517 In this sense the indicative is often used with ei, ei yáp, εἴθε, and especially in the case of ὤφελον, which appears either with or without these particles, and followed by the infinitive. This presumes, like the corresponding protasis (502), that the wish cannot be realized. Thus we find εἴθε σοι τότε συνεγενόμην (Xen. Mem. I. 2, § 46), "Oh! if I had been with you there!" (which I was not). εἴθ ̓ ὠφελ ̓ ̓Αργοὺς μὴ διαπτάσθαι σκάφος Κόλχων ἐς αἶαν κυανέας Συμπληγάδας ! (Eurip. Med. init.), "Oh! if the Argo had not been obliged (as it was) to fly through the Symplegades to the Colchian land!" 518 The mere wish is often expressed interrogatively by the optative with Tŵs av, "Oh! how could it be done!" as πῶς ἂν ὑμῖν ἐμφανὴς ἔργῳ γενοίμην ὥς μ ̓ ἔθεσθε προσφιλή; (Soph. Phil. 531), "Oh! how could I show my gratitude by my actions!" SV. The Imperative in Conditional Propositions. 519 The imperative differs very little in any of its usages from the subjunctive. 520 It sometimes appears, like èáv with the subjunctive, as the conditional protasis of the future; thus, θάπτε με, ὅττι τάχιστα, πύλας ̓Αίδαο περήσω (Hom. Il. XXIII. 71), i. e. "the sooner you bury me, the sooner I shall pass the gates of Hades,” ἐάν με ὡς τάχιστα θάπτῃς, πύλας Α. ὡς τ. περήσω. Also with kaí interposed; as λaßé, kaì elσei (Plato, Theœtet. 154 c), "take it, and you will know," i. e. ¿àv λaßîs, elσel. 521 In its more common use, as a hortative, deliberative, or imperative form, we have already seen that the subjunctive often takes the place of this mood, with this difference, that except in prohibitions, when both moods are employed, the subjunctive is used for the first person, and the imperative for the second. This appears most clearly when they are both used in juxtaposition or antithesis; thus, Α. σιώπα Β. σοί γ' ὦ κατάρατε σιωπῶ 'γώ ; 'yw; "A. Hold your tongue, i. e. you must hold your tongue. B. What! must I hold my tongue for you?" σκοπῶμεν κοινῇ, καὶ εἰ κ.τ.λ., ἀντίλεγε, καί σοι πείσομαι (Plato, Crito, 48), "let us consider the matter together, and if you can, confute me, and I will give way." 522 The imperative is often a mere exclamation, as in eité, aye, pépe, ide, idoú, &c. And these imperatives are often prefixed to the first person of the subjunctive to urge the deliberation; thus, φέρε, τί σοι δῶ καταφαγεῖν, 523 The future, which is the regular apodosis of the subjunctive and imperative, is often used to express the latter, chiefly, however, in interrogative-negative and in prohibitive sentences; as παίδες, οὐ σκέψεσθε; (Plat. Symp. 212 D), "slaves, go at once and see!" (below, 540). 524 From the interchange of the imperative, subjunctive, and future in other cases, arise some uses of the former which may remind us of the fact (above, 293), that the imperative differs from the indicative only in the form of the person-endings. Thus, on the one hand, we find constructions in which a question is followed by an imperative; such as οἶσθ ̓ οὖν ὃ δράσεις, ὡς ἀπαίρωμεν χθονός; "dost know what thou must do, in order that we may sail away from this land? Furnish us with corn, of which we are in want." Or by a prohibition; as οἶσθ ̓ ὡς μετεύξει καὶ σοφωτέρα φανεῖ; τὰ χρηστὰ μή σοι λυπρὰ φαινέσθω ποτε "dost know how thou must alter thy prayers and appear wiser? Let not good things ever appear grievous to thee." But, on the other hand, we find that the future of the relative clause in the question is attracted into the imperative which follows; thus we have οἶσθ ̓ οὖν ὃ δρᾶσον; μήτ ̓ ἀποσπασθῇς βίᾳ, κ.τ.λ. (Id. Hec. 225), "dost know what thou must do ?-neither be torn away by force," &c. And even with a sentence interposed: Ι. οἶσθά νυν ἅ μοι γενέσθω; Θ. σὶν τὸ σημαίνειν τόδε. Ι. δεσμὰ τοῖς ξένοισι πρόσθες (Id. Iph. Taur. 1204), "I. Dost know what must be done for me? Th. Thou must tell me this. I. Put chains on the foreigners." The Latin comedian, from not understanding this idiom has endeavoured to express it by a transposition, tange sed scin' quomodo (Plaut. Rud. III. 5, 18), which has misled Bentley and other scholars. 525 We find the imperative in deliberative interrogations, without any direct evidence of such an attraction; as τί οὖν; ὃ πολλάκις ἐρωτῶ, κείσθω νόμος ἡμῖν; (Plat. Legg. p. 801 d), "what then?