ing property fraudulently conveyed by the bankrupt, and in its opinion the court said (p. 881):

"It is true the trustee asked that the conveyance be declared fraudulent as to all creditors both subsequent and antecedent, while the court only adjudged that the conveyance was fraudulent as to antecedent creditors, but we do not understand that the Trustee in bankruptcy is complaining of the judgment in so far as it refused to adjudge the conveyance actually fraudulent. The judgment does not undertake to dispose of the proceeds that may be realized from the sale of the property, but leaves this question open for future determination, and we do not doubt that, when the court comes to make an order concerning the disposition of the proceeds in the hands of the trustee as special commissioner, it will direct that the proceeds be paid over to the trustee in bankruptcy to be administered as a part of the estate of the bankrupt in the bankruptcy court. In anticipation of what we assume the court will do, we may with propriety in this opinion direct that it make such orders. If the court in the judgment had undertaken to divest the trustee of the control of this fund, we would upon this point reverse the judgment with directions to proceed as indicated, but, as the court did not make such an order, we are of the opinion that on the appeal of the trustee the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed."

Therefore it appears that the judgment of the lower court, directing the proceeds to be disposed of in the bankruptcy proceedings, was distinctly affirmed, and the court declared that a contrary holding would have been reversed.

After dealing with the questions brought up by the grantees in the deed, it was held that the court below was wrong in fixing the date of the delivery and acceptance of the deed as of April 20, 1907, instead of December 4, 1906, and the court said (page 882):

"To what extent this will affect the judgment creditors

Opinion of the Court.

236 U. S.

we are not advised; but only those creditors whose debts were created previous to December 4, 1906, are entitled to participate in the proceeds realized from the sale of the property. If the proceeds amount to more than sufficient to pay such debts, the surplus should be paid to the grantees in the deed."

But we do not think in this part of the opinion the Court of Appeals of Kentucky intended in anywise to depart from its affirmation of the judgment of the Circuit Court upon the trustee's appeal and its explicit recognition of the authority of the Bankruptcy Court to control the disposition of the proceeds of the sale. The court did not consider § 67-f in its opinion, nor did it give, as it had no authority so to do, any specific direction as to the distribution of the fund in the Bankruptcy Court. The McCracken Circuit Court after the mandate came down repeated its order as to the distribution in the Bankruptcy Court by reference to its former judgment, and the trustee applied for an order in that court which was made and subsequently appealed from in the present case.

Under the Bankruptcy Act, when the conveyance was set aside, the lien or attachment being within four months of the bankruptcy proceeding, the bankrupt being then insolvent, of which fact no question is made, and the Bankruptcy Court having ordered that the lien be preserved for the benefit of creditors, it became good under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act for the benefit of all the creditors of the estate. Under this order the Bankruptcy Court had acquired jurisdiction,-the state court had no possession of the property except such as the attachment gave-and after the conveyance was set aside in the state court, for which purpose the state court is given concurrent jurisdiction by § 70 of the Bankruptcy Act, it had the right to determine for itself the disposition of the fund arising from the property sold. Miller v. New Orleans Fertilizer Co., 211 U. S. supra.

236 U. S.

Statement of the Case.

We find no error in the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals, directing the distribution of the proceeds of the sale for the benefit of all the creditors of the estate. The decree is accordingly

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE PITNEY and MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS dissenting.

IOWA CENTRAL RAILWAY COMPANY v. BACON, ADMINISTRATOR OF LOCKHART.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA.

No. 130. Submitted January 19, 1915.-Decided February 23, 1915. If the suit be one of which the Circuit Court can rightfully take jurisdiction, the state court loses jurisdiction on the filing of the petition and bond, and subsequent proceedings in that court are void; but if on the face of the record, including the petition for removal, it does not appear that the suit is removable, the state court is not bound to surrender its jurisdiction and may proceed as if no application for removal had been made. Traction Co. v. Mining Co., 196 U. S. 239. Although the petition may allege that plaintiff sustained damages in excess of two thousand dollars, if the prayer for recovery is for less than that sum, the jurisdictional amount is not involved, and the filing of a petition and bond does not effect a removal of the case. Although the Federal court may have made orders continuing a case in which a petition and bond had been filed, and even dismissed it for want of prosecution, if the question of its authority had never been presented to or decided by it, the state court is not bound to respect such orders as conclusive of the question of jurisdiction; and so held in a case which on the face of the record was not removable as the amount claimed was less than $2,000, although the damages were stated in the petition as having exceeded that sum. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. McCabe, 213 U. S. 207, distinguished.

