pardon was directed. In the case at bar nothing is defined. There is no identity of the offenses pardoned, and no other clue to ascertain them but the information incorporated in an article in a newspaper. And not that entirely, for absolution is declared for whatever crimes may have been committed or taken part in "in connection with any other article, matter or thing concerning which he [Burdick] may be interrogated."

It is hence contended by Burdick that the pardon is illegal for the absence of specification, not reciting the offenses upon which it is intended to operate; worthless, therefore, as immunity. To support the contention cases are cited. It is asserted, besides, that the pardon is void as being outside of the power of the President under the Constitution of the United States, because it was issued before accusation, or conviction or admission of an offense. This, it is insisted, is precluded by the constitutional provision which gives power only "to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States," and it is argued, in effect, that not in the imagination or purpose of executive magistracy can an "offense against the United States" be established, but only by the confession of the offending individual or the judgment of the judicial tribunals. We do not dwell further on the attack. We prefer to place the case on the ground we have stated.

(2) May plaintiff in error, having the means of immunity at hand, that is, the pardon of the President, refuse to testify on the ground that his testimony may have an incriminating effect? A superficial consideration might dictate a negative answer but the answer would confound rights which are distinct and independent.

It is to be borne in mind that the power of the President under the Constitution to grant pardons and the right of a witness must be kept in accommodation. Both have sanction in the Constitution, and it should, therefore, be the anxiety of the law to preserve both,-to leave to each

its proper place. In this as in other conflicts between personal rights and the powers of government, technical— even nice distinctions are proper to be regarded. Granting then that the pardon was legally issued and was sufficient for immunity, it was Burdick's right to refuse it, as we have seen, and it, therefore, not becoming effective, his right under the Constitution to decline to testify remained to be asserted; and the reasons for his action were personal. It is true we have said (Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 605) that the law regards only mere penal consequences and not "the personal disgrace or opprobrium attaching to the exposure" of crime, but certainly such consequence may influence the assertion or relinquishment of a right. This consideration is not out of place in the case at bar. If it be objected that the sensitiveness of Burdick was extreme because his refusal to answer was itself an implication of crime, we answer, not necessarily in fact, not at all in theory of law. It supposed only a possibility of a charge of crime and interposed protection against the charge, and, reaching beyond it, against furnishing what might be urged or used as evidence to support it.

This brings us to the differences between legislative immunity and a pardon. They are substantial. The latter carries an imputation of guilt; acceptance a confession of it. The former has no such imputation or confession. It is tantamount to the silence of the witness. It is non-committal. It is the unobtrusive act of the law giving protection against a sinister use of his testimony, not like a pardon requiring him to confess his guilt in order to avoid a conviction of it.

It is of little service to assert or deny an analogy between amnesty and pardon. Mr. Justice Field, in Knote v. United States, 95 U. S. 149, 153, said that "the distinction between them is one rather of philological interest than of legal importance." This is so as to their ultimate effect, but there are incidental differences of importance. They

are of different character and have different purposes. The one overlooks offense; the other remits punishment. The first is usually addressed to crimes against the sovereignty of the State, to political offenses, forgiveness being deemed more expedient for the public welfare than prosecution and punishment. The second condones infractions of the peace of the State. Amnesty is usually general, addressed to classes or even communities, a legislative act, or under legislation, constitutional or statutory, the act of the supreme magistrate. There may or may not be distinct acts of acceptance. If other rights are dependent upon it and are asserted there is affirmative evidence of acceptance. Examples are afforded in United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128; Armstrong's Foundry, 6 Wall. 766; Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall. 147. See also Knote v. United States, supra. If there be no other rights, its only purpose is to stay the movement of the law. Its function is exercised when it overlooks the offense and the offender, leaving both in oblivion.

Judgment reversed with directions to dismiss the proceedings in contempt and discharge Burdick from custody.

MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS took no part in the consideration and decision of this case.

Opinion of the Court.

236 U.S.

CURTIN v. UNITED STATES.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

No. 472. Argued December 16, 1914. Decided January 25, 1915.

Decided on the authority of Burdick v. United States, ante, p. 79.

THE facts, which are similar to those involved in the preceding case, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Henry A. Wise, with whom Mr. Henry W. Sackett was on the brief, for plaintiff in error.

The Solicitor General for the United States.

MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the court.

This writ of error was argued and submitted at the same time as Burdick v. United States, just decided, ante, p. 79. Its purpose is to review a judgment for contempt against Curtin upon presentment of the Federal grand jury for refusing to answer certain questions in the same proceeding considered in the Burdick Case in regard to a certain article published in the New York Tribune. Curtin is a reporter on that paper. He declined to answer the questions on the ground that the answers would tend to incriminate him. At a subsequent hearing a pardon issued by the President was offered him (it was the same in substance as that offered Burdick) and he was again questioned. He declined to receive the pardon or to answer the questions on the same ground as before. He was, on presentment of the grand jury, adjudged guilty of

contempt, fined as Burdick was, with the same leave to purge himself of the contempt, the court deciding that the pardon was valid and sufficient for immunity. Upon Curtin again refusing to answer, the judgment was made absolute and he was committed to the custody of the United States Marshal.

It will be observed, therefore, the case is almost identical in its facts with the Burdick Case and exactly the same in principle. On the authority of that case, therefore, the judgment is reversed and the case remanded with instruction to dismiss the proceedings in contempt and discharge Curtin from custody.

MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS took no part in the consideration and decision of this case.

DUFFY v. CHARAK, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF JULES & FREDERIC COMPANY.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT.

No. 120. Argued January 14, 1915.-Decided January 25, 1915.

A taking possession by the mortgagee of the personal property under the power contained in the mortgage is a delivery that satisfies the requirements of the Massachusetts statute in regard to the delivery of goods sold or mortgaged unless recorded.

Goods under attachment may be sold or mortgaged upon notice to the officer, as effectively as though a true delivery took place. The holder of a recorded mortgage on personal property in Massachusetts, made within four months of the petition, took possession under the power contained in his mortgage after the sheriff had levied under an attachment, and the next day the petition was filed. Held that the mortgagee was entitled to his security to the extent that VOL. CCXXXVI-7