Page images
PDF
EPUB

Obregon, whose ideas, aims, and achievements are too little known in Europe. The balance of political power constituted the ultimate aim of Izvolsky's strivings Witte, convinced that the political aspect of the world's interests were the least important, included all the Continental Powers in his comprehensive plan for a pacific league which would transform Europe into a single federal State.

In virtue of that humanitarian aim and also of his intimate knowledge of Russia's lack of cohesion, Witte was a man of peace. War, he was wont to say, would be the ruin of his country; and the sole efficacious means of avoiding it was, to his thinking, to bring about a sincere alliance between Russia, whose vital interests were rooted in peace, and the two Powers in whose mutual hatred and ambitions lurked the only danger of hostilities. This conception, in the abstract, was specious and superlatively attractive; but whether the concrete conditions were such as to render it feasible may well be doubted. In any case the Russian statesman, like the Mexican President, deserves credit for instinctively making straight for the deepest and most powerful currents in the history of his time and seeking to connect with them those of his own country, and for descrying or divining, behind the clatter of official tongues and the noisy clamour of naive or knavish agitators, the dynamic forces which, as yet silent and well-nigh imper. ceptible, were steadily sapping the foundations of human society.

In his conversation with the Kaiser at Rominten, Witte opened his mind on the European situation in the following words:

[ocr errors]

'I declared. that, among the countries of the world, Europe seemed to me like a decrepit old woman. Unless a radical change is brought about, . . . Europe will soon have to yield her dominating place in the world to the mighty empires which are rising beyond the seas. The time is not far off . . . when this continent will be treated with that condescending respect which well-mannered people accord to venerable old age; and before the next few centuries are past, the greatness of Europe will be to the inhabitants of our planet what the grandeur of Rome, the glory of Greece, and the might of Carthage are to us' (p. 409).

But Izvolsky's efforts to preserve the balance of political power, as well as Witte's more ambitious and statesmanlike aims, were frustrated by Nicholas II. During his reign everybody who obtained a responsible post in the administration was estimated, not by his specific weight but by the degree of favour which he was supposed to enjoy with the Tsar himself or with some of the influential personages in his environment. And in nearly every case this reflected nimbus usurped the place of intellectual capacity and moral character. If one examines the gallery of political portraits of the reign of Russia's last sovereign, one is astounded at the piteous dwarfs who then passed for giants. Most of them received, together with their office, a ready-made reputation for what they were deemed capable of achieving. The ore of genius and of genuine talent was hardly ever hall-marked by the Autocrat; and without his stamp it had no currency in political circles.

There have been 'providential men' in the history of nations who seem appointed by destiny to ruin the Empires over which they preside. And among the classical examples, Louis XVI, Nicholas II, and Wilhelm II occupy foremost places in the annals of modern times. Such men, by their character, temperament, and mentality, contrive mechanically to raise to their highest power the main forces of disintegration, and to effect a wide breach in the dam which theretofore kept them confined and inoperative. The last ill-fated Tsar of all the Russias worked unwittingly and fatally in this direction almost from the day of his accession to the hour of his dethronement. His shiftiness, tergiversation, and cunning, his spasmodic acts which contradicted each other and left confusion worse confounded, his everchanging objects, his jealousy of superiority in his ministers, and above all else, his fatal gift of irritating those whom it was his duty and his interest to conciliate, qualified him for the office of executor of Fate.

E. J. DILLON.

Art. 13. THE TRI-UNE KINGDOM, POLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL.

I.

THE Armistice of November 1918 found the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in a very precarious situation. The relations with other States were difficult, but the internal condition of the Kingdom was still more so. During the three years which have elapsed con siderable progress has been made, and to-day, from both points of view, the position is distinctly improved.

At the beginning of 1919, the Tri-une Kingdom was recognised by the Great Powers; subsequently Treaties between it and Germany, Bulgaria, Austria, and Italy were concluded and ratified, while Treaties were made with Turkey and Hungary, which were not, however, ratified till much later. In accordance with the Treaty of St Germain (with Austria) the population of the basin of Klagenfurt were to declare by means of a plebiscite whether they should belong to Austria or to the Tri-une Kingdom. The plebiscite when taken proved unfavour able to us. It was taken in what was known as zone 'A' (to the south of the Wörtersee), which contains 1768 square kilometres of territory; about half the population went to the poll, 22,000 (or about 59 per cent.) voting for Austria, while some 15,000 (41 per cent.) voted for the Tri-une Kingdom. The majority in favour of Austria was 6747. This defeat was entirely unexpected, but the issue was placed beyond a doubt, and we have to accept the results. A majority of the population of the district voted for Austria; and, adherents as we are of the principle of self-determination, we raised no protest. It may, however, be remarked that the definition of the plebiscite zone was defective; if it had been confined to those districts in which the Slovenes are in the majority, the plebiscite would have gone in our favour. As it is, a Slovene population numbering at least 15,000 has been handed over to Austria, and the beautiful Alpine districts which they inhabit are lost to the Tri-une State.

