in Virginia who owed money to British merchants, should be exonerated from their debts, if they paid the money due into the public treasury instead of sending it to Great Britain; and all such as stood indebted, were invited to come forward and give their money, in this manner, towards the support of the contest in which America was then engaged." Now, according to the principles of Paley, these Virginian planters would have been justified, in foro conscientiæ, in defrauding the British merchants of the money which was their due. It is quite clear that the "design and intention of the law was to allow the fraud-the planters were even invited to commit it; and yet the heart of every reader will tell him, that to have availed themselves of the legal permission, would have been an act of flagitious dishonesty. The conclusion is therefore distinct that legal decisions respecting property, are not always a sufficient warrant for individual conduct. To the extreme disgrace of these planters it should be told, that although at first, when they would have gained little by the fraud, few of them paid their debts into the treasury, yet afterwards many large sums were paid. The Legislature offered to take the American paper money and as this paper money, in consequence of its depreciation, was not worth a hundredth part of its value in specie, the planters, in thus paying their debts to their own government, paid but one pound instead of a hundred, and kept the remaining ninety-nine in their own pockets! Profligate as these planters and as this Legislature were, it is pleasant for the sake of America to add, that in 1796, after the Supreme Court of the United States had been erected, the British merchants brought the affair before it, and the judges directed that every one of these debts should again be paid to the rightful creditors.

It might be almost imagined that the moral philoso

pher designed to justify such conduct as that of the planters. He says, when a man “refuses to pay a debt of the reality of which he is conscious, he cannot plead the intention of the statute, unless he could show that the law intended to interpose its supreme authority to acquit men of debts of the existence and justice of which they were themselves sensible."* Now the planters could show that this was the intention of the law, and yet they were not justified in availing themselves of it. The error of the moralist is founded in the assumption, that there is “supreme authority” in the law. Make that authority, as it really is, subordinate, and the error and the fallacious rule which is founded upon it, will be alike corrected.

In applying to the law of the land as a moral guide, it is of importance to distinguish its intention from its letter. The intention is not, indeed, as we have seen, a final consideration, but the design of a legislature is evidently of greater import, and consequent obligation, than the literal interpretation of the words in which that design is proposed to be expressed. The want of a sufficient attention to this simple rule, occasions many snares to private virtue, and the commission of much practical injustice. In consequence, partly of the inadequacy of all language, and partly of the inability of those who frame laws, accurately to provide for cases which subsequently arise, it happens that the literal application of a law, sometimes frustrates the intention of the legislator, and violates the obligations of justice. Whatever be the cause, it is found in practice, that courts of law usually regard the letter of a statute rather than its general intention; and hence it happens that many duties devolve upon individuals. in the application of the laws in their own affairs. If legal courts usually decide by the letter, and if decis* Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. iii, p. 1, c. 4.

ion by the letter often defeats the objects of the legislator and the claims of justice, how shall these claims be satisfied except by the conscientious and forbearing integrity of private men? Of the cases in which this integrity should be brought into exercise, several examples will be offered in the early part of the next Essay.

CHAPTER II.

THE LAW OF NATURE.

Its authority-Limits to its authority-Obligations resulting from the rights of Nature-Incorrect ideas attached to the word Nature.

We here use the term, the law of nature, as a convenient title under which to advert to the authority, in moral affairs, of what are called natural instincts and natural rights.

"They who rank pity among the original impulses of our nature, rightly contend that when this principle prompts us to the relief of human misery, it indicates the divine intention and our duty. Indeed, the same conclusion is deducible from the existence of the passion, whatever account be given of its origin. Whether it be an instinct or a habit, it is in fact a property of our nature which God appointed.'*

I should reason similarly respecting natural rights -the right to life-to personal liberty-to a share of the productions of the earth. The fact that life is given us by our Creator-that our personal powers and mental dispositions are adapted by Him to personal liberty-and that He has constituted our bodies so as * Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 3, p. 2, c. 5.

to need the productions of the earth, are satisfactory indications of the Divine will, and of human duty.

So that we conclude the general proposition is truethat a regard to the law of nature, in estimating human duty, is accordant with the will of God. There is little necessity for formally insisting on the authority of the law of nature, because few are disposed to dispute that authority, at least when their own interests are served by appealing to it. If this authority were questioned, perhaps it might be said that the expression of the Divine will tacitly sanctions it, because that expression is addressed to us under the supposition that our constitution is such as it is; and because some of the Divine precepts appear to specify a point at which the authority of the law of nature stops. To say that a rule is only in some cases wrong, is to say, that in many it is right to which may be added the consideration, that the tendency of the law of nature is manifestly beneficial. No man questions that the "original impulses of our nature" tend powerfully to the wellbeing of the species.

In speaking of the instincts of nature, we enter into no curious definitions of what constitutes an instinct. Whether any of our passions or emotions be properly instinctive, or the effect of association, is of little consequence to the purpose, so long as they actually subsist in the human economy, and so long as we have reason to believe that their subsistence there is in accordance with the Divine will.

But the authority of the law of nature, like every other authority, is subordinate to that of the moral law. This indeed is sufficiently indicated by those reasonings which show the universal supremacy of that law. Yet it may be of advantage to remember such expressions as these: "Be not afraid of them that kill the body, and after that have no more that they can

do.

But fear him which, after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell.''* This appears distinctly to place an instinct of nature in subordination to the moral law. The "fear of them that kill the body," results from the instinct of self-preservation; and by this instinct we are not to be guided when the Divine will requires us to repress its voice.

Parental affection has been classed amongst the instincts. The' declaration, "He that loveth son or . daughter more than me, is not worthy of me," clearly subjects this instinct to the higher authority of the Divine will; for the "love" of God is to be manifested by obedience to his law. Another declaration to the same import subjects also the instinct of selfpreservation: "If a man hate not (that is by comparison) his own life also, he cannot be my disciple."|| And here it is remarkable, that these affections or instincts are adduced for the purpose of inculcating their subordination to the moral law.

Upon one of the most powerful instincts of nature, the restraints of revelation are emphatically laid. Its operation is restricted, not to a few of its possible objects, but exclusively to one; and to that one upon an express and specified condition.S

The propriety of holding the natural impulses in subjection to a higher law, appears to be asserted in this language of Dugald Stewart: "The dictates of reason and conscience inform us, in language which it is impossible to mistake, that it is sometimes a duty to check the most amiable and pleasing emotions of the heart; to withdraw, for example, from the sight of those distresses which stronger claims forbid us to relieve, and to deny ourselves that exquisite luxury which arises from the exercise of humanity." Even

* Luke xii. 4. Luke xiv. 26. See Matt. v. 28.

† Dr. Price.

Matt. x. 37.

I Cor. vi. 9. vii. 1, 2.

Gal. v. 19, etc.