Save that the statute of limitations is not relied upon, the questions here presented are almost all identical with those in the other case, and in so far as they are the same they are sufficiently disposed of by what is there said. There are but two points of difference and they require only brief mention.

The Commission's report of June 8, 1911, finding the rate in question excessive and unreasonable and what would have been a reasonable rate was admitted in evidence over the defendant's objection that it was made in another and separate proceeding, that is, upon the complaint of Meeker & Company, and therefore was not admissible in this case for any purpose. The objection was rightly overruled. Without any doubt it was within the discretion of the Commission to permit Henry E. Meeker to intervene in respect of his individual claim in the proceeding begun by Meeker & Company or to consolidate his complaint with theirs. This, in effect, is what was done. The supplemental report so shows and it does not appear that the railroad company objected to that course or was in any way prejudiced by it. Besides, the reparation order recites that it was made after a full hearing and submission of the issues presented by the complaint and answer relating to this claim and there was no evidence tending to contradict the recital.

The further objection was made to the admission of the same report that it contained much that was not relevant to the case on trial, but the objection was overruled and it is fairly inferable from the record that the entire report was placed before the jury. It hardly could be said that the presence of some irrelevant matter rendered the whole report inadmissible, and yet the objection seems to have been made in that view. The objection would have been better founded had it been confined to what was deemed irrelevant. Of course, all that should have gone before the jury was the relevant findings

236 U. S.

in the report, and have asked more. for what occurred,

Syllabus.

counsel for the plaintiff ought not to But we need not fix the responsibility for it is certain that the defendant was not harmed by it. The case made by the evidence rightly admitted was such as, in the absence of any opposing evidence, and there was none, clearly entitled the plaintiff to a verdict for the amount claimed. Every fact essential to a recovery, save the service of the reparation order and the refusal to comply with it, was prima facie established by the findings and order of the Commission and these could not be rejected by the jury in the absence of any countervailing evidence. Kelly v. Jackson, 6 Pet. 622, 632. The service of the order was expressly admitted and the refusal to comply with it was fully proved and practically conceded. Of course, harmless error constitutes no ground for reversal.

We conclude, therefore, that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals must be reversed and that of the District Court must be modified by eliminating the allowance of an attorney's fee of $2,500 for services before the Commission and affirmed as so modified.

It is so ordered.

SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. RAILROAD COMMISSION OF INDIANA.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF INDIANA.

No. 107. Argued December 9, 1914.—Decided February 23, 1915.

If the car is moving on a railroad engaged in interstate commerce it is subject to the provisions and penalties of the Safety Appliance Act, although engaged at the time in intrastate commerce. United States v. Southern Ry., 222 U. S. 20.

The principle that an act may constitute a criminal offense against

Argument for Defendant in Error.

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two sovereignties so that punishment by one does not prevent punishment by the other, only relates to cases where both sovereignties have jurisdiction over the act. It has no application where one of the governments has exclusive jurisdiction of the subject-matter and therefore has the exclusive power to punish.

Under the Federal Constitution the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is such that when exercised it is exclusive and ipso facto supersedes existing state legislation on the same subject. Congress may so circumscribe its regulations in regard to a matter within its exclusive jurisdiction as to occupy only a limited field and leave a part of the subject open to incidental legislation by the States; but the Safety Appliance Act extended to the whole subject of equipping cars with safety appliances to the exclusion of further action by the States.

The Indiana statute requiring railway companies to place grab-irons and hand-holds on the sides and ends of every car having been superseded by the Federal Safety Appliance Act, penalties imposed by the former cannot be recovered as to cars operated on interstate railroads although engaged only in intrastate traffic.

THE facts, which involve the effect of the Federal Safety Appliance Act on state statutes relating to safety appliances on railroad cars used in interstate commerce, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. John D. Welman, with whom Mr. Alexander P. Humphrey and Mr. Edward P. Humphrey were on the brief, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Frank H. Hatfield, with whom Mr. John R. Brill, Mr. John W. Brady and Mr. Thomas W. Littlepage were on the brief, for defendant in error:

Congress has such power as has been delegated to it by the States and all power not granted by the States is reserved to the States.

If the state statute is not a regulation of interstate commerce, it is not in contravention of or opposed to the right of Congress and therefore not in violation of the commerce clause. Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465; Hennington v.

236 U.S.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

Georgia, 163 U. S. 299; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; People v. Chicago &c. R. R., 79 N. E. Rep. 144.

The state statute in question was passed in the exercise of the police power of the State.

A statute of a State and an act of Congress on the same subject may be enforced in pursuance of a common purpose to afford a remedy. Voelker v. Chicago &c. R. R., 116 Fed. Rep. 867-873.

If a railroad company is engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce, this does not prevent the State from adopting such regulations as it may deem proper to provide for the safety of its citizens. People v. Chicago &c. R. R., 220 Illinois, 581; People v. Erie R. R., 198 N. Y. 369; Missouri &c. R. R. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137; 2 Elliott on Railroads, 690; 4 Id. 1671; Missouri &c. R. R., v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262; and see as to an Ohio statute identical with the one here involved, Detroit &c. Co. v. State, 91 N. E. Rep. 869.

The state statute in question has not been superseded. When Congress acts the state laws are superseded only to the extent that they affect commerce outside of the State as it comes within the State. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137; N. Y. &c. R. R. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628; Morgan Steamship Co. v. Louisiana, 118 U. S. 455; Compagnie &c. Co. v. State Board, 186 U. S. 380; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27.

The state statute is not invalid unless it is repugnant to the act of Congress. Lake Shore R. R. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285; Pittsburg &c. R. R. v. State, 172 Indiana, 147; Chicago &c. R. R. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133; Missouri &c. R. R. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613.

A state statute is not invalid because of a Federal statute on the same subject, unless the state statute is repugnant to the Federal statute. People v. Erie R. R., 198 N. Y. 369; Gulf &c. R. R. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98; Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299; New Orleans &c.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

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R. R. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587; Minneapolis &c. R. R. v. Emmonds, 149 U. S. 364.

In order that a state law or the action of state authorities under such law should be construed a regulation of commerce between the States, the operation of such law or the action of such state authorities must be a direct interference or regulation and directly or substantially hurtful to such commerce, not a mere incidental or casual interruption or regulation or remotely hurtful. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99; Louis. & Nash. R. R. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503; New York &c. R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 158 U. S. 431; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 150; Louis. & Nash. R. R. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677; Nashville &c. R. R. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96; Davis v. Cleveland &c. R. R., 217 U. S. 157.

So long as the action of the State is not repugnant to, or does not interfere with, or place burdens upon, or undertake to regulate, interstate commerce, or is a mere police regulation, its action, though in aid of interstate commerce, is not invalid, unless it is a direct interference. Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501; Standard &c. Co. v. Wright, 225 U. S. 540; United States v. Minneapolis, 223 U. S. 335; Meyer v. Wells, 223 U. S. 298; Atchison &c. R. R. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280; Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427; Louisville &c. R. R. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587; Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691.

It is not enough to render the state law invalid simply that it is similar to the Federal statute. United States v. DeWitt, 9 Wall. 41; Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214; Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99; New York &c. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 158 U. S. 431.

Where both the State and Congress have made certain acts a violation of the criminal law, the commission of the act may be an offense against, or transgression of, the laws of both, and may be punished in both jurisdictions.