VIRTUE. The definitions which have been proposed of virtue have necessarily been both numerous and various, because many and discordant standards of rectitude have been advanced; and virtue must, in every man's system, essentially consist in conforming the conduct to the standard which he thinks is the true one. This must be true of those systems, at least, which make virtue consist in doing right.-Adam Smith indeed says, that "Virtue is excellence; something uncommonly great and beautiful, which rises far above what is vulgar and ordinary."* By which it would appear that virtue is a relative quality, depending not upon some perfect or permanent standard, but upon the existing practice of mankind. Thus the action which possessed no virtue amongst a good community, might possess much in a bad one. The practice which "rose far above" the ordinary practice of one nation, might be quite common in another: and if mankind should become much worse than they are now, that conduct would be eminently virtuous amongst them which now is not virtuous at all. That such a definition of virtue is likely to lead to very imperfect practice is plain; for what is the probability that a man will attain to that standard which God proposes, if his utmost estimate of virtue rises no higher than to an indeterminate superiority over other men? Our definition of virtue necessarily accords with the principles of morality which have been advanced in the preceding chapter: Virtue is conformity with the Standard of Rectitude; which standard consists, primarily, in the expressed will of God. Virtue, as it respects the meritoriousness of the agent, is another consideration. The quality of an *Theo. Mor. Sent. action is one thing, the desert of the agent is another. The business of him who illustrates moral rules, is not with the agent, but with the act. He must state what the moral law pronounces to be right and wrong but it is very possible that an individual may do what is right without any virtue, because there may be no rectitude in his motives and intentions. He does a virtuous act, but he is not a virtuous agent. Although the concern of a work like the present is evidently with the moral character of actions, without reference to the motives of the agent; yet the remark may be allowed, that there is frequently a sort of inaccuracy and unreasonableness in the judgments which we form of the deserts of other men. We regard the act too much, and the intention too little. The footpad who discharges a pistol at a traveller and fails in his aim, is just as wicked as if he had killed him; yet we do not feel the same degree of indignation at his crime. So, too, of a person who does good. A man who plunges into a river and saves a child from drowning, impresses the parents with a stronger sense of his deserts than if, with the same exertions, he had failed. -We should endeavor to correct this inequality of judgment, and in forming our estimates of human conduct, should refer, much more than we commonly do, to what the agent intends. It should habitually be borne in mind, and especially with reference to our own conduct, that to have been unable to execute an ill intention deducts nothing from our guilt; and that at that tribunal where intention and action will be both regarded, it will avail little if we can only say that we have done no evil. Nor let it be less remembered, with respect to those who desire to do good but have not the power, that their virtue is not diminished by their want of ability. I ought, perhaps, to be as grateful to the man who feelingly commiserates my sufferings but cannot relieve them, as to him who sends me money or a physician. The mite of the widow of old was estimated even more highly than the greater offerings of the rich. CHAPTER V. SCRIPTURE. The morality of the Patriarchal, Mosaic, and Christian dispensations-Their moral requisitions not always coincident— Supremacy of the Christian morality-Of variations in the Moral Law-Mode of applying the precepts of Scripture to the questions of duty-No formal moral system in ScriptureCriticism of Biblical morality-Of particular precepts and general rules-Matt. vii. 12.—1 Cor. x. 31.—Rom. iii. 8.— Benevolence, as it is proposed in the Christian Scriptures. THE MORALITY OF THE PATRIARCHAL, MOSAIC AND CHRISTIAN DISPENSATIONS. One of the very interesting considerations which are presented to an enquirer in perusing the volume of Scripture, consists in the variations in its morality. There are three distinctly defined periods, in which the moral government and laws of the Deity assume, in some respects, a different character. In the first, without any system of external instruction, he communicated his will to some of our race, either immediately or through a superhuman messenger. In the second, he promulgated, through Moses, a distinct and extended code of laws, addressed peculiarly to a selected people. In the third, Jesus Christ and his commissioned ministers, delivered precepts, of which the general character was that of greater purity or perfection, and of which the obligation was universal upon mankind. That the records of all these dispensations contain declarations of the will of God, is certain that their moral requisitions are not always coincident, is also certain; and hence the conclusion becomes inevitable, that to us, one is of primary authority;-that when all do not coincide, one is paramount to the others. That a coincidence does not always exist, may easily be shown. It is manifest, not only by a comparison of precepts and of the general tenor of the respective records, but from the express declarations of Christianity itself. One example, referring to the Christian and Jewish dispensations, may be found in the extension of the law of Love. Christianity, in extending the application of this law, requires us to abstain from that which the law of Moses permitted us to do. Thus it is in the instance of duties to our "neighbor," as they are illustrated in the parable of the Samaritan.* Thus too, in the sermon on the mount: "It hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy: but I say unto you, Love your enemies."† It is indeed sometimes urged that the words "hate thine enemy," were only a gloss of the expounders of the law but Grotius writes thus-"What is there repeated as said to those of old, are not the words of the teachers of the law, but of Moses; either literally or in their meaning. They are cited by our Saviour as his express words, not as interpretations of them."‡ If the authority of Grotius should not satisfy the reader, let him consider such passages as this: "An Ammonite or a Moabite shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord. Because they met you not with bread and with water in the way, when ye came forth out of Egypt. Thou shall not seek their peace nor their prosperity all thy days for ever."§ This is not coincident † Matt. v. 43. Deut. xxiii. 3, 4, 6. *Luke x. 30. Rights of War and Peace. with, "Love your enemies;" or with, "Do good to them that hate you;" or with that temper which is recommended by the words, "to him that smiteth thee on one cheek, turn the other also."'* "Pour out thy fury upon the heathen that know thee not, and upon the families that call not on thy name,'-is not coincident with the reproof of Christ to those who, upon similar grounds, would have called down fire from heaven.|| "The Lord look upon it and require it,'t-is not coincident with, "Lord, lay not this sin to their charge."S "Let me see thy vengeance on them, "SS" Bring upon them the day of evil, and destroy them with double destruction," ¶is not coincident with "Forgive them, for they know not what they do."'** : Similar observations apply to swearing, to polygamy, to retaliation, to the motives of murder and adultery. And as to the express assertion of the want of coincidence - The law made nothing perfect, but the bringing in of a better hope did." "There is verily a disannulling of the commandment going before, for the weakness and unprofitableness thereof." If the commandment now existing is not weak and unprofitable, it must be because it is superior to that which existed before. ++ But although this appears to be thus clear with respect to the Jewish dispensation, there are some who regard the moral precepts which were delivered before the period of that dispensation, as imposing permanent obligations: they were delivered, it is said, not to one peculiar people, but to individuals of many; and, in the persons of the immediate survivors of the deluge, *Matt. v. 39. ‡‡ Heb. vii. 18. ** Luke, xxiii. 34. Jer. x. 25. 22 Jer. xx. 12. Luke, ix. 54. tt Heb. vii. 19. |