-according to my repeated question, must a law be laid down?" This probably arises from a transition, by means of or, from the direct to the oblique oration. This transition is distinctly seen in the following passages: ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν, ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ Oavμale тà λeyóμeva (Plat. Crit. 50 c). By the side of the future: χρὴ δεῖξαι ὅτι, ὧν μὲν ἐφίενται, πρὸς τοὺς μὴ ἀμυνομένους κτάσ θωσαν, οἷς δὲ γενναῖον, κ.τ.λ., ἀνανταγώνιστοι ἀπ ̓ αὐτῶν οὐκ ȧríası (Thucyd. IV. 92). § VI. The Infinitive as a Substitute for the Imperative. 526 The infinitive, or adverbial mood, does not take its place in the protasis, except as a substitute for the imperative. As an adverb, or secondary predicate, it is appended to the finite verb, which contains the main predication, as an explanatory adjunct (above, 468). In the same way, however, as the gerundive, or inflected form of the infinitive, assumes to itself a significance of obligation, which is properly conveyed by the substantive-verb (above, 423), the earlier Greek writers use the infinitive, without the substantive-verb on which it depends, as an imperative, to express what must or ought to take place. Thus, καὶ ταῦτ ̓ ἰων εἴσω λογίζου, κἂν λάβῃς μ' ἐψευσμένον, (Soph. Ed. T. 462). 527 Sometimes also as the expression of a wish or prayer; as ὦ Ζεῦ, ἐκγενέσθαι μοι Αθηναίους τίσασθαι (Herod. v. 105), where it cannot be said that the substantive-verb is necessarily understood; for we might say in English, "Oh! that it might be allowed to me, &c.," and the Latin utinam marks a similar dependent clause. § VII. The Negative Particles pμn and ov. 528 The distinction between μn and où depends upon their respective applicability to the different members of a conditional proposition. For Mý belongs to the protasis; Ou to the apodosis or to the categorical proposition; in other words, Mý negatives a supposition, i. e. it prohibits or forbids; Où negatives an affirmation, i. e. it affirms that the case is not so; or, to express the rule according to the principles already laid down, un is used in all those dependent sentences which are virtually or formally hypothetical; consequently uń is used (1) with the participle in the hypothesis; (2) after particles expressing a condition or supposition, as ei, éáv, étteidáv, őtav; (3) after particles implying the purpose or motive, as ἵνα, ὅπως, ὄφρα; (4) after relatives and relative particles with an indefinite antecedent expressed or understood; (5) in all expressions of a wish; (6) in all prohibitions; and (7) with the infinitive as representing an adverbial sentence; whereas où is used in all other cases. The following are comprehensive examples: (a) un in the protasis by the side of où in the apodosis, Plat. Phæd. 76 E: ei μn ταῦτά ἐστι, οὐδὲ τάδε, “ if what has been said is not the case, neither is what follows;" (b) μn in the prohibition by the side of où in the categorical negation, Eurip. Alc. 690: μn Ovñox vπÈP τοῦδ ̓ ἀνδρός, οὐδ ̓ ἐγὼ πρὸ σοῦ, “ do not die for me, and I will not die for you;" (c) un in the negation of a wish and in an indefinite relative sentence by the side of où with the optative in the apodosis, Soph. Antig. 676: ἐγὼ δ ̓ ὅπως σὺ μὴ λέγεις ὀρθῶς τάδε οὔτ ̓ ἂν δυναίμην μήτ' ἐπισταίμην λέγειν, i. e. "but I neither could be able, nor may I know how to say, in what way (i. e. any way in which, below, 532) you are not right in what you say." For the use of oπws cf. Plat. Theœt. p. 164 D; οὔπω μανθάνω ὅπως λέγεις. § VIII. Mn in the Protasis. 529 The following are special examples of μn in dependent sentences, implying an assumption, a wish, or a prohibition : (a) Indicative: ei μn yiyveтai, "if it does not come to pass,' and so of the other tenses. (b) Imperative: μǹ «λéπтe, “do not steal" (in general). (c) Subjunctive: μὴ κλέψῃς (more rarely μὴ κλέψεις), not steal” (this particular thing: above, 427, (cc), (a,)); éàv μǹ yévηтaι, "if it shall not come to pass." "do (d) Optative: un yévoiтo, "may it not come to pass "=" oh! if it could be avoided!" ei μǹ yévolto, “if it were not to come to pass." (e) Infinitive : θεοὶ πολῖται, μή με δουλείας τυχεῖν, “ let me not incur slavery;" Tò μǹ yevéolai, “the supposition that it has not come to pass;" |