their characters; a particular sedateness in their conversation and behaviour, that qualifies them for council, with a great intrepidity and resolution that fits them for action. They are all of them men of concealed fire, that doth not break out with noise and heat in the ordinary circumstances of life; but shows itself sufficiently in all great enterprises that require it. It is true, the general upon the Rhine hath not had the same occasions as the others to signalize himself; but if we consider the great vigilance, activity, and courage, with the consummate prudence, and the nice sense of honour which appears in that prince's character, we have great reason to hope, that as he purchased the first success in the present war, by forcing into the service of the confederates an army that was raised against them in the very heart of the empire, he will give one of the finishing strokes to it, and help to conclude the great work which he so happily begun. The sudden check that he gave to the French army, the last campaign, and the good order he established in that of the Germans, look like the happy presages of what we may expect from his conduct. I shall not pretend to give any character of the generals on the enemy's side; but I think we may say this, that, in the eyes of their own nation, they are inferior to several that have formerly commanded the French armies. If then we have greater numbers than the French, and at the same time better generals, it must be our own fault if we will not reap the fruit of such advantages.

It would be loss of time to explain any further our superiority to the enemy in numbers of men and horse. We see plainly that we have the means in our hands, and that nothing but the application of them is wanting. Let us only consider what use the enemy would

make of the advantage we have mentioned, if it fell on their side; and is it not very strange that we should not be as active and industrious for our security, as they would certainly be for our destruction? But before we consider more distinctly the method we ought to take in the prosecution of the war, under this particular view, let us reflect a little upon those we have already taken in the course of it for these six years past.

The allies, after a successful summer, are too apt, upon the strength of it, to neglect their preparations for the ensuing campaign, while the French leave no art nor stratagem untried to fill up the empty spaces of their armies, and swell them to an equal bulk with those of the confederates. By this means our advantage is lost, and the fate of Europe brought to a ́second decision. It is now become an observation, that we are to expect a very indifferent year after a very successful one. Blenheim was followed by a summer that makes no noise in the war. Ramillies, Turin, and Barcelona, were the parents of our last campaign. So many dreadful blows alarmed the enemy, and raised their whole country up in arms. Had we on our side made proportionable preparations, the war by this time had been brought to a happy issue. If, after having gained the great victories of Blenheim and Ramillies, we had made the same efforts as we should have done had we lost them, the power of France could not have withstood us.

In the beginning of the winter we usually get what intelligence we can of the force which the enemy intends to employ in the campaigns of the succeeding year, and immediately cast about for a sufficient number of troops to face them in the field of battle. This, I must confess, would be a good method, if we were

engaged in a defensive war. We might maintain our ground with an equal number of forces; but our business is not only to secure what we are already in possession of; we are to wrest the whole Spanish monarchy out of the hands of the enemy; and, in order to it, to work our way into the heart of his country by dint of arms. We should therefore put forth all our strength, and without having an eye to his preparations, make the greatest push that we are able on our own side. We are told that the enemy at present thinks of raising threescore thousand men for the next summer: if we regulate our levies in that view, we do nothing; let us perform our utmost, as they do, and we shall overwhelm them with our multitudes. We have it in our power to be at least four times as strong as the French; but if ten men are in war with forty, and the latter detach only an equal number to the engagement, what benefit do they receive from their superiority?

It seems therefore to be the business of the confederates to turn to their advantage their apparent odds in men and horse; and by that means to out-number the enemy in all rencounters and engagements. For the same reason it must be for the interests of the allies to seek all opportunities of battle, because all losses on the opposite side are made up with infinitely more difficulty than on ours; besides, that the French do their business by lying still, and have no other concern in the war than to hold fast what they have already got into their hands.

The miscarriage of the noblest project that ever was formed in Europe, can be ascribed to nothing else but our want of numbers in the several quarters of the war. If our armies on all sides had begun to busy and insult the enemy, at the same time that the

forces marched out of Piedmont, Toulon had been at present in the hands of the duke of Savoy. But could that prince ever have imagined that the French would have been at liberty to detach whole armies against him? or will it appear credible to posterity, that, in a war carried on by the joint force of so many populous and powerful nations, France could send so great a part of its troops to one seat of the war, without suffering in any of the rest? whereas it is well known, that, if the duke of Savoy had continued before Toulon eight days longer, he had been attacked by an army of sixty thousand men, which was more than double the number of his own; and yet the enemy was strong enough every where else to prevent the confederates from making any impression upon them. However, let us fall into the right measures, and we may hope that the stroke is only deferred. The duke of Savoy hath secured a passage into Dauphiny, and if the allies make such efforts in all parts, as we may reasonably expect from them, that prince may still make himself master of the French dominions on the other side of the Rhone.

There is another part of our conduct which may perhaps deserve to be considered. As soon as we have agreed with the states-general upon any augmentation of our forces, we immediately negotiate with some or other of the German princes, who are in the same confederacy, to furnish out our quota in mercenaries. This may be doubly prejudicial to the alliances; First, as it may have an ill influence on the resolutions of those princes in the diet of the empire, who may be willing to settle as small a quota as they can for themselves, that they may have more troops to hire out; and, in the next place, as it may hinder them from contributing the whole quota which

they have settled. This actually happened in the last campaign, when we are told the Germans excused themselves for their want of troops upon the Rhine, as having already put most of their forces into the British and Dutch service. Such an excuse, indeed, is very unjust, but it would be better to give them no occasion of making it; and on such occasions to consider what men are apt to do, as well as what they may do with reason.

It might therefore be for our advantage that all the foreign troops in the British pay should be raised in neutral countries. Switzerland, in particular, if timely applied to, might be of great use to us; not only in respect of the reinforcements which we might draw from thence, but because such a draught of forces would lessen the number of those that might otherwise be employed in the French service. The bulk of our levies should nevertheless be raised in our own country, it being impossible for neutral states to furnish both the British and Dutch with a *sufficient number of effective men; besides, that the British soldiers will be more at the disposal of their general, and act with greater vigour under the conduct of one for whom they have so just a value, and whom they do not consider only as their leader, but as their countryman. We may likewise suppose that the soldiers of a neutral state, who are not animated by any national interest, cannot fight for pay with the same ardour and alacrity as men that fight for their prince and country, their wives and children.

It may likewise be worth while to consider whether the military genius of the English nation may not fall by degrees, and become inferior to that of our neighbouring states, if it hath no occasion to exert itself. Minds that are altogether set on trade and profit, of