already used to that, and must continue to hope for better times in future years.

The moment at which these proposals were made (June 1917) was one of great activity in Turkey. It had been decided at the Headquarters of the Central Powers that Bagdad must be retaken, and the Germans sent Falkenhayn to supervise the operations. Large quantities of rolling stock, mainly Belgian, and of material generally, were despatched to Turkey, the question of payment being postponed till the close of hostilities. German troops poured into Constantinople. Large stocks of munitions were accumulated at Haidar Pasha, to be the base of the new enterprise. But on Sept. 2, 1917, a terrific explosion, or rather series of explosions, accompanied by fire, entirely destroyed the Port of Haidar Pasha and all that was therein. This catastrophe to the German arms has been variously ascribed to a bomb dropped from an aeroplane, to incendiary action on the part of some Allied agent, and to accident. Whatever its cause, the Entente had no greater stroke of luck. We shall probably never know the full cost in lives or money of this catastrophe. The Mesopotamian Expedition was thereupon abandoned. While continuing to control and direct the political and military activities of Turkey, the Germans decided to attempt no further adventures in the East and merely to mark time,' holding as many British troops as possible in Mesopotamia and Palestine, but reserving their chief effort for the West.

Thus, the Bagdad Railway, from being a factor of the first importance, became the feeder of a 'side-show.' It was allowed to struggle on in a bankrupt condition, sustained only by the supply-without payment by the military authorities of rolling stock, material, and labour. This last was particularly useful in the Taurus, where the through line with its tunnel system was opened in time to be of service to Allenby's Army arriving from Egypt. But the Bagdad Railway during the last year of the War lived from hand to mouth, and can be regarded as to all intents and purposes part of the Anatolian Railway working almost exclusively for the Army. After the foregoing balance sheet for 1916, which was published in the summer of 1917, no further Vol. 285.-No. 467.

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accounts or reports were produced. The portion of the line near Bagdad appeared irretrievably lost. That near Aleppo fell into Allenby's hands, and was administered by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force till it was handed over to the French. The separation between the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways became effective; for the former was now controlled by the British in Constantinople and the latter by the French in Aleppo.

It may be asked what will be the future of the enter prise which once set half Europe by the ears? The Anatolian Railway is commercially sound; and should Asia Minor obtain the stable government it needs, Anatolia will take its proper place as one of the great granaries of the world. The Cilician plain, if properly administered, could not only rival but even might excel all other cotton-growing areas. Its harbours are few and indifferent, so that, should the difficulties involved in the maintenance of the Taurus Tunnel system not prove insuperable, the railway from Konia southwards, including the connexion between Aleppo and the coast, may prove successful under its new name, the 'SyriaCilicia Railway.' At the other end, the development of Mesopotamia and the movement of its produce towards its natural embouchure on the Persian Gulf will be facilitated by the existence of a railway from Bagdad to the coast and, though a pipe-line can do much, railway connexion with the coast is a natural requirement of the Mosul oilfields. But between Mosul and Alexandretta lie some four hundred miles of country, most of it mountain or desert; and now that the events of the War have placed Mesopotamia under British control, it is natural that a sea-faring people should seek to develop it down the valley of the Two Rivers to the nearest sea. Turkey ruled the land but not the sea; it was necessary for her to cross half a continent to evade British sea-power and British control of the Suez Canal. But it is improbable that under

and

* It would never pay to bring goods from Cilicia by Konia to Constanti nople or Smyrna. All such goods must go by sea from Cilicia. The only use of the Taurus Tunnel is to carry goods from the south-eastern part of the plateau to, Cilician harbours and vice versa.

ordinary circumstances, even given a stable administration, it should ever be financially worth while to te complete and work the line from Aleppo eastwards. When Asia Minor and Syria on the one side and Mesopotamia on the other have been developed, then the question may arise.

There are enough possibilities in these lands to occupy all the capital available. They have never been properly administered since Roman days. Gradual development of natural resources will succeed; but ambitious and showy Trans-Continental ventures have been proved a snare and delusion. Speedy TransContinental communication will, in future, be made by air; and, though the Bosphorus may be bridged or tunnelled, the world does not need a through express from Vienna, Paris, or Ostend to the Persian Gulf.

A. D. C. RUSSELL.