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Opinion of the Court.

236 U. S.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error was convicted of peddling without a license. His defence was that if applied to his dealings the Virginia law would interfere with commerce among the States, contrary to Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. The facts are as follows. The Empire Art Institute of New York sent soliciting agents to Virginia who took orders on a blank furnished by the Company. These blanks stated that the Company would place a limited number of a 'new Aquarell Portrait' 'at cost of material, India Ink $1.98 and Water Color $3.96,' and the one exhibited went on: "On or about Apr. 10, 1911, we agree to deliver to the holder of this contract a fully finished Ink Portrait as shown by our salesman. Mrs. T. P. Morrisette agrees to pay $1.98 for the portrait when delivered. We do not compel you to take frames from us but owing to the delicate nature of the work all portraits are delivered in appropriate frames which this ticket entitles you to select at wholesale prices." On receipt of such order the Company shipped the portrait when prepared and, in a separate parcel, frames suitable for them to an agent, in this case the plaintiff in error. The latter put the pictures into appropriate frames and then delivered the portraits, offering the customer a choice of three different styles of frames, the customer taking one or not at his will.

The court below thought that the purchase of the frames was to be regarded as a separate transaction occurring wholly in Virginia. Whether or not this was its technical aspect as an executed contract, it often has been pointed out that commerce among the States is a practical not a technical conception. The preliminary contract bound the Company to furnish a chance to take a frame with the portrait. Obviously it was contemplated that the frames would be sent from New York as well as the pictures, as

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in practice they were, and although the bargain was not complete until the Company's offer was accepted in Virginia, the furnishing of the opportunity was a part of the interstate transaction. From the point of view of commerce the business was one affair. Dozier v. Alabama, 218 U. S. 124. Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 389. Browning v. Waycross, 233 U. S. 16, 21.

Judgment reversed.

DALTON ADDING MACHINE COMPANY v. THE STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA.

No. 190. Submitted March 8, 1915.-Decided March 22, 1915.

The rule that courts should not stop state officers charged with enforcing laws from performing their statutory duty for fear they should perform it wrongly applies especially in cases of taxes and license fees.

One carrying on business which he claims is interstate, and on which the State imposes a license tax, has an adequate remedy at law by paying the tax under protest and raising the constitutional question in a suit to recover it; and where, as in this case, no special hardship is shown, the general rule that equity will not enjoin the collection. of taxes where there is an adequate remedy at law applies. 213 Fed. Rep. 889, affirmed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Thomas A. Banning and Mr. Samuel Walker Banning for appellant.

Mr. John Garland Pollard, Attorney General of the State of Virginia, and Mr. Christopher B. Garnett for appellees.

Opinion of the Court.

236 U. S.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from an order of three Judges denying a preliminary injunction as prayed in the appellant's bill. The bill alleges that the appellant is a Missouri corporation, having its factory in Missouri, that it obtains orders for its machines in Virginia through drummers, considers and accepts or rejects them in Missouri, and, if it accepts, forwards the machine from its factory. In some cases the possible customer is allowed to try a machine previously forwarded and in the hands of the Virginia agent, and if he is accepted as a purchaser and desires to keep it, is permitted to do so. The appellant contends that its business in Virginia is wholly interstate. A statute of Virginia requires foreign corporations doing business there to obtain a license from the State Corporation Commission, to pay a fee, &c., and it is alleged that the Commission threatens to take proceedings to enforce the statute and the penalties provided for disobeying it against the appellant, contrary to Article I, § 8, of the Constitution. The appellant further alleges that it has reason to fear and fears a multiplicity of proceedings and the imposition of many fines and that it will suffer irreparable loss from even a temporary interference with its affairs, through loss of sales and prestige, help to its competitors and encouragement of similar proceedings in other States. 213 Fed. Rep. 889.

The court below remarked that it was not contended that the statute was unconstitutional but was alleged only that it was feared that it might be enforced in such a way as to contravene the Commerce Clause and suggested that if proceedings should be instituted by the Commission there would be a hearing before it, with a right to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals, and, upon a proper showing, to take the case to this court, and that there was nothing to indicate that the Commis

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sion would not give the appellant a fair hearing or would attempt to enforce the law against it in an oppressive way. On this ground, without expressing an opinion as to the liability of the appellant under the statute, it held that no case for an injunction was made out.

We agree with the District Court in its conclusion and in its grounds. Like it we leave on one side the merits of the appellant's claim of immunity and confine ourselves to deciding that no reason is shown for anticipating the ordinary course of the law. We also leave aside the question whether the action of the Commission is or is not the action of a court protected from interference on the part of the courts of the United States. Rev. Stat., $720. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210, 226, 230. The general principle is that it is not for the courts to stop officers of this kind from performing their statutory duty for fear that they should perform it wrongly. First Nat. Bank of Albuquerque v. Albright, 208 U. S. 548, 553. Especially is this true in the matter of collecting taxes and license fees. Boise Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276. The appellant has an adequate remedy at law in its right to raise the constitutional question if proceedings are taken against it, or, it seems, to recover the money if it pays under protest. No special circumstances are shown, that we can notice, to take this case out of the ordinary rule. Indiana Mfg. Co. v. Koehne, 188 U. S. 681, 690.

Decree affirmed.

Argument for Defendants in Error.

236 U. S.

GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v.

HOWER.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON.

No. 88. Submitted November 11, 1914.-Decided March 22, 1915.

Bona fide purchase is an affirmative defense which the grantee must set up in order to defeat the claim of one seeking to have a trust declared in lands patented, if the bill is otherwise sufficient. Rev. Stat., § 2291, is specific in its requirements that in order to obtain a patent for a homestead, the applicant must have actually resided upon or cultivated the same for a term of five years. While the law deals tenderly with one going in good faith on the public lands, with a view of making a home thereon, the right is a statutory one, and, in such a case as this, it is essential to show compliance with the statute as a prerequisite to obtaining a patent. Although acting in good faith, settlement upon land other than that included in the entry is not sufficient; and in this case so held as to an entry for one quarter-section where the entryman, through mistake, built his home on another quarter-section and at a point about onequarter of a mile from the land entered, notwithstanding he did make a trail and build a stable on the land entered. 69 Washington, 380, reversed.

THE facts, which involve the construction of Rev. Stat., § 2291, and the necessity of the homesteader making improvements on the land entered, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. E. C. Lindley, Mr. Thomas R. Benton, Mr. F. V. Brown and Mr. F. G. Dorety for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Eugene G. Kremer and Mr. J. A. Coleman for defendants in error:

In Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530, 535; Baldwin v. Stark, 107 U. S. 463; Bohall v. Dilla, 114 U. S. 47; Lee v. Johnson, 116 U. S. 48; Gonzales v. French, 164 U. S. 342, relied on by plaintiff in error, the patent of the United States was supported against an attempt to set it aside,

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