All the decisions up to October 15, 1918, are fully considered in Pratt v. British Medical Assn., 35 T.L.R. 14.

I am, by no means, satisfied that the attempt to intimidate, made by the union in this case by a combination of its members which could make it very effective and which, of course, would be quite different from the act of any single individual, does not bring the case within the principles of Quinn v. Leathem, supra.

Without regard to our own special legislation, but having regard to our Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1907, ch. 20, which prohibits strikes except under certain conditions, the right of action, in my opinion, clearly exists.

It

If the employer had waited until a strike had actually taken place and then dismissed the plaintiffs the defendants would, by unlawful means, have accomplished their purpose. seems to me that the threat to do something unlawful to accomplish a purpose is in itself adopting an unlawful means for gaining the object.

The plaintiffs, having suffered damage by such unlawful acts, are entitled to maintain an action.

STUART, J. [The learned Judge first made an extended statement of facts of which the following is his summary: The plaintiffs were miners and had belonged to miners' unions for some years. A local union of the United Mine Workers of America had been formed in 1916 among the employees of The Rose Deer Mining Co. at Wayne, Alberta, and the plaintiffs were members of it. In February, 1917, one Tupper, the manager of the company, becoming dissatisfied with the actions of the union, closed the mine down. This the learned Judge thought was an illegal lockout within the meaning of The Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1907. The plaintiffs and some 14 other miners remained in Wayne and when the company opened again in about three weeks these men went to work with no union organization. The other men had all left. In March the plaintiffs received a very abusive and scurrilous anonymous letter calling them "scabs," etc. Gradually more men came to work and in July, 1917, a local union was again organized. This the two plaintiffs were

App. Div. 1919

Williams

V.

Local Union
No. 1562

U.M.W. of A.

Harvey, C.J.

App. Div. 1919

Williams

V.

No. 1562

twice asked to join but they refused until the matter of the anonymous letter was "cleared up." In October, Tupper told the plaintiffs that they would have to be discharged unless Local Union they fixed it up with the union as he had received word from U.M.W. of A. the union that there would be a strike if they continued to work. The plaintiffs were employed on piece work and were liable to discharge at any time. They were consequently discharged. Later on having received what they considered an apology regarding the anonymous letter they applied for admission to the union but were refused. The learned Judge. then proceeded.]

Stuart, J.

In the statement of claim it is alleged that the defendant local union No. 1562 is a body corporate, that the defendant Albert Young was a check weigh man and the other individual defendants miners and all members of the local union, that by the constitution of the local union it is provided that membership therein shall be open to individuals of any race, colour or creed; that prior to October 14, 1917, the plaintiffs had made application for admission as members in the local union in accordance with the constitution and by-laws and that the local union wrongfully, and in violation of the constitution and by-laws, refused to accept the plaintiffs as members whereby they had suffered damage, that they again made application on December 21 and were again wrongfully refused; that prior to October, 1917, the plaintiffs had been employed as coal miners by the Rose Deer Coal Mining Company and had, while in such employment, earned $8.50 a day on an average, that the individual defendants, of which there are six, while members of the local union about October, 1917, did "wrongfully and maliciously conspire together and combined with each other and with other persons unknown to the Plaintiffs to injure the Plaintiffs by depriving them of their employment and to induce the dismissal of the Plaintiffs from the employment of the Company and in pursuance of conspiracy and such combination did intimidate the said employer by objecting to the continued employment of the plaintiffs and by threatening to tie up the mine by going on strike in the event of their demand not being acceded to and did succeed in having the plaintiffs, without other justification or

excuse, discharged from the employment of the said Company, whereby the plaintiffs suffered damage:" It is further alleged that the defendant, the local union, in October, 1917, did "wrongfully and maliciously and unlawfully with intent to deprive the Plaintiffs of their employment as coal miners with the Company, notify the Company that the Plaintiffs could no longer be employed by the Company and that the Local Union objected to their further employment and did wrongfully and, in restraint of the continued exercise of their trade as coal miners, intimidate the Company by threatening a general strike and to tie up the production of the mining property of .he Company and did, thereby, succeed in inducing, without other cause, the dismissal of the plaintiffs whereby they suffered damage." The plaintiffs, therefore, claimed general damages of $1,000 against the local union for wrongful refusal to admit them as members, a declaration that they are entitled to be members and an order compelling their acceptance as such, general damages of $1,000 against both the union and the individual defendants for the other wrongs alleged and special damage against all the defendants for $871.25, being the wages they could have earned during the suspension of their employment. The union and the individual defendants joined in one defence which denied the alleged corporate character of the union and also specifically denied in detail all the allegations of the statement of claim. They also, as an alternative defence, alleged that the plaintiffs, while members of the union, had violated its constitution and by-laws and by their acts, caused the union. to become disorganized and defunct and that their conduct at all times was opposed to the best interests of the union. They also alleged that, whatever had been done by them, was done solely with intent to further the legitimate objects of the organization with which they were connected and not to injure the plaintiffs.

