CHA P. XIII.

In what Government Taxes are capable of In

creafe.

TAXES may be increased in most republics, Book

XIII.

because the citizen, who thinks he is pay- Chap. 13, ing himself, chearfully fubmits to them, and more. and 14. over is generally able to bear their weight, from the nature of the government.

In a monarchy taxes may be increased, becaufe the moderation of the government is capable of procuring opulence: it is a recompence, as it were, granted to the prince for the refpect he fhews to the laws. In defpotic governments they cannot be increased, because there can be no increase of the extremity of flavery.

CHA P. XIV.

That the Nature of the Taxes is relative to the
Government.

A Capitation is more natural to flavery; a du

ty on merchandizes is more natural to li berty, by reafon it has not fo direct a relation to the perfon.

It is natural in a defpotic government for the prince not to give money to his foldiers, or to those belonging to his court; but to diftribute lands amongst them, and of courfe, that there fhould be very few taxes. But if the prince gives money, the most natural tax he can raife is a capitation, which can never be confiderable. poffible to make different claffes tors, because of the abufes that

7

For as it is imof the contribumight arife from thence,

XIII.

Chap. 15.

Book thence, confidering the injuftice and violence of the government, they are under an abfolute neceffity of regulating themselves by the rate of what even the poorest and most wretched are able to contribute. The natural tax of moderate governments, is the duty laid on merchandizes. As this is really paid by the consumer, though advanced by the merchant, it is a loan which the latter has already made to the former. Hence the merchant must be confidered on the one fide as the general debtor of the state, and on the other as the creditor of every individual. He advances to the state the duty, which the confumer will fome time or other refund; and he has paid for the consumer the duty which he has advanced for the merchandize. It is therefore obvious, that in proportion to the moderation of the government, to the prevalence of the fpirit of liberty, and to the fecurity of private fortunes, a merchant has it in his power to advance money to the ftate, and to pay confiderable duties for individuals. In England a merchant lends really to the government fifty or fixty pounds fterling for every tun of wine he imports. Where is the merchant that would dare do any fuch thing in a country like Turky? And were he fo prefumptuous, how could he do it with a crazy or fhattered fortune?

CHA P. XV.
Abufe of Liberty.

To thefe great advantages of liberty it is ow

ing that liberty itfelf has been abused. Be

cause a moderate government has been productive

of

XIII.

of admirable effects, this moderation has been laid BOOK afide because great taxes have been raifed, they Chap. 15. wanted to carry them to excefs: and ungrateful to the hand of liberty of whom they received this prefent, they addreffed themselves to flavery who never grants the leaft favor.

Liberty produces exceffive taxes; the effect of exceffive taxes is flavery; and flavery produces a diminution of tribute.

Most of the edicts of the eastern monarchs are to exempt every year fome province of their empire from paying tribute *. The manifeftations of their will are favors. But in Europe the edicts of princes are disagreeable even before they are feen, because they always make mention of their own wants, but not a word of ours.

From an unpardonable indolence in the minifters of those countries, owing to the nature of the government, and frequently to the climate, the people derive this advantage, that they are not inceffantly plagued with new demands. The public expence does not increafe, because the minifters do not form new projects; and if fome by chance are formed, they are fuch as are foon executed. The governors of the ftate do not perpetually torment the people; for they do not perpetually torment themselves. But it is impoffible there fhould be any fixed rule in our finances, fince we always know that we fhall have fomething or other to execute, without ever knowing what it is.

It is no longer customary with us to give the appellation of a great minifter to a wife difpenfer of

This is the practice of the Emperors of China.

the

Book the public revenues; but to a perfon of dexterity,

XIII.

Chap. 16, and cunning, who is clever at finding out what we call the ways and means.

and 17.

IT

CHA P. XVI.

Of the Conquefts of the Mahometans.

T was this excefs of taxes * that occafioned the prodigious facility with which the Mahometans carried on their conquefts. Inftead of a continual feries of extortions devised by the fubtle avarice of the Greek emperors, the people were fubjected to a fimple tribute, which was paid and collected with eafe. Thus they were far happier in obeying a barbarous nation, than a corrupt government, in which they fuffered every inconvenience of loft liberty, with all the horror of present slavery.

A

CHA P. XVII.

Of the Augmentation of Troops.

New distemper has fpread itfelf over Eu rope, infecting our princes, and inducing them to keep up an exorbitant number of troops. It has its redoublings, and of neceffity becomes contagious. For as foon as one prince augments his forces, the rest of course do the fame; fo that nothing is gained thereby but the public ruin. Each monarch keeps as many armies on foot, as if his people were in danger of being

See in hiftory the greatnefs, the oddity, and even the folly of those taxes. Anaftafius invented a tax for breathing, ut qu'fque pro hauftu aeris penderet.

exterminated; and they give the name of

*

peace to this general effort of all against all. Thus is Europe ruined to fuch a degree, that were private people to be in the fame fituation as the three most opulent powers of this part of the globe, they would not have neceffary fubfiftence. We are poor with the riches and commerce of the whole world; and foon, by thus augmenting our troops, we fhall be all foldiers, and be reduced to the very fame fituation as the Tartars . †.

Great princes, not fatisfied with hiring or buying troops of petty ftates, make it their bufinefs on all fides to pay fubfidies for alliances, that is, generally to throw away their money.

The confequence of fuch a fituation is the perpetual augmentation of taxes; and the mifchief which prevents all future remedy, is that they reckon no more upon their revenues, but in waging war against their whole capital. It is no unusual thing to fee governments mortgage their funds even in time of peace, and to employ what they call extraordinary means to ruin themselves; means fo extraordinary indeed, that fuch are hardly thought on by the most extravagant young spendthrift.

* True it is that this state of effort is the chief support of the balance, because it checks the great powers.

† All that is wanting for this is, to improve the new invention of the militia eftablished in most parts of Europe, and carry it to the fame excels as they do the regular troops.

Book XIII. Chap. 17.

VOL. I.

Y

CHA P.