wrested from her one by one, and that, in the process, what remains of her military strength would be destroyed. The time has come to choose which course she will pursue-west, or east; whether she will aim at expansion oversea, where the British Navy bars the way, or overland, where the way lies through friendly territory. There can be no doubt which of these alternatives more nearly touches the neutral Powers-especially America— whose good offices she has succeeded in enlisting in support of her astute proposal for a conference, at which she doubtless hopes to secure, by adroit manipulation of the occupied territories, what is essential for the realisation of one or other of her aims.

The one thing that seems certain at the moment is that Germany wants peace. The conquest of Rumania, so far as it has been achieved, has not given the economic relief which the German people had been led to expect; for the Rumanians destroyed the stocks of grain with a thoroughness which may be gauged by the irritation displayed in the German press. The shortage of men may be judged from the efforts which the Germans are making to expand and supplement their resources by the impressment of prisoners of war and Belgian slaves, the general levy of the population, and the endeavour to enlist a Polish army. It would be rash to conclude from such indications that Germany is on the verge of collapse, for it is not her way to await the compulsion of necessity. We must credit her with the resolve to make a determined effort to regain a temporary superiority in men, artillery, and aircraft; and, the peace lure having failed, we must expect her to make a desperate bid for victory, to gain which she will stick at nothing that may promise to give her the advantage.

W. P. BLOOD.

Art. 15.-GERMANY, THE UNITED STATES, AND PEACE.

1. The Issue. By J. W. Headlam. Constable, 1916. 2. Imperial Germany.

By Prince von Bülow. New edition, with Preface by J. W. Headlam. Cassell, 1916. 3. The Road toward Peace. By Charles W. Eliot. Houghton Mifflin, 1915.

4. The American Crisis and the War. By W. M. Fullerton. Constable, 1916.

5. Articles by Cosmos' in New York Times, Nov.-Dec. 1916.

And other works and papers.

ON several occasions during the last two years German statesmen have spoken, primarily to their own people but also to the world, on the possibility of peace. Their remarks, as was only natural, were studiously vague, but they were accompanied by indications, sufficiently clear, that the peace contemplated was one which would leave Germany in possession of most of the advantages she had gained. They attracted no great amount of attention here, being regarded as kites sent up to show which way the wind was blowing, or as intended to appease a warweary people and to placate the neutrals. Many other forecasts of the probable or desirable conditions of peace have also been published by persons and groups of more or less authority in Germany and elsewhere, especially within the last twelve months. Meanwhile it was supposed that, across the Atlantic, the bulk of the American people was either indifferent or favourable to the cause of the Allies. The action, or the inaction, of the President was thought to indicate a policy of 'peace at any price'; and the result of the Presidential election was regarded as proving that the one thing the American people desired was to be 'kept out of the war.' Consequently, no active intervention was feared-least of all, an intervention which, whether so intended or not, would assist our opponents. Nevertheless, it must have been evident to any student of American politics and American newspapers, during the last three or four months, that an active pacificist sentiment was growing up in the States. New motives became apparent; fresh forces were seen at work; a change of feeling in certain

quarters towards the Allies, a veering of opinion as to the probable issue of the war, made themselves felt. It seems worth while, in the first place, to collect and compare the most noteworthy of the peace-programmes referred to, in order to see if they throw any light on the conditions likely to be proposed by Germany and her allies; and, secondly, to examine the condition of American feeling and the changes that have taken place in it, in order to form some idea of the forces and motives which have resulted in the Presidential Note. The events of the last six weeks we must assume to be fresh in our readers' minds.

In the attempt to ascertain German aspirations and intentions, we may leave on one side the ante-bellum schemes and forecasts of such bodies as the Pan-German League. By this time they may be supposed to be fairly well known in this country, and to some sections of American society. With regard to the plans of the League in Central and South-Eastern Europe, Herr Naumann's Mitteleuropa,' and M. Chéradame's recently translated work, are well calculated to enlighten public opinion; and further information will be found in another article in the present number of this Review. It is well to keep these projects in mind, for they not only indicate the intentions of influential Germans before the war, but they also show how large a step the German armies have already made towards the realisation of Pan-German ambitions, and how fatal to the security of Europe and the world would be a peace which left Germany in a position to realise them fully. But, for our present purpose, we shall do well to confine ourselves to the views of more or less authoritative persons or bodies, published since the war began. A very useful introduction to this subject is to be found in Mr J. W. Headlam's admirable little book.

We can take no higher authority than the German Chancellor himself. On no less than six occasions Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has spoken publicly about the possibility of peace. So far back as May 1915, shortly after the entrance of Italy into the war, he declared that Germany must endure till she had 'gained and created every possible real guarantee and security, so that none of our enemies, neither alone nor united,