appears to have been made some months before with King Ferdinand, for the co-operation of the Bulgarian army after the harvest had been gathered in.

Although the Allied Governments failed to appreciate the full significance of the Balkan situation, attempts were made to turn it to advantage. The aspirations of Greece in Albania and Asia Minor, and of Roumania in Transylvania, were incentives to participation on the side of the Allies. But Roumania could not venture to embark on a war of uncertain duration while the possession of the Dardanelles by the Turks cut her off from outside sources of munition-supply. Greece appears to have been approached in February at the instance of M. Briand, who suggested an attack on Hungary by joint Allied, Greek, and Serbian forces. The occasion was opportune, for the Russians were threatening Hungary from the Carpathians. But the project fell through; the abortive negotiations with Bulgaria were resumed; and the attack on the Dardanelles was undertaken.

The probable objects and the expediency of the expedition were discussed at some length in the April and October issues of this Review. Information which has since been divulged throws some light on its genesis and management. Disclosures made in the House of Commons by Mr Churchill on Nov. 15 show that the idea of taking some action against Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean was originally suggested by Russia as a means of relieving the pressure in the Caucasus. Mr Churchill said:

'In consequence of these communications . . . I began to direct the attention of the First Sea Lord and other naval advisers to the possibilities of action in Turkish waters. The Dardanelles stood out as incomparably the most decisive operation that was open. Of course from the beginning we all recognised that a joint naval and military operation by surprise was the best way. . . .'

But, as no military force was available, the project of an unsupported naval attack was discussed. Lord Fisher, the responsible naval adviser of the Government, advised against using fighting ships for bombarding purposes except in conjunction with military operations.' Lord Fisher, it may be observed, had at his disposal the

Naval War Staff, a specially selected body of officers, analogous to the General Staff of the Army, who have made a special study of naval strategy and tactics, and whose duty it is to prepare plans for naval operations. It may, therefore, be inferred that Lord Fisher's opinion, apart from his own qualifications for forming a correct judgment, represented the best naval opinion. The advice was rejected, and other advisers were sought. Having given his opinion, and having been overruled on the advice of officers subordinate to him, Lord Fisher declined further to discuss the question at a War Council held on Jan. 28, at which plans which had been prepared at Mr Churchill's direction for carrying out the operation were considered and approved. Mr Churchill laid stress on that fact, which he regarded as implying acquiescence. The matter needs full investigation, for it is of vital importance that the position of the Government with respect to their naval and military advisers should be clearly defined. Mr Asquith, in a speech in the House on Nov. 2, disclosed the views and practice of the Government in the following words:

'You cannot determine your policy or your course of action entirely and exclusively by military considerations. . . . It is the duty of the Government to rely very largely on the advice of its military and naval counsellors, but . .

some

times it is necessary to run risks and encounter dangers which purely military or naval policy would warn you against.'

This being the ruling principle adopted by the Government, it is evident that the naval and military forces of the Crown may at any time be involved in wild or even disastrous enterprises through the advice of their naval or military counsellors being set aside by a civilian War Council,

When the troops came on the scene six weeks after the failure of the naval attack, the land operations were confined to one side of the Straits, presumably because the Allied Powers were not able at the time to provide a sufficient force to operate on both sides. The French contingent, which landed in the first instance on the Asiatic coast, was transferred, after repelling heavy attacks, to the Peninsula, where the small extent of

front, the natural strength of the position, and the security afforded by the sea on both flanks, enabled the Turks to hold large reserves in hand to meet fresh attacks, such as that at Suvla Bay on Aug. 6. Had it been possible to operate on both sides, the Allies would have had the best of the situation, because, with their ample facilities for transport, they could have reinforced either side more speedily than could the Turks. The advantage of surprise having already been lost, it might have been better to wait till a sufficient force could be provided for the double operation, than to run risks and encounter dangers' by attempting a doubtful enterprise. There is, indeed, some reason to suppose, from an unofficial statement, that the Greek army had been expected to co-operate, but that the arrangement fell through because the Allied Governments, in their negotiations at Sofia, had committed themselves to certain offers which precluded them from guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Greece, a condition on which the Greek Government insisted. Should this be true, it may be inferred that the original plan was based on the assumption that a Greek contingent would participate; but that, when this was not forthcoming, it was decided to proceed with the reduced forces available.

