selected audience. Laws of this description are not unfamiliar. Of course we have nothing to do with the wisdom of the defendant, the prosecution, or the act. All that concerns us is that it cannot be said to infringe the Constitution of the United States.

Judgment affirmed.

GEORGE N. PIERCE COMPANY, PETITIONER, v. WELLS, FARGO & COMPANY.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

No. 14. Argued December 8, 1913. Restored to docket October 26, 1914. Reargued January 7, 1915.-Decided February 23, 1915.

One who deliberately without fraud or imposition accepts a contract of shipment limiting the recovery to a valuation specified in the filed tariff, but who is given the privilege of paying increased rates for increased valuation and liability up to full amount as also specified in the filed tariff, is limited in case of loss to recover the specified

amount.

Contracts for limited liability when fairly made do not contravene the settled principles of the common law preventing the carrier from contracting against liability for its own negligence. Hart v. Pennsylvania R. R., 112 U. S. 331.

Under the provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce in regard to filing tariffs and the Carmack Amendment of 1906 to that Act, the amount to which the liability of the carrier is limited and the additional rate for additional liability must be stated in the filed tariff and must be equally applicable to all shippers under like circumstances.

The legality of a contract limiting the carrier's liability to a specified or agreed valuation does not depend upon that valuation having a relation to the value of the shipment, but depends upon acceptance of the parties to the contract and upon the filed tariff and the re

quirement of the shipper to take notice thereof and to be bound thereby.

If the filed tariff specifies an amount as the carrier's liability which is unreasonable, it is for the Interstate Commerce Commission to correct upon proper proceedings, but it stands until so corrected and all shippers under like circumstances must be treated alike. While the fifty dollar limit of value of the shipment and of express companies' liability for shipments of undeclared value at regular rates has been modified by the Commission since the shipment in this case, it was then the filed tariff limitation and the shipper was bound to take notice thereof; and to permit a greater recovery than the amount specified in the filed tariff would result in the very favoritism towards him that it is the purpose of the anti-discrimination provisions in the Act to Regulate Commerce to avoid.

The rule that conclusiveness of filed tariff rates does not relate to attempted fraudulent acts or billings, has no application where, as in this case, the transaction was open and above board and the character of the goods was known to both parties and the shipper was competent to agree to the lower valuation in consideration of the lower rate. A contention as to liability of the carrier for value of wreckage which was not presented on the pleadings nor involved in the disposition of the case by the court below cannot be considered here. 189 Fed. Rep. 561, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the validity of clauses in express receipts limiting the liability of the carrier to a fixed amount in absence of declared valuation and payment of a higher rate, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Alfred L. Becker, with whom Mr. William B. Hoyt, Mr. Maurice C. Spratt and Mr. John W. Yerkes were on the brief, for petitioner.

Mr. Charles W. Pierson, with whom Mr. William W. Green, Mr. L. A. Doherty and Mr. Charles W. Stockton were on the brief, for respondent.

MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court.

This action was begun in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of New York, to recover

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236 U.S.

$20,000 for the loss of certain automobiles, shipped for the petitioner, hereinafter called the Automobile Company, by the respondent, hereinafter called the Express Company. The automobiles were shipped under circumstances to be detailed later, and the recovery of their value was sought for a breach of the contract to carry safely; failure to deliver according to the contract; for negligence; and for breach of the duty imposed upon the initial carrier by § 20 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, the Carmack Amendment (Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584). The automobiles were shipped and receipt was issued in the form usually used by the express companies and containing the clause "Nor in any event shall said Company be held liable beyond the sum of Fifty Dollars, at not exceeding which sum the said property is hereby valued unless a different value is hereinabove stated." The receipt is in the form of the one shown in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, and is identical in form with the one involved in the case of Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U. S. 469.

At the trial, the tariff-book of the Express Company was marked for identification, but does not appear to have been embodied in the record. Counsel for the petitioner has, since the argument, filed a memorandum in explanation of the tariffs of the Express Company, and giving extracts therefrom, from which it appears that the rate for uncrated automobiles is double the merchandise rate, and that a through rate could be made by combination of rates from the point of shipment to the basing point, thence to destination. The rates filed, according to the memorandum, show merchandise rate from Chicago, as a basing point, to Buffalo, whence the goods were shipped, and shows merchandise rate, California section, page 20, from Chicago to San Francisco, and double the merchandise rate from Chicago to Buffalo, Chicago to San Francisco, would be $26.50 per hundred pounds, or, using

Kansas City as a basing point, taking the rates from Kansas City to Buffalo, Kansas City to San Francisco, the doubled rate would be the same amount per hundred pounds; also a valuation tariff, showing an additional charge for value in excess of $50, on rate of $8 per hundred pounds or over, 20 cents per hundred pounds, and, as the memorandum shows, if the value of the shipment may be taken to be $15,487.06, the rate for that sum in excess of $50.00 would be $31.00.

The Automobile Company was engaged in Buffalo in the manufacture, sale and shipment of automobiles. It had frequently made use of the services of the Express Company, knew its course of business, had a copy of its tariffs and a book of its express receipts and was familiar with the same; that is, it knew of the filed rate based upon weight or volume and the primary statement of value and consequent limitation upon the right to recover, as well as of the existence of a right to declare additional value and secure in case of loss an additional amount of recovery. Indeed, the Automobile Company had frequently resorted to the method of making a declaration of increased value in order to secure an increased amount of recovery under the tariff.

In May, 1907, the Automobile Company requested the Express Company to furnish an express car for the shipment of a carload of automobiles to San Francisco. Negotiations followed between the officers of the two companies and an understanding was reached. An express car was furnished and put as requested by the Automobile Company upon a sidetrack where it could be by that company conveniently loaded. Four automobiles were then moved by their own power to the place of loading and together with an extra automobile body and other automobile parts were loaded in the car by the shipper. When the car was loaded, triplicate receipts on the form usually used by the Express Company were made out and handed

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to the agent of the Automobile Company, who read them, observed the absence of declaration of value and the limitation of $50.00, and said they were satisfactory. Before the shipment moved, the agent of the Express Company again called the attention of the agent of the shipper to the absence of declared valuation, inquired whether such declaration had been intentionally omitted and whether the property was insured, and was told that the omission was intentional and that the property was insured. Indeed it was shown beyond dispute that the failure to declare an additional value was the result of a change in the method of shipping its goods which had been shortly before put in practice by the Automobile Company, and that in this particular case the additional value was not declared because the shipment had been ordered from San Francisco, and the primary rate, that is the one shown by the tariff on weight or volume based upon the primary value, had been designated from San Francisco as the rate under which the goods should be carried. The car moved toward its destination but never reached there because while in transit on the rails of the Santa Fe Railway in the State of Missouri it was destroyed by fire.

This suit was then brought by the Automobile Company against the Express Company and the Santa Fe Railway to recover $20,000.00, the alleged value of the automobiles. The suit as to the Santa Fe Railway was dismissed for want of service and the case was tried only against the Express Company. As the case went to the jury, there was no denial of some liability on the part of the Express Company, the issue being whether its responsibility was limited to the sum of $50.00, the value of the automobiles as stated in the shipping receipt, which was in accordance with the published and filed tariff, or embraced the actual value of the things shipped. The trial court sustained the limitation in the receipt and directed a verdict for the $50.00 only, and after the affirmance by the Circuit Court