influence, even in a democratic country like Bulgaria. In spite, however, of the very strong hostility of the other political groups and of their criticism of his prolonged European tour, this legislation, which includes a statute instituting compulsory labour, has in no way robbed the Premier of the confidence of his own Party. Indeed, when M. Stambolisky and his colleagues formally resigned in February and during the Peasant Conference which represented the organised Peasant Party at Sofia, they were immediately re-elected to office, notwithstanding the fact that the Opposition had raised a doubt as to what would be the standpoint assumed by that gathering.

With regard to the future, there are two questions of great significance. It is essential, primarily, whether he be in power or in opposition, that M. Stambolisky should realise the necessity for moderation, temperateness, and good judgment; and that, bearing in mind the recent trend of historical events in Greece, he should never lose sight of the facts that a one-man régime is a dangerous expedient, and that experienced and balanced politicians have their ways of bringing about the fall of leaders to whom they are opposed. In the second place, if we ignore, as I must here ignore, the difficulty in which Bulgaria is placed by her obligation to recruit the army by voluntary enlistment, and the fairness or unfairness of the solutions maintained or adopted in regard to Macedonia and the Dobrudja, there are still the questions of Western Thrace and of Bulgarian commercial access to the Egean. The position in regard to these questions is remarkable; for whilst, under the Treaty of Neuilly, Bulgaria definitely agreed to her frontiers with Roumania and Jugo-Slavia, she renounced her Egean coastal strip of territory in favour of the principal Allied and Associated Powers (including the United States), whose settlement as to this territory she undertook to accept. This area was subsequently handed over to Greece by the abovementioned unpublished Treaty or by the Treaty of Sèvres, to neither of which documents America was or is a party.

Whatever be the Allied decision upon the larger and broader aspects of this question, a Bulgarian access to

the Egean, guaranteed by the Treaty of Neuilly, has been again recognised. Nevertheless, to those who know the Balkans, it must be obvious that, as the pre-war outlet possessed by Serbia at Salonica was unsatisfactory to that country, so will be the Bulgarian exit upon the Ægean unless, and at least until, that exit is really and directly maintained under Allied control. Such control is, however, foreseen in the above-named unpublished Treaty, for by Article 16, Bulgaria has the right to demand from ́ the Council of the League of Nations the appointment of an International Commission responsible for the proper execution of the arrangements about Dédéagatch. This demand may, or may not, have been made; but in any case I believe that Bulgaria is still compelled to export and import her goods only by way of her Black Sea and Danubian ports. Such a restriction, which hampers the trade of that country, is also disadvantageous to Western Europe, for it delays the arrival and increases the cost of the Bulgarian cereals of which we are in need. Consequently, unless there is to be territorial revision in regard to Western Thrace, especially as Bulgaria has now become a member of the League, it is to be hoped that an early opportunity will be taken to facilitate her trade by its natural route down the Maritza Valley, and that something will be done to give her that free use of a port which has been promised. The adoption of such measures will not only be in accordance with justice, but it will tend to increase the chances of Balkan peace.

The position in Turkey and in Greece, and the final attitude of the Powers towards the Treaty of Sèvres, are so obscure that it is useless here to dogmatise upon these questions. Indeed, although at one time it seemed possible that the Near Eastern Conference, which met in London on Feb. 21, would be able to come to an immediate and definite decision upon these all-important subjects, things are changing so rapidly from day to day, that I shall only attempt briefly to allude to the situations which I found existing in Constantinople, in the Smyrna area, and in Athens, pointing out in as few

* Bulgaria was admitted as a member of the League of Nations at Geneva on Dec. 16, 1920, by a majority of 35 votes to 2.

words as possible the meaning of these positions and their effect upon the future trend of political events in this part of the world.

To begin with, in theory there are, or were, two Turkeys-Constantinople, and the greater part of Anatolia. The former area, the one with which I am now directly concerned, extends only just beyond the Chatalja Lines and in Asia roughly up to Ismid. As defined by the Treaty of Sèvres, Turkey in Europe thus includes merely European Constantinople and its immediate precincts, which have an area of about 1500 square miles and a population of approximately 1,200,000 souls. On the other hand, whilst almost the whole of Anatolia, to the east of a line drawn more or less south approximately from Broussa to the Mediterranean, forms nominally a second Turkey under the Nationalists, the Hellenic Army is in occupation of a large zone over and above the Smyrna area allotted to Greece under the Treaty. The whole country is, therefore, in chaos and, so to speak, in the melting-pot; for whereas the Constantinople Government has signed, and could be compelled to stand by, the Treaty of Sèvres, most of, if not all, its members, together with practically the entire Turkish population, are in sympathy with, and prepared to support, Mustapha Kemal Pasha and the Angora party. This state of things, which was clearly demonstrated by the attitude adopted by the two Delegations who attended the London Conference, means that we can now take Turkey as being represented by one policy-the policy of so-called Nationalism.

There are two distinct aspects of the Treaty of Sèvres which are worthy of consideration-the fairness and the wisdom of originating that document and the honesty or the desirability of revising it. Knowing well the difficulties and the dangers besetting any solution of the Ottoman problem, and realising that there are two sides to any question, I feel decidedly that this international instrument was both unjust and ill-advised. Whilst an enemy may not be entitled to be dealt with on the basis of equity, the Treaty was unjust because it does not fulfil the policy defined by Mr Lloyd George and implied by Mr Wilson; because there is good reason Vol. 235.-No. 467.

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