Xéyw iva eidîs, “I speak to the end, and with the intention that you may know," we neither express the fact, as in Xéyw σè eidévai, "I speak the fact that you know," nor the consequence, as λéyw, woтe σè eidévaι, "I speak so that as a result you know." In both the latter cases the realization is presumed or secured; but in the first case we have merely the motive or purpose which influences the speaker, whether he attains his end or not.

606 There are three forms of the final sentence. (a) When the end is expressed by the infinitive. (b) When it is expressed by the future participle. (c) When it is expressed by a finite verb dependent on some relative or negative particle. Thus we may say, with very little difference of meaning:

66

(α) ἦλθεν ἀδικεῖν οι ὡς οι ὥστε ἀδικεῖν, “ he came to do wrong."

(6) ἦλθεν ἀδικήσων οι ὡς ἀδικήσων, “he came, as being about to do wrong."

(c) ἦλθεν ἵνα, ὅπως, ὡς or poet. ὄφρα ἀδικήσοι, “ he came, in order that he might do wrong."

τί λέγεις

In this use of the infinitive or future participle, as well as in that of the third form, which is more specially appropriated to the expression of an end, we may easily distinguish these final sentences from the objective or temporal, by observing that, while in the latter an answer is made to the question "what?" or "when ?" in the final sentence the question "why?" obtains an answer. Thus we may ask, Tí λéyes; "what do you say?" and answer in the objective sentence, λéyw σè ȧdixeîv, “I say that you do wrong." Or we may ask, Tóтe ȧμаρтável; "when does he err?" and answer in πότε ἁμαρτάνει the temporal sentence, ἁμαρτάνει ἀδικῶν, “ he errs when he does wrong." Or we may ask, πoû åμapтávei; "where does he err?" and answer with a local predication, ἁμαρτάνει, ὅπου, ἵνα, ἐν οἷς adiel, "he errs where he does wrong." But in all three forms of the final sentence given above, we imply the question διὰ τί ἦλθεν; "why did he come ?" and the answer is, "in order to do wrong," "with the intention of doing wrong," "to the end that he might do wrong."

607 The following examples will illustrate the three forms of the final sentence:

(a) The infinitive alone is used in many idiomatic collocations, in which we wish to express the end or purpose as briefly as possible. Thus Plat. Phadr. p. 229 B : ἐκεῖ σκιά τ ̓ ἔστι καὶ πνεῦμα μέτριον καὶ ποὺ καθίζεσθαι ἤ, ἐὰν βουλώμεθα, κατακλιθῆναι, “ there is shade and a gentle breeze and grass for the purpose of sitting, or, if we please, of reclining." Eurip. Phon. 25: Sídwoi Bovróλoioiv ἐκθεῖναι βρέφος, “ he gives the child to the herdsmen in order that they may expose it." Xen. Cyr. IV. 5, § 1: otrov μn пéμжетe μndè Tev, "do not send them viands or the means of drinking." Plat. πιεῖν, Apol. p. 28 Ε : ἄρχοντες οὓς εἵλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, “ the rulers, whom you chose in order that they might rule me" (cf. Xen. Mem. 1. 7, § 3: κυβερνᾶν κατασταθείς. III. 2, § 1: στρατηγεῖν ἡρημένος). With os or σTe the final sentence with the infinitive is distinguished by the meaning from the corresponding form of the illative. Thus in Thucyd. Ι. 121, χρήματα δ ̓ ὥστ ̓ ἔχειν ἐς αὐτά, οἴσομεν, "we will contribute money, in order that we may have it for these objects," clearly implies an end or intention, and not the result as a matter of fact. The infinitive, as indicating the end, is sometimes used in the substantival form, i. e. with the article, and either