157 Iowa, 493, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the state and Federal courts and the effect of an attempted reVOL. CCXXXVI-20

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

236 U.S.

moval of the case to the Federal court where the amount in controversy was less than $2,000, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. William H. Bremner and Mr. F. M. Miner for plaintiff in error:

After the removal to the United States court the amount in controversy would be for determination by the Federal court under the rules of practice prevailing in that court.

The original notice fixed the amount which would be claimed by the plaintiff at ten thousand dollars.

Ünder statutes similar to the statutes of Iowa after an answer has been filed the prayer for relief becomes immaterial and the court may give judgment for such an amount as is consistent with the issues made and the proof. Marquat v. Marquat, 2 Kern. (12 N. Y. 336); 1 Bates' Pleading 315; Erck v. Omaha National Bank (Nebr.), 62 N. W. Rep. 67.

The prayer for relief forms no part of the petition and the sufficiency and character thereof, as well as the amount involved, must be determined from the facts stated and not from the prayer for relief. Henry v. McKittrick, 42 Kansas, 485; Tiffin Glass Co. v. Stoehr, 54 Oh. St. 157.

The Supreme Court of Iowa had, prior to the decision in this case, in various opinions held that the plaintiff was not limited to the relief asked by his petition. Wilson v. Miller, 16 Iowa, 111; Marder v. Wright, 70 Iowa, 42; Johnson v. Rider, 84 Iowa, 50.

The state court was without jurisdiction, the case having been actually removed to the United States Circuit Court and that court having determined it had jurisdiction thereof.

After the filing of the transcript in the United States court the case was continued from term to term.

The fact that no order directing the removal of the case was entered by the state court is immaterial, as such an

236 U. S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

order or the failure to make such an order does not affect the question of removal. Brigham v. Thompson, 55 Fed. Rep. 881; State v. Coosaw Mining Co., 45 Fed. Rep. 804809; LaPage v. Day, 74 Fed. Rep. 977; Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 485; Eisemann v. Delmar Mining Co., 87 Fed. Rep. 248; Loop v. Winter, 115 Fed. Rep. 362; Van Horne v. Litchfield, 70 Iowa, 11; Byson v. McPherson, 71 Iowa, 437; Ohle v. C. & N. W. Ry., 64 Iowa, 599; Chambers v. Ill. Cent. Ry., 104 Iowa, 238; Myers v. C. & N. W. Ry., 118 Iowa, 312, 325; Turner v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 106 U. S. 552; Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589, 595.

The case was actually removed, whether rightfully or not, and the state court lost jurisdiction by such removal and could only recover jurisdiction by remand from the Federal court or the commencement of a new action. State v. Coosaw Mining Co., 45 Fed. Rep. 804, 809; C. & O. Ry. v. McCabe, 213 U. S. 207.

If the Federal court was without jurisdiction because the case was not removable, the remedy of the plaintiff was by moving to remand in the Federal court. Turner v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 106 U. S. 552, 555; C. & O. Ry. v. McCabe, 213 U. S. 207, 218; Des Moines Nav. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U. S. 552, 559; Judge v. Arlen, 71 Iowa, 186.

The cases cited show that as a petition for removal sufficient in all respects and in proper form, with a good and sufficient bond has been filed, the case was removed, and thereafter only the Federal court could determine whether or not it had jurisdiction.

The judgment for costs entered by the United States court in favor of the plaintiff in error is still in full force and effect, never having been set aside or reversed and cannot be treated as a nullity.

The effect of the decision by the Supreme Court of Iowa is to hold that the judgment of the United States court is