The case was tried by Mr. Justice Simmons without a jury and he gave judgment for each of the plaintiffs against each of the defendants, including the union, for $100 general damages and for $435.62 as damages for loss of wages. He did not deal at all, apparently, with the claim for admission to

17-A.L.R.

App. Div. 1919

Williams V.

Local Union

No. 1562

U.M.W. of A.

Stuart, J.

App. Div.

1919

Williams

V.

Local Union

No. 156

U.M.W. of A.

Stuart, J.

the union and this part of the action is practically dropped as there is no cross appeal.

We are here face to face with one of the serious problems of law connected with trades-unionism.

In the view I take of the case it is unnecessary to spend time in considering one matter much discussed upon the argument, namely, the status of the local union as a party to the action. I am inclined to the view that, in consequence of what occurred, in consequence of the union, without protest having appeared by its solicitor, and defended the action, and in consequence of such things as the use of a stamp which the union officials referred to in their evidence as a seal, the union ought not to be heard now, nor at the end of the trial, to say that they could not be sued. But I do not express any final opinion upon the matter.

Assuming the decision of this point to fall against the contention of the union I confess I find myself unable to see how it can, in the circumstances of this case, be of any assistance to the plaintiffs. Granting that the union can be sued as a party to the action on some such principle as was applied in Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] A.C. 426, 70 L.J.K.B. 905, 85 L.T. 149, then, in my opinion, it must be considered as an entity of some kind for all purposes. It seems to me that the Court ought not to treat it as such an entity in one breath for the purpose of saying it can be sued and then in the next breath, for the purpose of applying the principles of law invoked in the case, dissolve it into its parts and look thenceforth at the parts and not at the whole. If the union is to be made liable for damages and its funds attached by a judgment then surely it must, beyond all question, be for some act done by it as such entity and not for the individual acts of the persons who, together, constitute the entity. Whatever kind of a legal conception we entertain in regard to it, whatever legal character we ascribe to it in order to make it a "suable" party, if I may use the expression, I think that conception and that character must be adhered to throughout. Otherwise we wander in a fog and play fast and loose with legal principles.

App. Div. 1919

Williama

A partnership is liable, of course, for the acts of its individual members. But this is on the pure principle of agency. The trial Judge treated the union as the agent of the men. However that may be I do not think each member of the Local union could be called the agent of the union.

This being so what is the position? The local union is sued for damages. It must surely be for some act of the union as such. What is charged against the union? It is not charged with conspiracy. In par. 7 of the statement of claim which alone contains a charge against the union no mention is made of either a conspiracy or a combination of any kind. And even if the union, as a legal entity of some kind, were charged with conspiracy it seems to me to be clear that it would have to be charged that this single legal entity had conspired or combined with some other person or persons. A single person cannot be guilty of a conspiracy with himself. But as I say there is no suggestion at all in the statement of claim that this legal entity, the local union, had combined or conspired either with itself or with anyone else. How then, I feel obliged to ask myself, can combination and conspiracy be made in this case an element of legal liability on the part of the union?

There was much discussion about what was called a representative action. Here again, I think, one may assume, though I am not yet prepared to admit, that all the individual members of the union could be properly represented in an action against them as individuals, by the union, of which they were members, that is, that, for the mere purposes of the style of cause, the name of the union could be inserted as a defendant as representing all its individual members. Still, even in that case, the persons who are really defendants are the individuals and not, by any means, this legal entity, the union, which merely is chosen to represent them. As I have always understood the idea of a representative action some few individual members of a class are selected to represent that whole class but these, so selected, are themselves also charged with the wrong. Even if we were to extend the idea of representation so as to justify the insertion of the name of such an organiza

V.

Union

No. 1562 U.M.W. of A.

Stuart, J.