6

We think, however, it is quite possible to enforce upon the attention of the companies the necessity of punctuality. Under the Act of 1871, already frequently cited, the Board of Trade may make ány inquiry with respect to any railway,' and require the production of any papers or returns they think fit. They can, therefore, at their discretion, demand from the companies, with or without the action of any of the public who may be aggrieved, returns of cases of 'habitual unpunctuality,' and may make reports upon such cases, and give such publicity to their reports as they deem desirable.

Unpunctuality is but one of the consequences of imperfect discipline, and by no means the most important. There are also to be considered the mistakes of servants, arising rather from inexperience and natural dulness than from want of discipline; but in these matters it would probably be impossible for the Commissioners or ourselves to make any practical suggestion which has not been already thoroughly tested or put into operation by the experienced officers of our railway companies.

In summing up the general result of the two and a half years' labour of the Commission, we would state that in our opinion the Commissioners have admirably succeeded in the first part of their duty, which was to inquire into the causes of accidents on railways; but have been unable to prove satisfactorily the possibility of removing any such causes by legislation.' The evidence distinctly points to the necessity of continuing to adhere, as closely as possible, to the policy of non-interference which has been so frequently and authoritatively affirmed in this country, but at the same time indicates that great improvements may be made both by the State and by the companies in the interests and for the safety of the public. Companies will now see the necessity of revising their regulations, so as to make them consistent with strict observance, and of redoubling their efforts to maintain the strictest possible discipline; whilst, on the other hand, the Board of Trade will extend their invaluable system of inspections and report, and the State will possibly acknowledge the advisability of revising the constitution of the Board of Trade inquiries into accidents, so as to combine thorough investigation with a judicial mode of procedure, without which much of their influence and usefulness is lost. It is also greatly to be desired that the working of the Court of the Railway Commissioners may be included in the full consideration of the whole question.

It will be gathered from the tenor of our remarks that thorough and searching inquiry into every alleged sin of omission and commission on the part of a railway company, and publicity to the report of the inspecting officers of the Government, are the remedies which we would substitute for the legislative interference recommended by the Commissioners. Cases of neglected maintenance,

unpunctuality, unreasonable delay in adopting the block system and continuous brakes, if in the opinion of the officers prejudicial to the public safety, should at once receive the utmost publicity.

If it be said that this, after all, is but a poor guarantee as compared with the legislation deemed necessary by the Commissioners, we would say that the influence of what is, in our opinion, the most important of all of the elements conducive to public safety has been entirely ignored by them, and that the omission invalidates their conclusions. The element of human fallibility has justly received the fullest consideration from the Commissioners, but surely it was no less essential for them to recognise the existence of the active living force 'human sensibility.' How constantly do we hear of accidents being prevented by the presence of mind, promptness, and energy of railway officials, and of porters and guards being cut to pieces in the attempt to save passengers from the consequences of their own imprudence. There appears no good reason to exclude the directors of railways from the possession of 'human sensibility,' even as we must admit that they are liable to 'human fallibility;' and instances might be adduced without number in proof of the presence and practical daily value on railways of the element 'human sensibility.' Yet in their report some of the Commissioners gravely assume that the companies actually balance the probable cost of railway collisions against the cost of works which would obviate them, and that they are guided in their decision by the appearance of the figures! If it is to be taken for granted that engine-drivers and guards are ready to lay down their lives, superintendents and managers to endure anxiety and mental anguish hardly less tolerable than death, and directors to incur the odium attached to a preventible accident, merely that an eighth per cent. greater dividend may be announced to the shareholders-then it must be concluded that the purchase of all the lines by Government, or a system of legislation infinitely more stringent and penal than that proposed by any of the Commissioners, can alone insure the public against the occurrence and consequences of frequent and preventible railway accidents.

JOHN FOWLER.

OUR ROUTE TO INDIA.

"NEVER to prophesy unless you know' is a wise rule for all writers on subjects connected with the vicissitudes of war, but especially for those whose vaticinations are liable to be falsified by events during the interval between composition and publication. Still there is one forecast with reference to the war now commenced in grim earnest which I can venture to make confidently; and that is, that the war, whenever and however it closes, will not leave things as they were previous to its inception. Putting aside the passing speculations of the hour, it seems to me as manifest as any unaccomplished fact can well be, that we are on the eve of a fundamental revolution in the affairs of Eastern Europe. We have come to the beginning of the end. In saying this I am not expressing an opinion whether the end is desirable or otherwise. Personally, I believe it would have been better for the world if the settlement of the Eastern Question could have been deferred for another generation. The prospect of Turkish rule over the Balkan peninsula being replaced by a Russian Protectorate affords me no satisfaction. But whether your sympathies are Turkophil or Russophil, whether you deem Turkey to be the victim of the most iniquitous of intrigues, or whether you hold Russia to be engaged in the holiest of crusades, I fail to see how you can shut your eyes to the patent fact that Ottoman rule in Europe is doomed. That this should be so does not indeed prove that it ought to be so. Good things as well as evil things have their day. Bulwarks of civilisation are no more immortal than remnants of barbarism. All I contend for is that, in Eastern Europe at any rate, the 'manifest destiny' is with the Christian as against the Moslem, with the Slav as against the Turk. It may be, though it scarcely seems to me within the region of probability, that Turkey may pull through the present crisis without absolute dismemberment of her Empire. But even on this hypothesis she can only owe her safety to the mutual jealousies of the Western Powers. It does not lie within the scope of this article to discuss the possible or probable arrangements which may be made at the conclusion of the war. As a matter of fact, however, it may be taken for granted that, whenever peace is made, Russia, whether in Europe or in Asia, will have taken a considerable step towards the overthrow of Ottoman rule, while Turkey will be left less able than

