As

the justice, or his belief in the justice, of his Client's cause. a reason why he may do this, though he believe otherwise, it is said that no promise to speak the truth was given, or supposed to be given. But we reply by asking, If there is no mutual understanding that he shall speak truly, to what purpose does he speak, or to what purpose do the judges hear?

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By those who contend for such indulgence to Advocates, it is alleged, that the Profession of Advocate exists as an instrument for the administration of Justice in the Community; and that it is a necessary maxim of the Advocate's Profession, that he is to do all that can be done for his Client. It is urged, that the application of Laws is a matter of great complexity and difficulty: that the right administration of them in doubtful cases is best provided for, if the arguments on each side be urged with the utmost force, and if the Judge alone decide which side is in the right; that, for this purpose, each Advocate must urge all the arguments he can devise, and must enforce them with all the skill he can command. It is added, to justify the Advocate, that, being the Advocate, he is not the Judge ;-that it is not his office to determine on which side Justice is; and that therefore his duty, in his office, is not affected by his belief on this subject.

And if the

"In reply to these considerations, the Moralist may grant that it is likely to answer the ends of Justice in a community, that there should exist a Profession of Advocates, ready to urge, with full force, the arguments on each side in doubtful cases. Advocate, in his mode of pleading and exercising his profession, allows it to be understood that this is all that he undertakes to do, he does not transgress his Duties of Truth and Justice, even in pleading for a bad cause; since, even for a bad cause, there may be arguments, and even good arguments. But if, in pleading, he assert his belief that his cause is just, when he believes it unjust, he offends against Truth; as any other man would do who, in like manner, made a like assertion. Nor is it conducive to the ends of justice, that every man, however palpably unjust his cause be, should have such support to it.

"To the argument, that the Advocate is not the Judge, and therefore that he is not responsible for his judgment on the merits of the case, the Moralist will reply, that every man is, in an unofficial sense, by being a moral agent a Judge of right and wrong, and an Advocate of what is right; and is, so far, bound to be just in his judgments, and sincere in his exhortations. This general character of a moral agent he cannot put off, by putting on any professional character. Every man, when he advocates a case in which morality is concerned, has an influence upon his hearers, which arises from the belief that he shares the moral

sentiments of all mankind. This influence of his supposed morality is one of his possessions; which, like all his possessions, he is bound to use for moral ends. If he mix up his character as an Advocate with his character as a Moral Agent, using his moral influence for the Advocate's purpose, he acts immorally. He makes the Moral Rule subordinate to the Professional Rule. He sells to his Client, not only his skill and learning, but himself. He makes it the Supreme Object of his life to be, not a good man, but a successful Lawyer.

"If it be alleged, that, by allowing the difference of his professional and unprofessional character to be seen in his pleading, the Advocate will lose his influence with his hearers; the Moralist will reply, that he ought not to have an influence which arises from a false representation of himself; and that, if he employ the influence of his unprofessional character, he is bound, in the use of it, to unprofessional Rules of Duty.

"The Advocate must look upon his Profession, like every other endowment and possession, as an Instrument, which he must use for the purposes of Morality. To act rightly is his proper object to succeed as an Advocate is a proper object, only so far as it is consistent with the former. To cultivate his Moral being is his highest end; to cultivate his Professional eminence is a subordinate aim.

"But further; not only is the Advocate to cultivate and practise his profession in subordination to moral ends, and to reject its Rules where they are inconsistent with this subordination; but moreover, there belong to him moral ends which regard his Profession; namely, to make it an Institution fitted to promote Morality. He must seek so to shape its Rules, and so to alter them if need be, that they shall be subservient to the Rules of Duty. To raise and purify the character of the Advocate's profession, so that it may answer the ends of justice, without requir ing insincerity in the Advocate, is a proper aim for a good man who is a Lawyer; -a purpose on which he may well and worthily employ his efforts and his influence." — Vol. 1., pp. 282 –

285.

The lamentable carelessness and levity with which otherwise conscientious men and women often treat the preliminaries to the marriage contract, the rashness with which the most sacred of promises is frequently made, the breach of that promise in multiplied instances because it ought never to have been made, attach a deep solemnity of interest to the passages which follow.

"Promises of Marriage often give rise to doubts and fears; for

the Promise implies much; - no less than affection and general community of interests during a whole life. A person may well hesitate before giving such a promise, and having given it, may fear whether he is not engaging for more than he can perform. But on the other hand, the Promise, sincerely given, leads to its own fulfilment; for affection grows, in virtue of the confidence which such an engagement establishes between the parties; the marriage union adds new ties to those which drew them together; and the progress of a well conducted married life makes conjugal affection continue as a habit.

