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politics ;” that they have not a public opinion finished
and chastened as that of the English has been finished
and chastened. A great many hasty writers have charged.
this defect on the “Yankee race," on the Anglo-American
character; but English people, if they had no motive to
attend to politics, certainly would not attend to politics.
At present there is business in their attention. They
assist at the determining crisis ; they assist or help it.
Whether the government will go out or remain is deter-
mined by the debate, and by the division in parliament.
And the opinion out of doors, the secret pervading
disposition of society, has a great influence on that
division. The nation feels that its judgment is im-
portant, and it strives to judge. It succeeds in deciding
because the debates and the discussions give it the facts
and the arguments. But under a presidential govern-
ment, a nation has, except at the electing moment, no
influence; it has not the ballot-box before it; its virtue
is gone, and it must wait till its instant of despotism
again returns. It is not incited to form an opinion like
a nation under a cabinet government; nor is it in-
structed like such a nation. There are doubtless debates
in the legislature, but they are prologues without a play.
There is nothing of a catastrophe about them; you can-
not turn out the government. The prize of power is
not in the gift of the legislature, and no one cares for the
legislature. The executive, the great centre of power
and place, sticks irremovable; you cannot change it in
any event. The teaching apparatus which has educated
our public mind, which prepares our resolutions, which

shapes our opinions, does not exist. No presidential country needs to form daily, delicate opinions, or is helped in forming them.

It might be thought that the discussions in the press would supply the deficiencies in the constitution; that by a reading people especially, the conduct of their government would be as carefully watched, that their opinions about it would be as consistent, as accurate, as well considered, under a presidential as under a cabinet polity. But the same difficulty oppresses the press which oppresses the legislature. It can do nothing. It cannot change the administration; the executive was elected for such and such years, and for such and such years it must last. People wonder that so literary a people as the Americans—a people who read more than any people who ever lived, who read so many newspapers should have such bad newspapers. The papers are not so good as the English, because they have not the same motive to be good as the English papers.) At a political “crisis,” as we say—that is, when the fate of an administration is unfixed, when it depends on a few votes yet unsettled, upon a wavering and veering opinioneffective articles in great journals become of essential moment. The Times has made many ministries. When, as of late, there has been a long continuance of divided parliaments, of governments which were without “ brute voting power,” and which depended on intellectual strength, the support of the most influential organ of English opinion has been of critical moment. If a Washington newspaper could have turned out Mr.



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Lincoln, there would have been good writing and fine argument in the Washington newspapers. But the Washington newspapers can no more remove a president during his term of place than the Times can remove a lord mayor during his year of office. Nobody cares for a debate in Congress which comes to nothing,” and no one reads long articles which have no influence on events. The Americans glance at the heads of news, and through the paper. They do not enter upon a discussion. They do not think of entering upon a discussion which would be useless.

After saying that the division of the legislature and the executive in presidential governments weakens the legislative power, it may seem a contradiction to say that it also weakens the executive power. But it is not a contradiction. The division weakens the whole aggregate force of government—the entire imperial power; and therefore it weakens both its halves. The executive is weakened in a very plain way. In England a strong cabinet can obtain the concurrence of the legislature in all acts which facilitate its administration; it is itself, so to say, the legislature. But a president may be hampered by the parliament, and is likely to be hampered. The natural tendency of the members of every legislature is to make themselves conspicuous. They wish to gratify an ambition laudable or blamable; they wish to promote the measures they think best for the public welfare; they wish to make their will felt in great affairs. All these mixed motives urge them to oppose the executive. They are embodying the purposes of others if they aid; they 24



THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. are advancing their own opinions if they defeat: they are first if they vanquish ; they are auxiliaries if they support. The weakness of the American executive used to be the great theme of all critics before the Confederate rebellion. Congress and committees of Congress of course impeded the executive when there was no coercive public sentiment to check and rule them.

But the presidential system not only gives the executive power an antagonist in the legislative power, and so makes it weaker; it also enfeebles it by impairing its intrinsic quality. A cabinet is elected by a legislature ; and when that legislature is composed of fit persons, that mode of electing the executive is the very best. It is a case of secondary election, under the only conditions in which secondary election is preferable to primary. Generally speaking, in an electioneering country (I mean in a <* country full of political life, and used to the manipulation of popular institutions), the election of candidates to elect candidates is a farce. The Electoral College of America is so. It was intended that the deputies when assembled should exercise a real discretion, and by independent choice select the president. But the primary electors take too much interest. They only elect a deputy to vote for Mr. Lincoln or Mr. Breckenridge, and the deputy only takes a ticket, and drops that ticket in an urn. He never chooses or thinks of choosing. He is but a messenger-a transmitter; the real decision is in those who choose him—who chose him because they knew what he would do.

It is true that the British House of Commons is sub

ject to the same influences. Members are mostly, perhaps, elected because they will vote for a particular ministry, rather than for purely legislative reasons. But

—and here is the capital distinction—the functions of the House of Commons are important and continuous. It does not, like the Electoral College in the United States, separate when it has elected its ruler; it watches, legislates, seats and unseats ministries, from day to day. Accordingly it is a real electoral body. The parliament of 1857, which, more than any other parliament of late years, was a parliament elected to support a particular premier—which was chosen, as Americans might say, upon the “Palmerston ticket”-before it had been in existence two years, dethroned Lord Palmerston. Though selected in the interest of a particular ministry, it in fact dustroyed that ministry.

A good parliament, too, is a capital choosing body. If it is fit to make laws for a country, its majority ought to represent the general average intelligence of that country; its various members ought to represent the various special interests, special opinions, special prejudices, to be found in that community. There ought to be an advocate for every particular sect, and a vast neutral body of no sect—homogeneous and judicial, like the nation itself. Such a body, when possible, is the best selecter of executives that can be imagined. It is full of political activity; it is close to political life; it feels the responsibility of affairs which are brought as it were to its threshold; it has as much intelligence as the society in question chances to contain. It is, what

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