enquiry or thought in the writer's mind the transition is immediate, from the idea of the doctrine to the punishment of those who adopt it.

Now the "evil" which is thus prohibited, is, any thing and all things discordant with the Divine will; so that the unsophisticated meaning of the rule is, that nothing which is contrary to the Christian law may be done for the sake of attaining a beneficial end. Perhaps the breach of no moral rule is productive of more mischief than of this. That "the end justifies the means," is a maxim which many, who condemn it as a maxim, adopt in their practice: and in political affairs it is not only habitually adopted, but is indirectly, if not openly, defended as right. If a senator were to object to some measure of apparent public expediency, that it was not consistent with the moral law, he would probably be laughed at as a fanatic or a fool; yet perhaps some who are flippant with this charge of fanaticism and folly may be in perplexity for a proof. If the expressed will of God is our paramount law, no proof can be brought; and in truth it is not often that it is candidly attempted. I have not been amongst the least diligent enquirers into the moral reasonings of men, but honest and manly reasoning against this portion of Scripture I have never found.

Of the rule, not to do evil that good may come,' Dr. Paley says, that it "is, for the most part, a salutary caution." A person might as well say that the rule

not to commit murder" is a salutary caution. There is no caution in the matter, but an imperative law. But he proceeds :-"Strictly speaking, that cannot be evil from which good comes."'* Now let the reader consider :-Paul says, "You may not do evil that good may come :" Ay, but, says the philosopher, if good does come, the acts that bring it about are NOT evil. What * Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 2. c. 8.

the apostle would have said of such a reasoner, I will not trust my pen to suppose. The reader will perceive the foundation of this reasoning. It assumes that good and evil are not to be estimated by the expressions of the will of God, but by the effects of actions. The question is clearly fundamental. If expediency be the ultimate test of rectitude, Dr. Paley is right; if the expressions of the Divine will are the ultimate test, he is wrong. You must sacrifice the one authority or the other. If this will is the greater, consequences are not if consequences are the greater, this will is not. But this question is not now to be discussed: it may however be observed that the interpretation which the rule has been thus made to bear, appears to be contradicted by the terms of the rule itself. The rule of Christianity is, evil may not be committed for the purpose of good the rule of the philosophy is, evil may not be committed, except for the purpose of good. Are these precepts identical? Is there not a fundamental variance, an absolute contrariety between them? Christianity does not speak of evil and good as contingent, but as fixed qualities. You cannot convert the one into the other by disquisitions about expediency. In morals, there is no philosopher's stone that can convert evil into good with a touch. Our labors, so long as the authority of the moral law is acknowledged, will end like those of the physical alchymist: after all our efforts at transmutation, lead will not become gold—evil will not become good. However there is one subject of satisfaction in considering such reasonings as these. They prove, negatively, the truth which they assail; for that against which nothing but sophistry can be urged, is undoubtly true. The simple truth is, that if evil may be done for the sake of good, all the precepts of Scripture which define or prohibit evil are laws no longer; for that cannot in any rational use of language be

called a law in respect of those to whom it is directed, if they are at liberty to neglect it when they think fit. These precepts may be advices, recommendations, "salutary cautions" but they are not laws. They may suggest hints, but they do not impose duties.

With respect to the legitimate grounds of exceptions or limitation in the application of this rule, there appear to be few or none. The only question is, What actions are evil? Which question is to be determined, ultimately, by the will of God.

BENEVOLENCE AS IT IS PROPOSED IN THE CHRIS

TIAN SCRIPTURES.

In enquiring into the great principles of that moral system which the Christian revelation institutes, we discover one remarkable characteristic, one pervading peculiarity by which it is distinguished from every other-the paramount emphasis which it lays upon the exercise of pure Benevolence. It will be found that this preference of "Love" is wise as it is unexampled, and that no other general principle would effect, with any approach to the same completeness, the best and highest purposes of morality. How easy soever it be for us, to whom the character and obligations of this benevolence are comparatively familiar, to perceive the wisdom of placing it at the foundation of the moral law, we are indebted for the capacity not to our own sagaciousness, but to light which has been communi. cated from heaven. That schoolmaster the law of Moses never taught, and the speculations of philosophy never discovered, that love was the fulfilment of the moral law. Eighteen hundred years ago this doctrine. was a new commandment.

Love is made the test of the validity of our claims to the Christian character-“ By this shall all men know

that ye are my disciples."* Again, "Love one another. He that loveth another hath fulfilled the law.

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this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witnesss, Thou shalt not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. Love worketh no ill to his neighbor; therefore love is the fulfilling of the law." It is not therefore surprising that after an enumeration, in another place, of various duties, the same dignified apostle says, "Above all these things put on charity, which is the bond of perfectness." The inculcation of this benevolence is as frequent in the Christian Scriptures as its practical utility is great. He who would look through the volume will find that no topic is so frequently introduced, no obligations so emphatically enforced, no virtue to which the approbation of God is so specially promised. It is the theme of all the apostolic exhortations, that with which their morality begins and ends, from which all their details. and enumerations set out and into which they return."§ "He that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him." More emphatical language cannot be employed. It exalts to the utmost the character of the virtue, and, in effect, promises its possessor the utmost favor and felicity. If then, of faith, hope and love, love be the greatest; if it be by the test of love that our pretentions to Christianity are to be tried; if all the relative duties of morality are embraced in one word, and that word is love; it is obviously needful that, in a book like this, the requisitions of benevolence should be habitually regarded in the prosecution of its enquiries. And accordingly the reader will sometimes be invited to sacrifice inferior considerations to these * John xiii. 35. † Rom. xiii. 9. Col. iii. 14. ? Evid. Christianity, p. 2. c. 2. 1 John iv. 16,

requisitions, and to give to the law of love that paramount station in which it has been placed by the authority of God.

It is certain that almost every offence against the relative duties, has its origin, if not in the malevolent propensities, at least in those propensities which are incongruous with love. I know not whether it is possible to disregard any one obligation that respects the intercourse of man with man, without violating this great Christian law. This universal applicability may easily be illustrated by referring to the obligations of Justice, obligations which, in civilized communities, are called into operation more frequently than almost any other. He who estimates the obligations of justice by a reference to that benevolence which Christianity prescribes, will form to himself a much more pure and perfect standard than he who refers to the law of the land, to the åpprehension of exposure, or to the desire of reputation. There are many ways in which a man can be unjust without censure from the public, and without violating the laws; but there is no way in which he can be unjust without disregarding Christian benevolence. It is an universal and very sensitive

test.

He who does regard it, who uniformly considers whether his conduct towards another is consonant with pure good will, cannot be voluntarily unjust; nor can he who commits injustice do it without the consciousness, if he will reflect, that he is violating the law of love. That integrity which is founded upon love, when compared with that which has any other basis, is recommended by its honor and dignity as well as by its rectitude. It is more worthy the man as well as the Christian, more beautiful in the eye of infidelity as well as of religion.

It were easy, if it were necessary, to show in what manner the law of benevolence applies to other relative