The Treaty with Italy was, after long and vehement debate, concluded in Rapallo on Nov. 12, 1920, and speedily ratified. By it, Italy gained the districts of Gorizia,

Gradiska, Trieste, and Istria, as well as several islands in the Adriatic; and, in addition, she got possession of Zara in Dalmatia. Fiume with its surrounding district becomes independent, its frontiers marching with those of Italy. In concluding this treaty, the Tri-une Kingdom made heavy sacrifices, but it was felt that it was high time to put an end to our acrimonious and dangerous dispute with Italy. The treaty was followed by a diplomatic understanding of a very precise nature between Italy and ourselves, which aims at ensuring the exact execution of the Trianon Treaty (between the Entente and Hungary), and preventing the return of the Habsburgs.

These treaties, taken together, define the boundaries of the Tri-une Kingdom, except on the Albanian side. The frontier here remains as yet unsettled, and is a cause of much internal difficulty. It is devoutly to be hoped that it may be speedily defined. Mention should also be made of the treaty between ourselves and CzechoSlovakia, which ensures mutual defence against all who may endeavour to hinder the execution of the Treaty of Trianon. During the recent visit of Mr Také Jonescu to Belgrade, a similar treaty was concluded with Rumania, which is to be followed by a military convention. Finally, our former treaty with Greece still holds good.

So much for foreign relations. The internal condition of the Kingdom at the close of the year 1918 was fraught with numerous difficulties. Serbia, the predominating partner in the new State, had been carrying on war almost continuously for more than six years, for the last three of which her territory was occupied by the enemy. The land had been almost ruined and plundered of everything worth removing. A fifth of the population had perished. When the emigrants returned, they found a land in which the railways had been destroyed and the roads torn up, so that there were no means of communication. The mines and the factories were destroyed; the towns, in particular the capital, Belgrade, as well as Šabac and Smederevo, were devastated. Libraries and museums and many private houses had disappeared. Of the population that remained, a large number were suffering from wounds or disease and had neither hope nor energy left. The emigrants returning home found that life had to begin

over again, with everything necessary for agriculture and domestic purposes to be procured afresh. Obviously, therefore, Serbia was unable to take over immediately the part that naturally belonged to her in the formation of the new State. The war had also struck Montenegro very heavily. The remaining lands, particularly Croatia and Slovenia, had remained practically untouched during the war, and were better prepared to take part in the work of reconstruction.

In this essential duty, the first question which de manded an answer was, 'Where are we to begin? Should it be with the restoration of the devastated territories or the political constitution of the new State as a whole?' The temptation to begin with agriculture and industrial reconstruction was great, but again Serbia sacrificed herself for the general good. She set aside her internal needs and devoted herself to the laying of a foundation for the new State. In this matter, however, not only in Serbia, but in other parts of the Tri-une Kingdom, there were great difficulties, some of which, it must be confessed, were of our own making. Professional politicians in most countries are a mischievous element, and the Tri-une Kingdom is no exception to this rule. Party passions and personal rivalries have risen very high during the last three years. They had their origin even during the war, when, at the sittings of the exiled Skupshtina in Corfu, two political parties, the Radicals and the Independents, waged a bitter quarrel, a quarrel only embittered and further confused when the Jugo Slav Committee, whose work in other respects may claim many merits, began to share in the petty party differences of Serbian politicians.

But, in addition to this internal trouble, there were other difficulties for which we were not to blame. The chief cause of these was the quarrel with Italy, which occupied fully two years. Internal conditions are always influenced by external, but the effect was necessarily more serious than usual in our case. The quarrel over the Adriatic hindered all progress and prevented any domestic reorganisation. No progress towards this end could be made while so serious an uncertainty in our foreign relations remained open. To clear up the political situation a General Election was required; but in order

« PreviousContinue »