The invasion of Serbia completely changed the situation. The defeat of Turkey and the capture of Constantinople ceased to be possible objectives; and, after considerable delay, and the discussion of reports by Sir Charles Monro and Lord Kitchener, who were sent out successively to examine the local situation, the troops were withdrawn in December from the Suvla and Anzac positions. Those occupying the extremity of the Peninsula have now also retired, fortunately without loss. A very difficult operation has been carried out with great skill and remarkable success. But it remains a melancholy confession of complete and costly failure. The conquest of Serbia has for the time being given the Teutonic Powers the command of the Balkans and the Bosphorus, which it may prove as hard to wrest from them as to recover Belgium; harder, perhaps, on account of the difficulty of transporting large forces by sea, and the nature of the country and communications, which require special transport and mountain artillery.

It was disclosed by Sir Edward Carson in his letter to the Prime Minister, dated Oct. 12, resigning office in the Cabinet, that the General Staff advised against the despatch of a force to Salonika. This is not surprising, for it has been evident from the first that the defection of Greece made the force of 150,000 men asked for by M. Venizelos altogether inadequate to produce a decisive effect, and that much larger forces would be required to meet the German combination, when, as seemed inevitable, the Serbian army had been dispersed. Apart from other considerations, the conveyance of large numbers by sea is a slow operation. A great deal has been said and written about the achievements of our fleet and mercantile marine in transporting the large armies we have put in the field; and, perhaps because the achievement has been so great, it does not seem to be generally recognised that the capacity of sea-power in this respect is strictly limited. The value of sea-power in connexion with military operations-what has been called 'amphibious power-has been greatly modified by the conditions of present-day warfare. Its greatest asset is surprise. A force when once embarked disappears, and it can strike unexpectedly at any point suitable for landing. But the size of the force that can be conveyed in one trip is limited by the tonnage available. When several trips have to be made, the destination is disclosed; and, when the distance is great, sea-power only provides a slow and inadequate means of transport. The advanced force is liable to be defeated by superior numbers, or to be encircled by a 'steel wall.' On the other hand, even if ships are numerous, they can be quickly unloaded only at large ports, where ample anchorage and wharfage are available. The possible points for disembarkation are, therefore, likely to be few, and the actual destination may even be foreseen. Amphibious power, in fact, only has its full value when the enemy is comparatively weak, and liable to surprise. With the large armies of the present day such conditions can rarely exist. They did exist at the Dardanelles; and, even after the Allies' intentions had been disclosed by the naval attack, the Turkish force was not unmanageably large during the first two months of the land operations.

The situation at Salonika is obviously very different.

Instead of seizing the initiative by surprise, the Allies have had to follow the German lead; and the transport of the large forces necessary to reverse the situation, which is a heavy tax on the already overstrained mercantile marine, can only be effected by numerous trips. It is doubtful whether enough troops will have been assembled to take the offensive before the enemy are ready to attack the position at Salonika, with the object of driving the Allied force into the sea, or building it in with a 'steel wall.' It would be undesirable to consider too closely the probable course of the future operations; but they will presumably be based on concerted action with Russian and, possibly, Italian forces, based, respectively, on the Black Sea or the Danube, and the Adriatic.

As for the Germans, a defeat in the Near East is probably the thing they are most anxious to avoid; and they may be expected to exert all their energies to avert it, and to secure their position before the spring, when new Russian armies will claim all their attention on the eastern front. The rumours of a great influx of troops into France, which became current about the middle of December, were probably initiated by them with the object of stopping the transfer of French and British troops to Salonika. A German excursion to Mesopotamia, which has also been rumoured, can hardly have been seriously thought of; and, since the set-back experienced by General Townshend after the battle of Ctesiphon on Nov. 22, that region is more likely than ever to be left in the hands of the Turks. Egypt offers a more tempting objective; and, were it not for the Balkan situation, a German contingent might have been expected to take part in the attack for which the Turks have been preparing under German direction. For Egypt-the neck of the British Empire,' as Bismarck described it-is regarded by Germany as the most vulnerable and vital quarter in which the power of England can be assailed; and its restoration to the Ottoman Empire is supposed to be one of the terms of the alliance with Turkey. According to unofficial statements a railway designed to connect the Haifa branch of the Damascus-Medina line with the Syrian frontier was opened for traffic as far as Beersheba on Aug. 9; and a field railway and a pipeline are being pushed across the desert towards the Suez