Political Science: Or, The State Theoretically and Practically Considered, Volume 1 |
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Page 2
... protection of rights to be the only end for which the state exists : far from this , we hold that a good state has other most important objects placed before it , as we hope to show in the sequel . But a state has no right to exist ...
... protection of rights to be the only end for which the state exists : far from this , we hold that a good state has other most important objects placed before it , as we hope to show in the sequel . But a state has no right to exist ...
Page 8
... blended - owing to the protection which early society draws from religion in order to secure justice - that the distinct subsistence of the civil relations does not stand forth in its due clearness 8 POLITICAL SCIENCE .
... blended - owing to the protection which early society draws from religion in order to secure justice - that the distinct subsistence of the civil relations does not stand forth in its due clearness 8 POLITICAL SCIENCE .
Page 12
... protection for themselves . Without this , which may be called the moral factor in jural science , the science would have no connection with ethics , for the exercise of rights , which are free powers of action , implies no moral ...
... protection for themselves . Without this , which may be called the moral factor in jural science , the science would have no connection with ethics , for the exercise of rights , which are free powers of action , implies no moral ...
Page 19
... protection . The use of force has been often , in modern times , intro- Use of force no duced into the definition of rights , as distin- criterion of jura . guishing them from moral claims and corre- sponding duties ; or , more ...
... protection . The use of force has been often , in modern times , intro- Use of force no duced into the definition of rights , as distin- criterion of jura . guishing them from moral claims and corre- sponding duties ; or , more ...
Page 20
... protect it , but by the clearness with which it can be shown to pertain to the nature and destiny of man . If an ... protection . Secondly , sometimes violation of duty is as plain as violation of obligation . Thus ingratitude in ...
... protect it , but by the clearness with which it can be shown to pertain to the nature and destiny of man . If an ... protection . Secondly , sometimes violation of duty is as plain as violation of obligation . Thus ingratitude in ...
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Common terms and phrases
absolute according action Aristotle Athens atimia authority belong body called citizens civil Comp consent constitution contract courts crime criminal despotism doctrine duty election elective monarchy equal especially evil existence exogamy feeling feudal force freedom give hands house of lords human individual injury institutions judge jural jus naturale justice kind king labor land legislation liberty limits magistrates marriage ment mixed government monarchy moral nation natural law nature necessary obligation offences oligarchy opinion parliament party penalty Plato political prevent principle private persons protection punishment question race reason regard relations religion religious revolution right of property Roman Roman law rule ruler says seems sense social social contract society sovereign Sparta state's Tacitus territory theocracy theory things tion tribes union usage violation vote witan witenagemote wrong Yale College
Popular passages
Page 249 - The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
Page 411 - The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates PROVING THAT IT IS LAWFUL, AND HATH BEEN HELD SO THROUGH ALL AGES, FOR ANY WHO HAVE THE POWER TO CALL TO ACCOUNT A TYRANT, OR WICKED KING, AND AFTER DUE CONVICTION TO DEPOSE AND PUT HIM TO DEATH, IF THE ORDINARY MAGISTRATE HAVE NEGLECTED OR DENIED TO DO IT.
Page 203 - If a determinate human superior, not in a habit of obedience to a like superior, receive habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and the society (including the superior) is a society political and independent.
Page 254 - But with regard to the merely contingent or, as it may be called, constructive injury which a person causes to society, by conduct which neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself ; the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom.
Page 338 - ... for he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid ; for he beareth not the sword in vain. For he is a minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.
Page 332 - And now art thou cursed from the earth, which hath opened her mouth to receive thy brother's blood from thy hand; when thou tillest the ground, it shall not henceforth yield unto thee her strength; a fugitive and a vagabond shalt thou be in the earth.
Page 169 - Law in general is human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the inhabitants of the earth ; the political and civil laws of each nation ought to be only the particular cases in which human reason is applied.
Page 412 - It follows, lastly, that since the king or magistrate holds his authority of the people, both originally and naturally for their good in the first place, and not his own, then may the people, as oft as they shall judge it for the best, either choose him or reject him, retain him or depose him, though no tyrant, merely by the liberty and right of freeborn men to be governed as seems to them best.
Page 332 - Defile not ye yourselves in any of these things: for in all these the nations are defiled which I cast out before you, and the land is defiled: therefore I do visit the iniquity thereof upon it, and the land itself vomiteth out her inhabitants.
Page 255 - In the first place, it must by no means be supposed, because damage, or probability of damage, to the interests of others can alone justify the interference of society, that therefore it always does justify such interference. In many cases an individual, in pursuing a legitimate object, necessarily and therefore legitimately causes pain or loss to others, or intercepts a good which they had a reasonable hope of obtaining.