and the main pivot of defence, the base of operations in the province, was in the hands of our Allies.

It is unnecessary to follow General Yudenitch in his pursuit of the different fractions of the Turkish army, northwards towards Trebizond to cut off the left wing which is retreating along the coast, followed by the Russian right; westwards down the valley of the Kara Su, towards Erzingan; and southwards through Bitlis (stormed by the Russians on March 2), whence the right wing appears to be retreating towards Mosul. These operations, at the time of writing, are still in progress; and the bulk of the Turkish reinforcements has not yet been encountered.

The full results of the Russian victory cannot as yet be discerned. Its immediate effect has been to attract troops from other theatres of war, thereby putting an end to any schemes for offensive action which the Turks may have entertained, or which the Germans may have planned to execute with their assistance. The force set free from Gallipoli, which was probably intended to play some part in the Balkans, has had to furnish reinforcements for Armenia; the projected attack on Egypt has been averted; and troops marching to Mesopotamia are said to have been recalled. By thus throwing the Turks everywhere on the defensive, the Russians have done something to repair the failure of their Allies last year to make an end of the Turkish military power by striking at its heart, Constantinople. They have paralysed one of its limbs; but the injury has not mortally affected the vital parts, while other limbs retain enough strength to detain important Allied forces in Egypt and Mesopotamia. The Turks thus continue to perform one of the functions for which their German masters intended them, namely to threaten from their central position certain regions which one or more of the Allied Powers could not afford to neglect, and so to bring about a wide dispersion of forces, which are either inactive, or employed in operations promising no decisive result. The Allied forces now operating, or inactive, in Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Egypt, probably exceed the whole effective strength of the Turkish army; not to mention Salonika, which is itself a legacy of the failure in the Dardanelles.

How far the Russians will be able to carry the work of reparation is a question about which it would be futile to speculate. It is evident that decisive results are not to be achieved on the outskirts of the Turkish Empire in Armenia, nor by operating towards Mosul and Baghdad. They must be sought on the road to Constantinople, to bar which the Turks would be compelled to bring up all their available forces and accept battle, the issue of which might decide the fate of the war party and the German directors at Constantinople, whose reign is said already to have become unpopular. But the way is long, the country difficult; and the line of communication by Erzerum, besides being inadequate for the supply of such forces as would be required when operating at a distance from the railhead on the Caucasian frontier, would need a large number of troops for its protection. The difficulties of supply might, perhaps, be mitigated by establishing fresh bases on the Black Sea coast, supplied by seatransport. Up to the present, the Russians appear to be occupied in clearing their flanks, and moving their main forces by the Kara Su valley towards Erzingan; while the rate of advance suggests that entrenching and road-making demand a great part of their attention. It may be that by striking a blow to relieve the tension in Mesopotamia and elsewhere, they have effected the object of their offensive, and that they will refrain from embarking on operations the end of which cannot be foreseen; contenting themselves with making good the dominating position already gained, and establishing connexion with their forces in Persia, whose advanced columns are working towards Urmia and Baghdad. The Turks, meanwhile, in anticipation of an advance towards Constantinople, are reported to be concentrating large forces about Sivas, and to be entrenching a position in that region under German supervision.

The situation in Mesopotamia, where General Townshend has been beleagured at Kut-el-Amara since the beginning of December, has caused general anxiety; and the conception and conduct of the campaign have been the subject of much criticism. The original object of the expedition is understood to have been the protection of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's wells, and the pipe-line

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which leads through Ahwaz to Barein on the Shatt-elArab, thirty miles below Basra. A force comprising two infantry brigades was despatched from Bombay early in November 1914, which after a couple of insignificant engagements, occupied Basra and Ahwaz. The security of the pipe-line would have been ensured by the maintenance of adequate forces at these points; but, whether more ambitious operations had been originally designed, or whether they were suggested by the feebleness of the opposition hitherto encountered, reinforcements were sent forward, and the advance was resumed with Baghdad as the objective. It may have been that the opportunity was thought favourable for striking a blow to strengthen British prestige in the East, which German and Turkish emissaries in India and elsewhere were endeavouring to undermine. Baghdad, though an object of Germany's ambition, was at the time of little military importance; and to bring the Turks to terms it would be necessary to strike at a more vital point. The political results anticipated from occupying the ancient City of the Caliphs were no doubt great, but it may be questioned whether they justified the employment of a considerable force, at a time when troops were scarce, in an isolated enterprise which could not be decisive.

