are we then to be told that the revelations from the Deity have conveyed no moral knowledge to man? that they make no act obligatory which was not obligatory before? that he who had the fortune to discover that "whatever is expedient is right," possessed a moral law just as perfect as that which God has ushered into the world, and much more comprehensive?

III. If some subordinate rule of conduct were proposed-some principle which served as an auxiliary moral guide I should not think it a valid objection to its truth, to be told that no sanction of the principle was to be found in the written revelation: but if some rule of conduct were proposed as being of universal obligation, some moral principle which was paramount to every other and I discovered that this principle was unsanctioned by the written revelation, I should think this want of sanction was conclusive evidence against it because it is not credible that a revelation from God, of which one great object was to teach mankind the moral law of God, would have been silent respecting a rule of conduct which was to be an universal guide to man. We apply these considerations to the doctrine of expediency: Scripture contains not a word upon the subject.

IV. The principles of expediency necessarily proceed upon the supposition that we are to investigate the future, and this investigation is, as every one knows, peculiarly without the limits of human sagacity: an objection which derives additional force from the circumstance that an action, in order to be expedient,

must be expedient on the whole, at the long run, in all its effects, collateral and remote.''* I do not know whether, if a man should sit down expressly to devise a moral principle which should be uncertain and difficult in its application, he could devise one that would *Mor. and Pol. Phil. B. 2, c. 8.

be more difficult and uncertain than this. So that, as Dr. Paley himself acknowledges, "It is impossible to ascertain every duty by an immediate reference to public utility." The reader may therefore conclude with Dr. Johnson, that "by presuming to determine what is fit and what is beneficial, they presuppose more knowledge of the universal system than man has attained, and therefore depend upon principles too complicated and extensive for our comprehension: and there can be no security in the consequence when the premises are not understood."†

V. But whatever may be the propriety of investigating all consequences collateral and remote," it is certain that such an investigation is possible only in that class of moral questions which allows a man time to sit down and deliberately to think and compute. As it respects that large class of cases in which a person must decide and act in a moment, it is wholly useless. There are thousands of conjunctures in life in which a man can no more stop to calculate effects collateral and remote, than he can stop to cross the Atlantic: and it is difficult to conceive that any rule of morality can be absolute and universal, which is totally inapplicable to so large a portion of human affairs.

VI. Lastly, the rule of expediency is deficient in one of the first requisites of a moral law-obviousness and palpability of sanction. What is the process by which the sanction is applied? Its advocates say, the Deity is a benevolent Being: as he is benevolent himself, it is reasonable to conclude he wills that his creatures should be benevolent to one another: this benevolence is to be exercised by adapting every action to the promotion of the "universal interest" of man: Whatever is expedient is right:" or, God wills that we should consult expediency.-Now we say that † B. 6, c. 12. † Western Isles.

there are so many considerations placed between the rule and the act, that the practical authority of the rule is greatly diminished. It is easy to perceive that the authority of a rule will not come home to that man's mind, who is told, respecting a given action, that its effects upon the universal interest is the only thing that makes it right or wrong. All the doubts that arise as to this effect are so many diminutions of the sanction. It is like putting half a dozen new contingencies between the act of thieving and the conviction of a jury; and every one knows that the want of certainty of penalty is a great encouragement to offences. The principle too is liable to the most extravagant abuse or rather extravagant abuse is, in the present condition of mankind, inseperable from its general adoption. "Whatever is expedient is right," soliloquizes the moonlight adventurer into the poultry-yard: "It will tend more to the sum of human happiness that my wife and I should dine on a capon, than that the farmer should feel the satisfaction of possessing it ;" and so he mounts the hen-roost. I do not say that this hungry moralist would reason soundly, but I say that he would not listen to the philosophy which replied, "Oh, your reasoning is incomplete: you must take into account all consequences collateral and remote; and then you will find that it is more expedient, upon the whole and at the long run, that you and your wife should be hungry, than that hen-roosts should be insecure."

It is happy, however, that this principle never can be generally applied to the private duties of man. Its abuses would be so enormous that the laws would take, as they do in fact take, better measures for regulating men's conduct than this doctrine supplies. And happily too, the Universal Lawgiver has not left mankind without more distinct and more influential perceptions

of his will and his authority, than they could ever derive from the principles of expediency.

But an objection has probably presented itself to the reader, that the greater part of mankind have no access to the written expression of the will of God: and how, it may be asked, can that be the final standard of right and wrong for the human race, of which the majority of the race have never heard? The question is reason

able and fair.

We answer then, first, that supposing most men to be destitute of a communication of the Divine will, it does not affect the obligations of those who do possess it. That communication is the final law to me, whether my African brother enjoys it or not. Every reason by which the supreme authority of the law is proved, is just as applicable to those who do enjoy the communication of it, whether that communication is enjoyed by many or by few; and this, so far as the argument is concerned, appears to be a sufficient answer. If any man has no direct access to his Creator's will, let him have recourse to eternal fitnesses,” or to "expediency;" but his condition does not affect that of another man who does possess this

access.

But our real reply to the objection is, that they who are destitute of Scripture, are not destitute of a direct communication of the will of God. The proof of this position must be deferred to a subsequent chapter; and the reader is solicited for the present, to allow us to assume its truth. This direct communication may be limited, it may be incomplete, but some communication exists; enough to assure them that some things are acceptable to the Supreme Power, and that some are not; enough to indicate a distinction between right and wrong; enough to make them moral agents, and

If

reasonably accountable to our common Judge. these principles are true, and especially if the amount of the communication is in many cases considerable, it is obvious that it will be of great value in the direction of individual conduct. We say of individual conduct, because it is easy to perceive that it would not often subserve the purposes of him who frames public rules of morality. A person may possess a satisfactory assurance in his own mind, that a given action is inconsistent with the Divine will, but that assurance is not conveyed to another, unless he participates in the evidence upon which it is founded. That which is wanted in order to supply public rules for human conduct, is a publicly avouched authority; so that a writer, in deducing those rules, has to apply, ultimately, to that standard which God has publicly sanctioned.

CHAPTER III.

SUBORDINATE STANDARDS OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

Foundation and limits of the authority of subordinate
moral rules.

The written expression of the Divine will does not contain, and no writings can contain, directions for our conduct in every circumstance of life. If the precepts of Scripture were multiplied a hundred or a thousand fold, there would still arise a multiplicity of questions to which none of them would specifically apply. Accordingly, there are some subordinate authorities, to which, as can be satisfactorily shown, it is the will of God that we should refer. He who does refer to them and regulate his conduct by them, conforms to the will of God.

To a son who is obliged to regulate all his actions by