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female, and provides for the disposition of their property under, as stated, rules and regulations provided by the Secretary of the Interior and declares that the jurisdiction of the Probate Courts of the State shall be subject to its provisions. And §6 declares to what courts the property of minors so defined shall be subject. Explicitly such property is made "subject to the jurisdiction of the probate courts of the State of Oklahoma." The qualification "except as otherwise specifically provided by law" means, as said by the Circuit Court of Appeals, "Federal law, not state law."

Counsel, however, resist that conclusion and contend that the jurisdiction which was made subject to the provisions of the section is yet to be regarded independently of them and subject to the provisions of the local statutes. The reasoning by which this is attempted to be supported is somewhat involved and is difficult to represent succinctly. It is that the enabling act of the State, except as modified, and the constitution of the State continued the laws in force in the Territory at the time of its admission into the Union until they expired or were altered or repealed, and that by those laws minors were defined (§ 733, Wilson's Digest) and other laws gave power to confer upon them the rights of majority. (Sections 73, 74 and 75, Wilson's Digest.) But this did not preclude the exercise of the power of Congress as exhibited in the act of May 27, 1908. Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U. S. 286. And the courts, both state and Federal, have found no difficulty in determining its meaning or its dominance over the provisions of the state law. Priddy v. Thompson, 204 Fed. Rep. 955; Jefferson v. Winkler, 26 Oklahoma, 653. And we think it is clear that sections 1 and 4 are not to be construed independently of the other sections of the act.

In Jefferson v. Winkler an Indian girl married when she was under eighteen, and while under that age conveyed

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her allotment. It was held that under the general law of Oklahoma the marriage emancipated her but that, notwithstanding, her conveyance was void, the act of May 27, 1908, prevailing over the state law. The reasoning of the court is directly antagonistic to that of appellants in the case at bar, the same contentions being urged in that case as in this. In other words, it was contended that § 1 of that act was absolute and was not modified by § 2, and the court, considering all of the provisions of the act, was of opinion that the legislative intention was to provide that the allotted lands of freedmen and mixedblood Indians of less than half Indian blood, under the age of eighteen if a female, and under the age of twentyone if a male, might be sold under the supervision and jurisdiction of the probate courts of the State and not otherwise. The court, therefore, decided, upon a consideration of the act of May 27, 1908, and of the laws of the State, that the latter removing the disability of minority do not extend to Indian minors as defined by the act of Congress.

The decision has been followed in Tirey v. Darneal, 37 Oklahoma, 606. Also Tirey v. Darneal, 37 Oklahoma, 611.

The construction has become a rule of property in the State and we should be disposed to accept it as such, even if we had doubts of the construction of the act of May 27, 1908. Reynolds v. Fewell, ante, p. 58.

The other contentions of appellants which have been argued are but phases of those we have reviewed or are determined by the same considerations.

Decree affirmed.

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MUTUAL FILM CORPORATION v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO.

No. 456. Argued January 6, 7, 1915. Decided February 23, 1915.

Where provisions for censorship of moving pictures relate only to films intended for exhibition within the State and they are distributed to persons within the State for exhibition, there is no burden imposed on interstate commerce.

The doctrine of original package does not extend to moving picture films transported, delivered and used as shown in the record in this case, although manufactured in, and brought from, another State. Moving picture films brought from another State to be rented or sold by the consignee to exhibitors, are in consumption and mingled as much as from their nature they can be with other property of the State and subject to its otherwise valid police regulation, even before the consignee delivers to the exhibitor.

The judicial sense, supporting the common sense of this country, sustains the exercise of the police power of regulation of moving picture exhibitions.

The exhibition of moving pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit like other spectacles, and not to be regarded as part of the press of the country or as organs of public opinion within the meaning of freedom of speech and publication guaranteed by the constitution of Ohio.

This court will not anticipate the decision of the state court as to the application of a police statute of the State to a state of facts not involved in the record of the case before it. Quare, whether moving pictures exhibited in places other than places of amusement should fall within the provisions of the censorship statute of Ohio. While administration and legislation are distinct powers and the line that separates their exercise is not easily defined, the legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles to control in given cases, and an administrative body may be clothed with power to ascertain facts and conditions to which such policy and principles apply.

It is impossible to exactly specify such application in every instance, and the general terms of censorship, while furnishing no exact standard

236 U.S.

Statement of the Case.

of requirements may get precision from the sense and experience of men and become certain and useful guides in reasoning and conduct. Whether provisions in a state statute clothing a board or Congress composed of officers from that and other States with power, amount to such delegation of legislative power as to render the provisions unconstitutional, will not be determined by this court in a case in which it appears that such Congress is still non-existent. The moving picture censorship act of Ohio of 1913 is not in violation of the Federal Constitution or the constitution of the State of Ohio, either as depriving the owners of moving pictures of their property without due process of law or as a burden on interstate commerce, or as abridging freedom and liberty of speech and opinion, or as delegating legislative authority to administrative officers. 215 Fed. Rep. 138, affirmed.

APPEAL from an order denying appellant, herein designated complainant, an interlocutory injunction sought to restrain the enforcement of an act of the General Assembly of Ohio passed April 16, 1913 (103 Ohio Laws, 399), creating under the authority and superintendence of the Industrial Commission of the State a board of censors of motion picture films. The motion was presented to three judges, upon the bill, supporting affidavits and some oral testimony.

The bill is quite voluminous. It makes the following attacks upon the Ohio statute: (1) The statute is in violation of §§ 5, 16 and 19 of article 1 of the constitution of the State in that it deprives complainant of a remedy by due process of law by placing it in the power of the board of censors to determine from standards fixed by itself what films conform to the statute, and thereby deprives complainant of a judicial determination of a violation of the law. (2) The statute is in violation of articles 1 and 14 of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and of § 11 of article 1 of the constitution of Ohio in that it restrains complainant and other persons from freely writing and publishing their sentiments. (3) It attempts to give the board of censors legislative power,

Statement of the Case.

236 U. S.

which is vested only in the General Assembly of the State, subject to a referendum vote of the people, in that it gives to the board the power to determine the application of the statute without fixing any standard by which the board shall be guided in its determination, and places it in the power of the board, acting with similar boards in other States, to reject, upon any whim or caprice, any film which may be presented, and power to determine the legal status of the foreign board or boards, in conjunction with which it is empowered to act.

The business of the complainant and the description, use, object and effect of motion pictures and other films contained in the bill, stated narratively, are as follows: Complainant is engaged in the business of purchasing, selling and leasing films, the films being produced in other States than Ohio, and in European and other foreign countries. The film consists of a series of instantaneous photographs or positive prints of action upon the stage or in the open. By being projected upon a screen with great rapidity there appears to the eye an illusion of motion. They depict dramatizations of standard novels, exhibiting many subjects of scientific interest, the properties of matter, the growth of the various forms of animal and plant life, and explorations and travels; also events of historical and current interest-the same events which are described in words and by photographs in newspapers, weekly periodicals, magazines and other publications, of which photographs are promptly secured a few days after the events which they depict happen; thus regularly furnishing and publishing news through the medium of motion pictures under the name of "Mutual Weekly." Nothing is depicted of a harmful or immoral character.

The complainant is selling and has sold during the past year for exhibition in Ohio an average of fifty-six positive prints of films per week to film exchanges doing business in that State, the average value thereof being the sum of

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