"But the intention of fulfilling the engagement in this sense, and the belief of a power to do so, can alone render it right to make the Promise. A Promise of Marriage, though made, cannot morally be carried into effect by him who does not intend thus to perform the engagement, or who despairs of doing so. If, before the Marriage takes place, he find the germ of conjugal affection wanting in his heart, the course of Duty is, to withdraw from entering upon the immoral condition of a mere external conjugal union. But still, in doing this, he violates a most serious Relative Duty to the person thus deceived. She may have to accuse him of no less an injury than the blighted hopes and ruined happiness of her whole life. To a man of any moral feeling, or even of any natural feeling, the remorse of having done such a wrong, by the promise of affection and livelong companionship, must be intense. And his shame also must be profound: for he may be supposed to have well examined his heart before he made the promise; and if his affections be so dark to himself, or so fickle, that, in spite of his self-examination, he has remained so long in error, and has been led to such a false step at last; how can he hope ever to be justified in making a like engagement with another person? A life of remorse and shame would be the proper sequel to such a fault.

"Without there being an absolute Promise of Marriage, there are often manifest suggestions of such a common purpose, between man and woman, which lead to difficulties of the same. kind. In all countries, and especially in countries in which men and women are left free, in a great measure, to choose for themselves their partners in married life, marriage is the great event of life; it is the point to which the thoughts and imaginations, the hopes and designs, of the young of both sexes, constantly tend. This is still more particularly the case with women; inasmuch as their social position depends mainly upon that of the husband. Hence, the manner and behaviour of young men and young women have a frequent reference, tacit or open, to the possibility

of engagements of marriage among them. Conversation, of almost any kind, may disclose features of character and disposition, by which one heart may be drawn to another; and indications of such inclination may be given, in all degrees, from the slightest to the most marked. Among such a variety of elements, it may often be doubtful how far such marks of preference, on the one side and on the other, may be equivalent to an Offer of Marriage, or to an Engagement. Nor can any general Rule be laid down; for much must depend upon the conventions of society. But we may say, in general, that Morality requires of us a most serious and reverent estimate of the marriage state, and of the union of heart and community of moral purpose by which the parties ought to be drawn together. Any behaviour, therefore, which, while it appears to tend to such a purpose, is really frivolous and unmeaning, or prompted only by vanity, or love of amusement, is at variance with Duty. Such behaviour is a very unfit portion of a life which has our Moral Culture for its constant purpose; and which looks upon the prospect of marriage, and the tone of intercourse with women, as means to this end."- Vol. 1., pp. 287-290.

Cases of necessity are next discussed, cases in which one is prompted to violate common rules and duties under the pressure of extreme danger or fear, whether for himself or others. It is useless to lay down maxims of conduct for such cases; for the course which an individual will take under a sudden emergency will depend for the most part on his previous moral culture, on the intensity of his regard for the class of duties which self-preservation or sympathy with the person endangered would tempt him to violate. But when under such circumstances an essentially immoral act is committed, the moral nature receives a severe shock, and the moral progress is for the moment suspended. Yet the shock may be transient, and the progress may be resumed with but brief interruption; for a temptation, which is not likely to recur, and which was yielded to in a paroxysm of dread, will probably do much less harm than a temptation to some transgression of far inferior magnitude, met and yielded to in the common course of the daily life. Sometimes the violation of common rules in a case of necessity is connected with signal self-devotion and self-sacrifice. It then becomes an heroic act, and may be attended with manifestations of character which will compel the admiration of the sternest moralist, while still, as it violates these general rules of mo

rality, which cannot be regarded with excessive reverence, he is unable to present it for approval and imitation.

Ignorance and error are often deemed to render wrong actions excusable. The first question, however, is, whether the ignorance or the error was unavoidable, or whether it resulted from the neglect of the duty of self-culture, or from the lack of investigation or caution as to the case in hand. In the latter alternative, the wrong action deserves no less censure than if it had been committed with full consciousness of the wrong, though the blame attaches itself to antecedent steps rather than to the ultimate act. Unavoidable ignorance or error may exist either with reference to the external facts which furnish the occasion for the wrong action, or with reference to the supreme law of actions as applicable to the case in hand. Ignorance or mistake as to facts which we have not the means of knowing, even though it leads to deeds essentially wrong, can imply no personal guilt, nor can it do any injury to the moral nature. The man who purchases stolen goods, under circumstances not adapted to excite suspicion as to their ownership, incurs neither blame nor harm. But ignorance of the law of duty, however involuntary, if not blameworthy, still is not harmless. It implies a suspended or inverted moral culture; and the wrong acts which flow from such ignorance tend to cloud over the conceptions of right and duty, to deepen vicious tendencies of the moral nature, and to lead the individual farther and farther from that conformity to the supreme law in which consists the supreme good. Thus in the divine government we recognize the workings of those cardinal maxims of human jurisprudence, "Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia juris non excusat."

Nations and communities, as well as individuals, have their own standards of right and wrong, more or less conformed to the supreme law; and these standards are generally progressive, as, with growing intelligence, moral conceptions gradually become clearer and clearer. We can conceive of no settled human society, without the distinct and well established conception of the general rights of person and property. Equally essential is the conception of the State, as legitimate ly sovereign and the guardian of individual rights. But the state may be invested with its supremacy and sacredness, before rights in general are distinctly defined and circum