she has proved hitherto to present any formidable resistance to the advance of Russia. Even the most sanguine of believers in the regeneration of Turkey under constitutional government would admit that the proximate, if not the immediate, occupation of Constantinople by Russia lies within the domain of possibility. You do not insure your house against fire because you think it likely to be burnt down, but because you think it possible it may be burnt down. It is sufficient, therefore, for us, as a nation, to know that the command of the Bosphorus passing into the hands of Russia is a possibility, to make it incumbent upon us to consider in what mode we should insure ourselves against the dangers arising out of this possible contingency.

The first question, then, which suggests itself is what practical difference it would make to England if the Bosphorus passed, either nominally or virtually, from under the command of Turkey into that of Russia. I may say in passing that the conditions of the problem under consideration would be modified in degree rather than substance, if, as many persons imagine, the interests of Germany and Austria should compel them to preclude Russia from obtaining possession of Constantinople. If once a vigorous independent government, which the force of events might lead to cooperate with Russia, should be established on the Bosphorus, we should lose the protection afforded to our Indian possessions by the fact of the lands lying east and west of the channel dividing Europe and Asia being under the dominion of a friendly, inert, and unprogressive power. Mr. Bright asked triumphantly at Manchester why we should be affected by a war three thousand miles away. The obvious answer is that the most important possessions of the British Crown lie yet more than three thousand miles further to the East. Of course, if it is contended that our Indian Empire is not worth preserving, cadit quæstio. It would be entirely foreign to my purpose to argue this point. I must ask my readers to take for granted, as the basis of my argument, that the preservation of our dominion in the East is a matter of paramount importance to us, only less important, indeed, than the preservation of our national independence. I may be wrong in this assumption; but it is one which, whether right or wrong, is shared by the vast majority of Englishmen. I say, then, unhesitatingly, that the chief, though not the sole, concern we have in the settlement of the Eastern Question lies in the effect that settlement must produce on the security of our Indian possessions. A mere glance at the map serves to show how the Ottoman Empire, together with the adjacent Mussulman kingdoms, lies like a huge breakwater between Russia and India. We are often told that the only solution of the Eastern Question is to drive the Turks back into Asia. It may be so. But the notion which the authors of this theory seem to hold, that the Sultan could transfer the seat of empire to Damascus, or Bagdad, or Smyrna, or Heaven knows where,

is an utter delusion. Constantinople is the keystone of the arch which supports the crumbling edifice of the Ottoman Empire. Take that away, and the whole structure falls to pieces. To build up a new empire east of the Bosphorus is a task beyond the capabilities of the Turks. Whatever power holds Stamboul is, in virtue of all precedent, mistress of Asia Minor. No doubt Islam would be a force to be taken into account even if there were no caliph in existence; and there would still be Mohammedan States notwithstanding the fall of Turkey. But our own experience in India has shown us that isolated and disjointed Mohammedan communities cannot hold their own against a dominant European Power. Thus, if the Cross should ever replace the Crescent on St. Sophia, Russia, instead of being opposed in her advance towards India by the formidable strength of a great and united if decaying empire, would only be confronted by a number of isolated and disjointed States resembling those of Central Asia, which, from their want of cohesion as well as from their internal jealousies and divisions, must inevitably fall an easy prey to any civilised military Power. Of course I may be told, as we are now daily told by our public instructors, that Russia has no idea of attacking Constantinople, and would be guilty of absolute insanity if she were to entertain any such idea. For my purpose, however, it is sufficient to show that a Russian advance on the Bosphorus is within the domain of possibility, and that the almost certain result of the present war will be to remove some at least of the more serious obstacles which have hitherto barred the advance of Russia Stamboul-wards, whether on land or sea. Supposing the war should at its close leave the frontiers of Roumania extended to the Balkan under a Russian Protectorate, Russian territory increased in Asia Minor by the annexation of Armenia, and the free passage of the Bosphorus thrown open to Russian men-of-war, it would be impossible to dispute the fact that Russia had made a long step towards the dismemberment of Turkey and the seizure of Constantinople. And yet, in the event of Turkey being worsted in the coming campaign, such terms of peace as those I have indicated are the least that Russia is likely to demand. Thus, whether we like it or not, we are bound in common prudence to face the contingency that at no distant period Russia may command the head of the Euphrates valley by land, and the Bosphorus by sea. If once Constantinople passes directly or indirectly into the hands of an active maritime State, the chain of inland seas leading from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Azof must become home waters, so to speak, of the Power holding the Bosphorus. It is only the utter apathy and want of enterprise, especially on sea, characterising Ottoman rule, which has hindered Turkey from becoming the chief maritime Power of the Levant. Given the possession of the Bosphorus, and Russia would soon have an ironclad fleet in the Sea of Marmora, which could sail out at any moment and reach Port Said long before reinforcements could