The usual mistake was made of underestimating the enemy. The long line of communication, liable to attack by predatory Arabs, needed large numbers for its protection; and General Townshend, with little more than a division, encountered greatly superior forces at Ctesiphon which obliged him to retreat to Kut-el-Amara, after having snatched a transient and costly victory. Reinforcements, which were on their way, had been despatched too late. The slow progress of General Aylmer's relieving column has probably been due not so much to insufficient strength as to the state of the country, which has enabled the Turks to occupy successive positions with their flanks resting on extensive swamps which, flooded by torrential rains, have made outflanking movements impossible. On each occasion the troops have been restricted to purely frontal attacks, over ground which afforded no vestige of cover, against formidable entrenchments well provided with machine guns, and manned by infantry which, having been trained under German supervision, is of

much higher fighting value than the local troops and Arab auxiliaries encountered during the early stages of the expedition. The losses, in consequence, have been very severe.

The large increase of numbers due to the relief operations, and the heavy casualties, have evertaxed the administrative services, the expansion of which has not kept pace with the augmentation of the fighting force. The river, in the earlier operations, afforded an easy and efficient means of supply; but, as the force grew, the number of barges and steamers became inadequate both for the carriage of supplies and for the evacuation of the wounded. Construction could not keep level with requirements; a number of new barges were swamped in crossing the ocean; others were destroyed by hostile agents. The medical personnel, appliances, and dressings were short, with the result that the wounded could not be properly attended to, and the proportion of deaths was abnormally large. All these shortcomings were, of course, the result of the initial miscalculation which led to the campaign being undertaken too light-heartedly and with insufficient force; for, as in other instances, a fraction of the strength needed to repair failure would have ensured success at the outset.

As already observed, the Russian victory in Armenia has probably done something to relieve the situation by stopping the flow of Turkish reinforcements to the Tigris. Our Allies have rendered further assistance by defeating German intrigues in Persia, and dispersing the mercenary levies of Prince Henry of Reuss, both of which were a serious menace to our position in Mesopotamia. The advance of one of their columns from Kermanshah towards Baghdad should also have a salutary effect by causing the enemy disquietude for the safety of the city and of their line of retreat.

Towards the middle of January there were signs of the development of a German offensive on the Western front which culminated in the Battle of Verdun. Attacks of varying importance took place at seventeen different points, the chief of which were in Champagne (Jan. 9), north of Arras (Jan. 23), about Frise, on the Somme

(Jan. 28-29), and south-east of Ypres (Feb. 14). Concerning these it need only be observed that they were probably intended to distract attention, and, by frequent false alarms, to cause the French to hesitate about moving their reserves to meet the real attack until its nature should be established beyond doubt.

It has always been expected that the Germans would endeavour to return to the offensive in France, because it is on that front that they must seek a decision. The immense size and consequent extensive fronts of the main armies of the present day has made it practically impossible to destroy them in battle, as the Germans found when operating against the Russian armies last year. A defeat affects only a limited portion of the line, and can be remedied by retreating and reforming on a new alignment. As the Russians proved, this manœuvre can be repeated, if necessary, so long as there is sufficient space in rear of the armies. It has, therefore, become more necessary than in former times to aim at the heart of the enemy's country, usually his capital, the capture of which, apart from the moral effect produced, would dislocate the machinery of government and administration, and tend to discourage the nation and weaken resistance. The vast extent of Russia offers no such tangible objective. At the end of their twelvemonths' campaign the Germans were still 300 miles from Petrograd and more than 400 miles from Moscow. Paris, on the other hand, is comparatively accessible, while the country provides relatively little space for retreat.

These considerations, among others, defined France as the theatre in which the Germans must first seek a decision. The repulse of the Russian armies made Germany's eastern frontier temporarily secure. The Balkan campaign was an interlude, necessitated by the precarious position of the Turks. Behind it there were political aims of the first importance, which required the destruction of Serbia; but these might have waited. No decision that could be attained in the Balkans would bring the end of the war in sight; though the Germans probably hoped that the Turks, when relieved from their

* See Quarterly Review' for January 1916, pp. 229–230.