CHA P. XVI.

Diftinctive Properties of a Republic.

IT is natural for

VIII. Chap 16.

Tis natural for a republic to have only a fmall Book territory; otherwise it cannot long fubfift. In an extenfive republic there are men of large fortunes, and confequently of lefs moderation; there áre trufts too confiderable to be placed in any fingle fubject; he has interests of his own; he foon begins to think that he may be happy and glorious, by oppreffing his fellow citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country.

In an extensive republic the public good is facrificed to a thousand private views; it is fubordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a fmall one, the intereft of the public is more obvious, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses have lefs extent, and of course are lefs protected.

The long duration of the republic of Sparta was owing to her having continued in the fame extent of territory after all her wars. The fole aim of Sparta was liberty; and the fole advantage of her liberty, glory.

It was the spirit of the Greek republics to be as contented with their territories, as with their laws. Athens was firft fired with ambition and gave it to Lacedæmon; but it was an ambition rather of commanding a free people, than of governing flaves; rather of directing than of breaking the union. All was loft upon the starting up of VOL. I.

N

mo

Book monarchy, a government whofe fpirit is more turned to increase of dominion.

VIII. Chap. 17.

Excepting particular circumftances *, it is difficult for any other than a republican government to fubfift longer in a fingle town. A prince of fo petty a state would naturally endeavour to oppress his fubjects, becaufe his power would be great, while the means of enjoying it or of caufing it to be refpected, would be inconfiderable. The confequence is, he would trample upon his people. On the other hand, fuch a prince might be easily crushed by a foreign or even a domeftic force; the people might every inftant unite and rife up against him. Now as foon as the fovereign of a fingle town is expelled, the quarrel is over; but if he has many towns, it only begins.

CHAP. XVII.

Diftinctive Properties of a Monarchy. A Monarchical state ought to be of a moderate

extent. Were it fmall, it would form itself into a republic were it very large, the nobility, poffeffed of great eftates, far from the eye of the prince, with a private court of their own, and fecure moreover from fudden executions by the laws and manners of the country, fuch a nobility, I fay, might throw off their allegiance, having nothing to fear from too flow and too diftant a punish

ment.

* As when a petty fovereign supports himself betwixt two great powers by means of their mutual jealousy; but then he has only a precarious exiftence.

Thus

VIII.

Thus Charlemain had scarce founded his empire Book when he was obliged to divide it; whether the go- Chap. 18, vernors of the provinces refused to obey; or whether, in order to keep them more under fubjection, there was a neceffity of parcelling the empire into feveral kingdoms.

After the decease of Alexander his empire was divided. How was it poffible for those Greek and Macedonian chiefs, who were each of them free and independent, or commanders at least of the victorious bands difperfed throughout that vaft extent of conquered land, how was it poffible, I fay, for them to obey?

Attila's empire was diffolved foon after his death; fuch a number of kings, who were no longer under reftraint, could not refume their fetters.

The fudden establishment of unlimited power is a remedy, which in those cases may prevent a disfolution but how dreadful the remedy, which after the inlargement of dominion, opens a new scene of mifery !

The rivers haften to mingle their waters with the fea; and monarchies lofe themselves in defpotic power.

CHAP. XVIII.

Particular cafe of the Spanish Monarchy.

LET not the example of Spain be produced against me; it rather proves what I affirm. To preserve America fhe did what even defpotic power itself does not attempt, fhe deftroyed the inhabitants. To preferve her colony, fhe was ob

N 2

liged

BOOK liged to keep it dependent even for its fubfift

VIII.

Chap 19.

and 20.

ence.

In the Netherlands, fhe effayed to render herself arbitrary; and as foon as fhe abandoned the attempt, her perplexity increased. On the one hand the Walloons would not be governed by Spaniards; and on the other, the Spanish foldiers refufed to (c) See the fubmit to Walloon officers ().

history of

the Unit

ed Pro

In Italy fhe maintained her ground, merely by vinces, by exhaufting herself and by enriching that country. Monf. Le For those who would have been pleafed to have got rid of the king of Spain, were not in a humour to refufe his gold.

Clerct

CHA P. XIX.

Diftinctive Properties of a defpotic Government:

A Large empire fuppofes a defpotic authority in the person who governs. It is neceffary that the quickness of the prince's refolutions should fupply the distance of the places they are fent to; that fear fhould prevent the remiffness of the distant governor or magiftrate; that the law fhould be derived from a fingle perfon, and should shift continually, according to the accidents which inceffantly multiply in a ftate in proportion to its

extent.

CHA P. XX.

Confequence of the preceding Chapters.

IF it be therefore the natural property of small ftates to be governed as a republic, of middling ones to be fubject to a monarch, and of large em

VIII.

pires to be fwayed by a defpotic prince; the con- Book fequence is, that in order to preferve the principles Chap. 214 of the established government, the ftate must be fupported in the extent it has acquired, and that the fpirit of this ftate will alter in proportion as it contracts or extends its limits.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Empire of China.

BEFORE I conclude this book, I fhall answer

an objection that may be made to the foregoing doctrine.

Our miffionaries inform us that the government of the vaft empire of China is admirable, and that it has a proper mixture of fear, honor, and virtue. Confequently I must have given an idle distinction, in establishing the principles of the three governments.

But I cannot conceive what this honor can be among a people, who act only through fear of being bastinaded *.

Again, our merchants are far from giving us any fuch accounts of the virtue fo much talked of by the miffionaries; we need only confult them in relation to the robberies and extor tions of the Mandarines (). I likewife appeal ()Among to another unexceptionable witnefs, the great lord others, De

Anfon.

Lange's relation.

Befides, Father Perennin's letters concerning the emperor's proceedings against some of the' princes of the blood (f) who had incurred his difpleasure () of the by their converfion, plainly fhew us a fettied plan Sournia

* It is the cudgel that governs China, fays Father du Halde,

N 3

Family of

ma, Edifying Letters, 18th

of collection.